Wonder if the problem is Peirce did not go all the way to where he already was -- semiosis -- which he might now realize as information as universal energy. Just surmising. amazon.com/author/stephenrose
On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 8:09 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, list, > > JAS: I acknowledge the ambiguity of words like "logic," "phenomenology," > and "semeiotic" in Peirce's writings taken as a whole, > > Then the difference between us is that you do not acknowledge the > ambiguity of the word “Normative” in CP 1.191. As Auke pointed out, the > main reason this matters is that if you wrongly attribute normativity > (uncapitalized) to Peirce’s “speculative grammar,” you miss the whole point > of Peirce’s expanding the scope of “logic” *beyond* normativity in the > usual sense of that word. Logic as semeiotic is no longer limited to the > classification of arguments as good or bad, or to the conditions of signs > being *true*; it now includes the conditions of signs being *signs*, i.e. > *meaning* anything. John has a point in that Logic as Semeiotic shares > with phenomenology an emphasis on *observation* and analysis — which must > indeed precede any judgments of good or bad in the practice of science. > > By the way, Peirce’s classification of sciences is itself ambiguous, in > that it follows Comte in placing the most general sciences at the top, so > that “lower” sciences take their principles from the “higher” (and > sometimes their data from the lower still) — but Peirce *also* tries to > define and classify sciences according to the natural groupings of their > practitioners into communities. In some cases, such as Logic, this > pragmatic aspect complicates the simple picture of top-down dependency. > Hence the significance of Peirce claiming that logicians will have to study > “the physiology of signs” simply because nobody else is going to do it (R > 499 as quoted by Bellucci). This complicates the traditional classification > of logic as one of the three Normative sciences. > > Gary f. > > > > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *Sent:* 10-Mar-19 18:55 > *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism > > > > Gary F., List: > > > > I acknowledge the ambiguity of words like "logic," "phenomenology," and > "semeiotic" in Peirce's writings taken as a whole, and (especially) in > philosophical discourse generally. However, the current topic of > discussion is really quite narrow--where Semeiotic is situated in Peirce's > classification of the sciences; specifically, "his last complete version" > (CP 1.180-202), which supposedly was the primary basis for John Sowa's > diagram. CP 1.191 *unambiguously* equates all three branches of > Semeiotic--Speculative Grammar, Critic, and Methodeutic--with Logic as the > third branch of Normative Science. Nothing in the rest of CP 1.180-202 > states or implies that *any *aspect of Semeiotic belongs *anywhere else *in > Peirce's classification. > > > > Regards, > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Sun, Mar 10, 2019 at 5:22 PM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > > Jon, > > On the contrary, your reply to JS does not address the points I raised at > all — the chief of which was the ambiguity of the word “logic” in Peirce’s > usage, which he managed to gloss over in CP 1.191, the one place where he > did use “logic” in the broad sense (i.e. as semeiotic) while *also *referring > to it as “Normative.” My post (plus correction) was an attempt to account > for that example, and for the other passage you quote below, by situating > them in their context. If my attempt doesn’t work for you, or you prefer to > use these terms inflexibly rather than admit their ambiguity in Peirce’s > usage, there’s nothing further I can do. > > As for your dispute with John S, rather than taking sides on the issue, I > prefer to attribute the dispute itself to the ambiguity of the words > “phenomenology” and “semeiotic.” This is the same ambiguity which caused > Joe Ransdell, a very responsible scholar, to say that almost all of > Peirce’s phenomenology really came under the heading of semeiotic. I don’t > agree with that position, or with John’s, or with yours for that matter, > because I think you are all assuming that the references of these > classificatory terms are more exact than they actually are, and coming to > different conclusions about what they (so exactly) mean. I think it would > help to consider *all* of Peirce’s “Ethics of Terminology,” and not *only* > the recommendation that every *scientific* term should have a single > exact meaning. That simply doesn’t work with terms that are in widespread > use; it only works in highly specialized disciplines. (I think it was > rather quixotic on Peirce’s part to try to make cenoscopy, or philosophy, > into such a specialized discipline.) > > Ironically, Peirce himself recognizes this kind of problem in the very > text named in our subject line. It’s the problem that in the discourse of > positive sciences, generalization necessarily leads to simplification which > amounts to falsification if considered too precisely. I’ve quoted it > before, but here it is again: > > [[ in speaking above of a “generalized” icon, I used the qualification in > a sense of “generalize” common among designers, especially among > cartographers, as well as in vernacular talk, though it is not the proper > logical sense of the verb, since it does not signify the removal of any > constituent of logical depth from a condition, nor confers any liberty on > the interpreter, but implies some almost microscopic items that are really > falsifications committed in the interest of simplification. Thus, a map > “generalizes” its image of a river in representing the latter as not making > sundry small windings that it really does make. So recollection may be said > to “generalize” the remembered perception in representing this to be > without many insignificant details that really did belong to it; and > although an icon is not, properly speaking, *general*, so far as it is a > pure icon, yet every icon must “generalize,” more or less, in this peculiar > sense. ]] > > Peirce is referring specifically to icons here, but it is obviously true > of verbal descriptions, and even more so of class-names, that they tend to > “generalize,” “falsify” and “simplify” simultaneously. I would argue that > this happens whenever Peirce refers to “logic” as a “normative science.” As > I think I have shown, the term “normative” does much more than distinguish > one kind of logic (“normative”) from another (“formal logic”). Hence the > need for Peirce to explain, as he does in your quote, that some adjustments > are needed in our concept of what “normative” means in the phrase > “normative sciences.” Those rivers have windings which are glossed over by > the usual signification of the term “normative.” > > Also relevant here, I think, are Peirce’s remarks about thinkers getting > into “ruts” which prevent them from presenting their own theories as well > as they might be presented by somebody else. He is talking specifically > about improvements to his system of Existential Graphs, but he is also > generalizing from that: > > [[ Experience seems further to show, what is credible enough *a priori*, > the needful improvements are more likely to be discerned by some second > person, whose mind is free from any deep ruts that may probably have been > formed in that of the original inventor, by the particular way in which he > has happened long to ponder the problem while it was not yet solved, > passing over and over again one roadway of thought; not to speak of the > effect of those same ruts in causing the original inventor to regard his > way of solving the problem as simpler, that is to say, more facile and > natural, than others that, in the absence of such ruts, are far superior to > it in that respect. This consideration has encouraged me to publish my > proof in the simplest form in which I can present it in a limited time; > since I am led to believe that it is not my part, but that of some other > thinker, to metamorphose my proof into a new form, in which it shall be > vastly superior to its first incorporation, alike in point of evidence and > in that of simplicity. ]] > > I might surmise that the “simplest form” in which he tried to publish his > “proof” of pragmaticism turned out to be MS 318 (simply entitled > “Pragmatism” in EP2), which was unfortunately rejected by two publishers > and did not appear in Peirce’s lifetime. In any case, he was hoping that > “some other thinker” would improve on what he had done because it would > avoid his own “ruts.” Whether that has happened, I am not prepared to say. > Anyway, I think one’s attempt to regularize terminology that is naturally > multivalent is likely to deepen whatever ruts one already tends to get > stuck in. > > Gary f. > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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