Jon Alen, Gary F, list,
In general I agree with your response to John, just a small remark on your comment on Gary F. GF: Peirce never says that Semeiotic is a Normative Science ... there is no single context in Peirce where he applies all three of the words Normative, Logic and Semeiotic to a single science. But he did say in CP 1.191 that logic is a Normative Science, "may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs," and has three branches--Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic. Are you really going to quibble over the absence of the word "Semeiotic," when that is unquestionably what he had in mind? -- In my opinion critic and methodeutic are normative, I agree to that since it draws lines between good and bad in their domain. But speculative grammar just sets out the basic make up of signs as they are in themselves: sign definition, the three (or later 10 Welby) relations with their trichotomies. Speculative grammer mirrors the first sign relation, the relation of sign to object introduces truth and falsity (critic), the relation with its interpretant effectiveness (methodeutic). The only possible candidate for a normative import would be esthetics, but then we already are contemplating the sign in relation to a possible interpreter, hence an interpretant thought. I think it is this Gary F. is thinking about. Best, Auke van Breemen Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Sun, Mar 10, 2019 at 11:12 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote: Slight correction: Peirce does use the broader sense of “Logic” in CP 1.191 (EP2:260), in the later part of his “Classification,” but he does not distinguish between the two senses, nor does he refer to the broader sense as “Semeiotic” (as he does elsewhere). This confuses the two senses, and contributes to our confusion about how to incorporate Semiotic into the classification. But Peirce can be forgiven because this text is only supposed to be an Outline. Gary f. From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> <g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > Sent: 10-Mar-19 11:18 Gary R, Jon, John, list, I am pretty much in agreement with what John said in his most recent post, but I’d like to take a step back a bit and try to explain where this terminological tangle is coming from, because some of Peirce’s most important ideas are entangled in it. The three key words are “logic”, “normative” and “semeiotic.” The first two were in common use among philosophers of Peirce’s time, and they involve ambiguities which are not problematic in most contexts, but become so when we combine them with the word “semeiotic”, which was not commonly used in Peirce’s time. So we need to look closely at Peirce’s usage of all three words, one at a time, in order to see why the combination “normative logic as semeiotic” did not and could not occur in Peirce’s own texts. Only then will we have a clear idea of what this phrase can mean for Peirceans. Let’s start with “logic.” Some of the ambiguities lurking behind this term can be glimpsed at the beginning of the article on it in Baldwin’s Dictionary (1902, http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Logic): [[ Logic is a science which has not yet completed the stage of disputes concerning its first principles, although it is probably about to do so. Nearly a hundred definitions of it have been given. It will, however, generally be conceded that its central problem is the classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into one division, and those which are good into another, these divisions being defined by marks recognizable even if it be not known whether the arguments are good or bad. Furthermore, logic has to divide good arguments by recognizable marks into those which have different orders of validity, and has to afford means for measuring the strength of arguments. An approach to such a classification is made by every man whenever he reasons, in the proper sense of that term. It is true that the contemplation of a state of things believed to be real may cause the contemplator to believe something additional, without making any classification of such sequences. But in that case he does not criticize the procedure, nor so much as distinctly reflect that it is just. He can, consequently, not exercise any control over it. Now, that which is uncontrollable is not subject to any normative laws at all; that is, it is neither good nor bad; it neither subserves an end nor fails to do so. ]] The article goes on to make the distinction between logica utens and logica docens, which I will assume is familiar to readers of this thread. But notice the usage here of “normative”: it refers back to “the classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into one division, and those which are good into another,” which is generally taken to be the “central problem” of logic. “Normative laws” are those which determine whether a reasoning procedure is (1) good or bad, or (2) subserves an end or fails to do so, where (1) and (2) are taken to be equivalent. Thus the basic signification of the term normative involves the “emphatic dualism” which, as Peirce says, is characteristic of normative sciences. But an ambiguity arises when we use the term in a classification of all sciences, so that it denotes three of those sciences: esthetics, ethics and logic. The recognition of those particular sciences as “Normative” was common in Peirce’s day, and he did not challenge it; but he did explain that they were normative in different ways and to different degrees. And this ambiguity is amplified by the ambiguity implicit in Peirce’s usage of the term “logic.” He was quite explicit about this ambiguity as early as 1896 (accepting that as the probable date of CP 1.444): [[ The term “logic” is unscientifically by me employed in two distinct senses. In its narrower sense, it is the science of the necessary conditions of the attainment of truth. In its broader sense, it is the science of the necessary laws of thought, or, still better (thought always taking place by means of signs), it is general semeiotic, treating not merely of truth, but also of the general conditions of signs being signs (which Duns Scotus called grammatica speculativa), also of the laws of the evolution of thought, which since it coincides with the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another, ought, for the sake of taking advantage of an old association of terms, be called rhetorica speculativa, but which I content myself with inaccurately calling objective logic, because that conveys the correct idea that it is like Hegel's logic. The present inquiry is a logical one in the broad sense. ]] Logic as semeiotic is logic in the broad sense. But Peirce was almost alone in using the word with that broad sense; the narrower sense was the one familiar to everybody else. Consequently Peirce could not use the broader sense in public except to explain why he thought the sense of the word should be broadened in this way. In those contexts he invoked the three-way division of logic as semeiotic into speculative grammar, critic, and rhetoric, where logical critic represents logic in the familiar and narrower (and most normative) sense. But in his 1903 Outline Classification of the Sciences (CP 1.180 – 202, EP2:258-62), Peirce does not use the broader sense at all. This explains why Semeiotic is not given any place in that classification scheme — and why we struggle to find a good place for it in our diagrams of that scheme. Peirce never says that Semeiotic is a Normative Science. On the other hand, in contexts where he is explaining why he sees Logic as Semeiotic, using “Logic” in the broad sense, he does not speak of Logic as a normative science. Consequently, there is no single context in Peirce where he applies all three of the words Normative, Logic and Semeiotic to a single science. If anybody can find one, that statement will be refuted. But I haven’t found one, and over the past few days I’ve searched Peirce’s texts extensively for that combination. Jon, I hope this will make it unnecessary for me to respond to your post in detail; but I will do so if requested. Gary f.
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