This post points to semiotics, cosmology, and perhaps physics as well. Peirce is writing from his own universalistic Christian, quasi-mystical perspective. It would be reductionist to regard this as soluble without inferring the context he was writing from.
On Tue, Jan 29, 2019 at 9:19 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > List: > > Today I took a look at a couple of the manuscripts for discarded drafts of > "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism." One of them included the > following about a Type. > > > > CSP: In the latter sense, which is by far the more important sense, a > "word" does not exist: it has a higher mode of being than existence, since > it is a form that imparts utility to the existing matter in which it gets > embodied. I term any sign having the mode of being of a form a *type* … > (R 292:[18]) > > > > This is reminiscent of Peirce's assertion that "a sign is not a real > thing. It is of such a nature as to exist in *replicas*" (EP 2:303; > 1904). It also matches his published description of a Type as "a > definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537; 1906). As I have discussed at > length before, during that time frame he generally associated "the mode of > being of a form" with 1ns, although there are other contexts where he > associated "form" with 3ns. In this case, he went on to make additional > pertinent remarks after drawing a parallel between a thought as a Type and > a "thinking" as a Token. > > > > CSP: It frequently happens that the distinctions between the immediate > object of a type, the type itself, and its immediate interpretant become > all but evanescent, and this is especially true of thought considered as a > type. I think there are slight distinctions; but I have no occasion to > dwell upon them at present. (R 292:[19]) > > > > The Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant are likewise associated > with 1ns, at least relative to the Dynamic Object and Dynamic Interpretant > as 2ns, and (in my view) the General Object and Final Interpretant as 3ns. > The "evanescence" of their distinctions from the Type itself is consistent > with my suggestion that they correspond to that which its Instances *possibly > could* denote and signify, respectively, in accordance with the Type's > definition within the Sign System to which it belongs. Moreover, aligning > the Type with Form as 1ns and (presumably) its Instances with Matter as 2ns > clarifies why Peirce elsewhere aligned the Sign itself with Entelechy as > 3ns. > > > > CSP: This *Entelechy*, the third element which it is requisite to > acknowledge besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together > ... and we infer that wherever Matter becomes determined to a Form it is > through a sign. Much that happens certainly happens according to Natural > Law; and what is this Law but something whose being consists in its > determining Matter to Form in a certain way? ... It is to be observed that > a sign has its being in the *power* to bring about a determination of a > Matter to a Form ... (NEM 4:295-300; 1904) > > > > What is the Form to which a Sign is capable of determining a Matter? A > *Type*. What is the Matter that the Sign is capable of determining to > that Form? A *Token*, which on that basis is an *Instance* of the Type. > And notice that Peirce by no means limited this to *human* semiosis; it > encompasses all that "happens according to Natural Law." > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
