JAS, List,
We must not forget that a sign needs to be considered in the context of semiosis in actu if we want to become determinate as to which sign aspects take what value on each of the trichotomies. For only that what contributes to the result, i.e. the responding sign, takes part in the semiotic process we study (See Hulswit’s A semiotic account of causation.) With regard to the dynamical object the tokens ‘man’ and ‘homme’ both can be regarded as of the same type, just as the spoken and written forms of ‘there’ can be regarded as the same type, although this probably is not the rule. I agree that with regard to what the terms connote, respectively English, French language with man and homme and written, spoken form with ‘there’ they are definitely regarded as of different type. Best, Auke van Breemen Van: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 17:50 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances Auke, List: According to the second long quote that I provided below from Peirce, "man" and "homme" are one and the same Sign, consistent with his statement elsewhere that "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904). I understand his emphasis here to be on "thing" (Brute Actuality), rather than "real." My question remains whether "man" and "homme" are also one and the same Type, or two different Types of the same Sign. Again, I now lean toward the latter. The three-letter sequence, m-a-n, is "a definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written English. The five-letter sequence, h-o-m-m-e, is "a definitely significant Form" that an individual Token must embody (at least approximately) in order to serve as an actual Instance of the Type in written French. To me, these different specifications for Instances imply different Types. Thanks, Jon S. On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 10:22 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: JAS, List, I am referring to aspects of signs when I am using terms like token, type and symbol. It is not the same sign, it is of the same type, symbol combination, ruled by the symbolic aspect, not the token, qualisign aspects. A habit of interpretation Is involved. Whether or not something(s) is the same sign (what for the qualisign/token aspects?) is a complicated question. So I would substitute on aspect level. Best, Auke van breemen Van: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 16:51 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances Auke, List: It is comforting to learn that I am not alone in wrestling with this question. Based on your analysis below, would you characterize the written versions of "man" and "homme" as two different Types of the same Sign, or two different _____ of the same Type? If the latter, what term fills the blank? Again, I am not referring here to actual individual Instances/Tokens, but to the one word "man" in written English and the one word "homme" in written French. Thanks, Jon S. On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 8:45 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@chello.nl <mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: JAS, list, I have been considering the same question. My conclusion is that a type originally is based on similarity. From an evolutionary point of view this probably is the first form. But If symbols are around that are based on the same type although the tokens that gave rise to the type differ, we may have imposed in our interpretation habit similarity to those different type/tokens. Thus, although at first sight the types differ, our habit of interpretation takes them as the same. From some point of view this is a similarity relation. For instance already all those different letter types handwritten, printed or on the screen, regarded as the same, already pull in the direction of a tolerant way in dealing with similarity. Best, Auke van Breemen Van: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > Verzonden: donderdag 24 januari 2019 15:15 Aan: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> Onderwerp: [PEIRCE-L] Signs, Types, Tokens, Instances List: At the risk of initiating the kind of terminology-focused discussion that has prompted complaints from certain quarters in the past, I am seeking input on a specific issue that has been causing me some mild consternation. The following passage provides what I consider to be Peirce's clearest definitions for Type, Token, and Instance. CSP: A common mode of estimating the amount of matter in a MS. or printed book is to count the number of words. There will ordinarily be about twenty the's on a page, and of course they count as twenty words. In another sense of the word "word," however, there is but one word "the" in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token ... In order that a Type may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies. I propose to call such a Token of a Type an Instance of the Type. Thus, there may be twenty Instances of the Type "the" on a page. (CP 4.537; 1906) Peirce's illustrative example here (and elsewhere) is "the," which is both one word in written English as a Type and twenty words on a printed page as Instances; i.e., Tokens of the Type. Now, consider what he wrote a few years earlier about a "representamen," which at that time he explicitly defined as a generalization of "sign," writing a few months later that "A Sign is a Representamen with a mental Interpretant" (CP 2.273, EP 2:273; 1903). CSP: The mode of being of a representamen is such that it is capable of repetition. Take, for example, any proverb. "Evil communications corrupt good manners." Every time this is written or spoken in English, Greek, or any other language, and every time it is thought of, it is one and the same representamen. It is the same with a diagram or picture. It is the same with a physical sign or symptom. If two weathercocks are different signs, it is only in so far as they refer to different parts of the air. A representamen which should have a unique embodiment, incapable of repetition, would not be a representamen, but a part of the very fact represented ... "Evil communications corrupt good manners" and Φθείρουσιν ἢθη χρήσθ' όμιλίαι κακαί are one and the same representamen. (CP 5.138, EP 2:203; 1903) According to this passage, the same Sign can be written, spoken, or thought in a given language; and it can also be written, spoken, or thought in different languages. For example, the written, spoken, and thought versions of "man" in English and "homme" in French are six distinct ways of embodying the same Sign. The many individual occasions when and where each is actually written, spoken, or thought are clearly Instances of a Type--but are they all Instances of the same Type, or Instances of six different Types of the same Sign? I previously thought the former, but now find myself inclined toward the latter--which would entail that many of my recent posts require careful revision accordingly. A Sign itself is indifferent to how it is embodied, but Peirce described a Type as "a definitely significant Form," which suggests to me a certain set of characters that something must possess in order to serve as an Instance of the Type within a particular Sign System. In written English, the recognizable three-letter sequence m-a-n is required for any Instance of "man" as a Type, even though aspects such as font, size, and color can (and do) vary widely. The alternative is to say that the written, spoken, and thought versions of "man" in English and "homme" in French are six different _____ of the same Type. What would fill the blank here? As far as I can tell, Peirce never coined any such term. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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