Gary R, Jon AS, and Gary F, Peirce's 1903 Outline Classification of the Sciences (CP 1.180 - 202) is his last complete version. I used it as the specification for nearly every solid and dotted line in the attached cspsci.png. I took into account some of his earlier writings in order to interpret his later ones, but the only additions are based on writings after 1903.
GR
I do not see that semiotic has any place in Peirce's descriptions of and explications of phenomenology.
That's true. Mathematics and phenomenology are the only two subjects that do not depend on any other science. But semeiotic is depends on both logic and phenomenology. Without some source of signs (e.g., perception and feelings) there is no semeiotic. And without some mathematics (in this case, formal logic) there are no semeiotic categories.
CSP: it will follow that there are but five theoretical sciences which do not more or less depend upon the science of logic. [—] The second of the five is that department of philosophy called Phenomenology, whose business it is simply to draw up an inventory of appearances without going into any investigation of their truth. (1902 [c.] Minute Logic: Why Study Logic? | CP 2.120) GR: Btw, the first of the five sciences which do not depend on logic as semeiotic is mathematics; then, following phenomenology, the third is theoretical esthetics, the fourth is theoretical ethics, and the fifth is logic as semeiotic itself. in Peirce's view, phenomenology is one of the five sciences which does not depend on logica docens, normative logic
That's true, and it's consistent with my diagram. Note CP 1.185:
CSP: Mathematics may be divided into a. the Mathematics of Logic; b. the Mathematics of Discrete Series; c. the Mathematics of Continua and Pseudo-continua.
https://www.textlog.de/4257.html Peirce used the term 'formal logic' as a synonym for mathematical logic, which he considered the first and simplest part of mathematics. In his earlier writings, he used mathematical principles and common sense. But his mature work came after EGs and his recognition of the phaneron. Without math or logic, the business of Phenomenology "is simply to draw up an inventory of appearances without going into any investigation of their truth." (CP 2.120) GR
Changing "semiotics" to "formal semiotics" in your diagram of the classification of sciences doesn't change the fact that, in Peirce's view, phenomenology is one of the five sciences which does not depend on logica docens, normative logic
I did not change anything. I used the term 'formal semeiotic' as a name for the first step of analyzing the "inventory of appearances". That analysis, which depends only on phenomenology and formal logic, is necessary to derive the categories needed for aesthetics and ethics. GR
Further, I do not see why you insist on not naming the third normative science as Peirce did, namely, as logic as semeiotic.
Primary reason: That's what Peirce wrote in CP 1.191.
Normative science has three widely separated divisions: i. Esthetics; ii. Ethics; iii. Logic... logic may be regarded as the science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: 1, Speculative Grammar... 2, Critic... 3, Methodeutic...
GR
I do not see where in Peirce you glean the notion of a 'formal semiotic'. It's an interesting idea which I'd like to hear more about
JAS
I second Gary R.'s request for specific citations or quotations of passages where you interpret Peirce as somehow endorsing this notion
I use that term for Book III: Phenomenology (CP 1.284 - 572), which covers many years of MSS that use mathematics and logic to derive the categories without any discussion of the normative sciences. It begins with the 1904 article on the phaneron, but the earlier writings talk about "phenomena". JAS
That is why all Semeiotic, including Speculative Grammar, is a branch of the former [Normative Science], not the latter [Phaneroscopy].
No. The CP editors moved all the discussion of the normative sciences *after* Book III on phenomenology. See CP 1.573 to 677. That obscures the chronology, but it shows the huge amount of semeiotic that results from Peirce's application of formal logic to analyze the phaneron. happy to adopt it. But it's important to emphasize the 169 pages of math/logic analysis of phaneroscopy prior to the normative sciences. JAS
as far as I can tell, [Peirce] consistently maintained--at least in his later years--that self-controlled thinking is a species of conduct, which is why ethics is a prerequisite for all three branches of Logic as Semeiotic.
No. Please read or reread CP 1.573 to 677. There is a lot of math and logic, but none of it depends on anything in the normative sciences. On this issue, I agree with GF's discussion of CP 2.227. My term 'formal semeiotic' is equivalent to (but conveniently shorter than) Peirce's phrase "the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs." By replacing "doctrine of signs" with 'semeiotic, we get the term 'formal semeiotic'. That justifies the addition to the attached cspsci.png. If anybody can propose a better term, I'd be happy to adopt it. But the 169 pages of phaneroscopy plus math/logic is the foundation for semeiotic. That point must be emphasized. JAS
A monad attached to a Line of Identity is also an Instance of a Proposition, not a logical subject; and by definition a logical subject is a part of a Proposition, so it cannot by itself assert a Proposition.
In English, if you assert a proposition "A and B", the two parts are also propositions. You can make an equivalent assertion by first asserting A and then asserting B. With the EG rules, you have even more flexibility in taking propositions apart.
JFS: In the triad of Icon, Index, and Symbol, it's a second. That implies it should be grouped with the second item Pheme, not the first item Seme. It is not a Second, it is an Existent--the divisions of Signs are ultimately according to the Universes, not the Categories
In every triad, the first describes a possibility, the second refers to an existent, and the third refers to a necessity. An icon, a predicate, or a term describes some possibility, but it doesn't determine any particular existent. An index, such as a pointing finger, determines some particular existent, but it doesn't describe it. JAS
"•car" is an Instance of the Proposition, "something is a car," and its logical subject is indefinite; namely, "something." Since it is a subject, "something" cannot possibly be a predicate; so what kind of Sign is it?
Linguists would say "indexical". Since that's a word that Peirce coined, I checked the 46 instances of 'indexical' in CP. And he stated more detail about it than most linguists would. But he did not say that the word 'something' is indefinite:
CP 2.289: Along with such indexical directions of what to do to find the object meant, ought to be classed those pronouns which should be entitled selective pronouns [or quantifiers] because they inform the hearer how he is to pick out one of the objects intended, but which grammarians call by the very indefinite designation of indefinite pronouns. Two varieties of these are particularly important in logic, the universal selectives, such as quivis, quilibet... and in English, any, every, all, no, none, whatever, whoever, everybody, anybody, nobody. These mean that the hearer is at liberty to select any instance he likes within limits expressed or understood, and the assertion is intended to apply to that one. The other logically important variety consists of the particular selectives, quis, quispiam... and in English, some, something, somebody, a, a certain, some or other, a suitable, one.
In an EG, a particular selective would map to a line of identity. A universal selective would map to a line of identity that begins in a negative area and continues into a positive area, where it is attached to a peg of some predicate. JAS
That is why all Semeiotic, including Speculative Grammar, is a branch of the former [Normative Science], not the latter [Phaneroscopy].
Absolutely not! That is a total distortion of everything that Peirce wrote about semeiotic from his earliest writings to his latest. Peirce admitted that his formal logic was just a small part in comparison to the much more important logic as semeiotic. But it's essential to recognize the dependencies: Without logic, there is no mathematics. Without mathematics, there is no basis for any kind of detailed analysis of the phaneron. Without that analysis, there is no basis for the normative sciences. I certainly recognize the importance of the normative sciences. But they are the result of a long chain of analysis, not the foundation for it. John
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