Gary R, Jon, John, list, I am pretty much in agreement with what John said in his most recent post, but I’d like to take a step back a bit and try to explain where this terminological tangle is coming from, because some of Peirce’s most important ideas are entangled in it.
The three key words are “logic”, “normative” and “semeiotic.” The first two were in common use among philosophers of Peirce’s time, and they involve ambiguities which are not problematic in most contexts, but become so when we combine them with the word “semeiotic”, which was not commonly used in Peirce’s time. So we need to look closely at Peirce’s usage of all three words, one at a time, in order to see why the combination “normative logic as semeiotic” did not and could not occur in Peirce’s own texts. Only then will we have a clear idea of what this phrase can mean for Peirceans. Let’s start with “logic.” Some of the ambiguities lurking behind this term can be glimpsed at the beginning of the article on it in Baldwin’s Dictionary (1902, http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Logic): [[ Logic is a science which has not yet completed the stage of disputes concerning its first principles, although it is probably about to do so. Nearly a hundred definitions of it have been given. It will, however, generally be conceded that its central problem is the classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into one division, and those which are good into another, these divisions being defined by marks recognizable even if it be not known whether the arguments are good or bad. Furthermore, logic has to divide good arguments by recognizable marks into those which have different orders of validity, and has to afford means for measuring the strength of arguments. An approach to such a classification is made by every man whenever he reasons, in the proper sense of that term. It is true that the contemplation of a state of things believed to be real may cause the contemplator to believe something additional, without making any classification of such sequences. But in that case he does not criticize the procedure, nor so much as distinctly reflect that it is just. He can, consequently, not exercise any control over it. Now, that which is uncontrollable is not subject to any normative laws at all; that is, it is neither good nor bad; it neither subserves an end nor fails to do so. ]] The article goes on to make the distinction between logica utens and logica docens, which I will assume is familiar to readers of this thread. But notice the usage here of “normative”: it refers back to “the classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into one division, and those which are good into another,” which is generally taken to be the “central problem” of logic. “Normative laws” are those which determine whether a reasoning procedure is (1) good or bad, or (2) subserves an end or fails to do so, where (1) and (2) are taken to be equivalent. Thus the basic signification of the term normative involves the “emphatic dualism” which, as Peirce says, is characteristic of normative sciences. But an ambiguity arises when we use the term in a classification of all sciences, so that it denotes three of those sciences: esthetics, ethics and logic. The recognition of those particular sciences as “Normative” was common in Peirce’s day, and he did not challenge it; but he did explain that they were normative in different ways and to different degrees. And this ambiguity is amplified by the ambiguity implicit in Peirce’s usage of the term “logic.” He was quite explicit about this ambiguity as early as 1896 (accepting that as the probable date of CP 1.444): [[ The term “logic” is unscientifically by me employed in two distinct senses. In its narrower sense, it is the science of the necessary conditions of the attainment of truth. In its broader sense, it is the science of the necessary laws of thought, or, still better (thought always taking place by means of signs), it is general semeiotic, treating not merely of truth, but also of the general conditions of signs being signs (which Duns Scotus called grammatica speculativa), also of the laws of the evolution of thought, which since it coincides with the study of the necessary conditions of the transmission of meaning by signs from mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another, ought, for the sake of taking advantage of an old association of terms, be called rhetorica speculativa, but which I content myself with inaccurately calling objective logic, because that conveys the correct idea that it is like Hegel's logic. The present inquiry is a logical one in the broad sense. ]] Logic as semeiotic is logic in the broad sense. But Peirce was almost alone in using the word with that broad sense; the narrower sense was the one familiar to everybody else. Consequently Peirce could not use the broader sense in public except to explain why he thought the sense of the word should be broadened in this way. In those contexts he invoked the three-way division of logic as semeiotic into speculative grammar, critic, and rhetoric, where logical critic represents logic in the familiar and narrower (and most normative) sense. But in his 1903 Outline Classification of the Sciences (CP 1.180 – 202, EP2:258-62), Peirce does not use the broader sense at all. This explains why Semeiotic is not given any place in that classification scheme — and why we struggle to find a good place for it in our diagrams of that scheme. Peirce never says that Semeiotic is a Normative Science. On the other hand, in contexts where he is explaining why he sees Logic as Semeiotic, using “Logic” in the broad sense, he does not speak of Logic as a normative science. Consequently, there is no single context in Peirce where he applies all three of the words Normative, Logic and Semeiotic to a single science. If anybody can find one, that statement will be refuted. But I haven’t found one, and over the past few days I’ve searched Peirce’s texts extensively for that combination. Jon, I hope this will make it unnecessary for me to respond to your post in detail; but I will do so if requested. Gary f. -----Original Message----- From: John F Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> Sent: 10-Mar-19 04:00 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Bedrock Beneath Pragmaticism Gary R, Jon AS, and Gary F, Peirce's 1903 Outline Classification of the Sciences (CP 1.180 - 202) is his last complete version. I used it as the specification for nearly every solid and dotted line in the attached cspsci.png. I took into account some of his earlier writings in order to interpret his later ones, but the only additions are based on writings after 1903. GR > I do not see that semiotic has any place in Peirce's descriptions of > and explications of phenomenology. That's true. Mathematics and phenomenology are the only two subjects that do not depend on any other science. But semeiotic is depends on both logic and phenomenology. Without some source of signs (e.g., perception and feelings) there is no semeiotic. And without some mathematics (in this case, formal logic) there are no semeiotic categories. > CSP: it will follow that there are but five theoretical sciences > which do not more or less depend upon the science of logic. [—] The > second of the five is that department of philosophy called > Phenomenology, whose business it is simply to draw up an inventory of > appearances without going into any investigation of their truth. > (1902 [c.] Minute Logic: Why Study Logic? | CP 2.120) > > GR: Btw, the first of the five sciences which do not depend on logic > as semeiotic is mathematics; then, following phenomenology, the third > is theoretical esthetics, the fourth is theoretical ethics, and the > fifth is logic as semeiotic itself. > > in Peirce's view, phenomenology is one of the five sciences which does > not depend on logica docens, normative logic That's true, and it's consistent with my diagram. Note CP 1.185: > CSP: Mathematics may be divided into a. the Mathematics of Logic; b. > the Mathematics of Discrete Series; c. the Mathematics of Continua and > Pseudo-continua. <https://www.textlog.de/4257.html> https://www.textlog.de/4257.html Peirce used the term 'formal logic' as a synonym for mathematical logic, which he considered the first and simplest part of mathematics. In his earlier writings, he used mathematical principles and common sense. But his mature work came after EGs and his recognition of the phaneron. Without math or logic, the business of Phenomenology "is simply to draw up an inventory of appearances without going into any investigation of their truth." (CP 2.120) GR > Changing "semiotics" to "formal semiotics" in your diagram of the > classification of sciences doesn't change the fact that, in Peirce's > view, phenomenology is one of the five sciences which does not depend > on logica docens, normative logic I did not change anything. I used the term 'formal semeiotic' as a name for the first step of analyzing the "inventory of appearances". That analysis, which depends only on phenomenology and formal logic, is necessary to derive the categories needed for aesthetics and ethics. GR > Further, I do not see why you insist on not naming the third normative > science as Peirce did, namely, as logic as semeiotic. Primary reason: That's what Peirce wrote in CP 1.191. > Normative science has three widely separated divisions: > i. Esthetics; ii. Ethics; iii. Logic... logic may be regarded as the > science of the general laws of signs. It has three branches: > 1, Speculative Grammar... 2, Critic... 3, Methodeutic... GR > I do not see where in Peirce you glean the notion of a 'formal > semiotic'. It's an interesting idea which I'd like to hear more about JAS > I second Gary R.'s request for specific citations or quotations of > passages where you interpret Peirce as somehow endorsing this notion I use that term for Book III: Phenomenology (CP 1.284 - 572), which covers many years of MSS that use mathematics and logic to derive the categories without any discussion of the normative sciences. It begins with the 1904 article on the phaneron, but the earlier writings talk about "phenomena". JAS > That is why all Semeiotic, including Speculative Grammar, is a branch > of the former [Normative Science], not the latter [Phaneroscopy]. No. The CP editors moved all the discussion of the normative sciences *after* Book III on phenomenology. See CP 1.573 to 677. That obscures the chronology, but it shows the huge amount of semeiotic that results from Peirce's application of formal logic to analyze the phaneron. happy to adopt it. But it's important to emphasize the 169 pages of math/logic analysis of phaneroscopy prior to the normative sciences. JAS > as far as I can tell, [Peirce] consistently maintained--at least in > his later years--that self-controlled thinking is a species of > conduct, which is why ethics is a prerequisite for all three branches > of Logic as Semeiotic. No. Please read or reread CP 1.573 to 677. There is a lot of math and logic, but none of it depends on anything in the normative sciences. On this issue, I agree with GF's discussion of CP 2.227. My term 'formal semeiotic' is equivalent to (but conveniently shorter than) Peirce's phrase "the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs." By replacing "doctrine of signs" with 'semeiotic, we get the term 'formal semeiotic'. That justifies the addition to the attached cspsci.png. If anybody can propose a better term, I'd be happy to adopt it. But the 169 pages of phaneroscopy plus math/logic is the foundation for semeiotic. That point must be emphasized. JAS > A monad attached to a Line of Identity is also an Instance of a > Proposition, not a logical subject; and by definition a logical > subject is a part of a Proposition, so it cannot by itself assert a > Proposition. In English, if you assert a proposition "A and B", the two parts are also propositions. You can make an equivalent assertion by first asserting A and then asserting B. With the EG rules, you have even more flexibility in taking propositions apart. > JFS: In the triad of Icon, Index, and Symbol, it's a second. > That implies it should be grouped with the second item Pheme, not the > first item Seme. > > It is not a Second, it is an Existent--the divisions of Signs are > ultimately according to the Universes, not the Categories In every triad, the first describes a possibility, the second refers to an existent, and the third refers to a necessity. An icon, a predicate, or a term describes some possibility, but it doesn't determine any particular existent. An index, such as a pointing finger, determines some particular existent, but it doesn't describe it. JAS > "•car" is an Instance of the Proposition, "something is a car," and > its logical subject is indefinite; namely, "something." Since it is a > subject, "something" cannot possibly be a predicate; so what kind of > Sign is it? Linguists would say "indexical". Since that's a word that Peirce coined, I checked the 46 instances of 'indexical' in CP. And he stated more detail about it than most linguists would. But he did not say that the word 'something' is indefinite: > CP 2.289: Along with such indexical directions of what to do to find > the object meant, ought to be classed those pronouns which should be > entitled selective pronouns [or quantifiers] because they inform the > hearer how he is to pick out one of the objects intended, but which > grammarians call by the very indefinite designation of indefinite > pronouns. Two varieties of these are particularly important in logic, > the universal selectives, such as quivis, quilibet... and in English, > any, every, all, no, none, whatever, whoever, everybody, anybody, > nobody. These mean that the hearer is at liberty to select any > instance he likes within limits expressed or understood, and the > assertion is intended to apply to that one. The other logically > important variety consists of the particular selectives, quis, > quispiam... and in English, some, something, somebody, a, a certain, > some or other, a suitable, one. In an EG, a particular selective would map to a line of identity. A universal selective would map to a line of identity that begins in a negative area and continues into a positive area, where it is attached to a peg of some predicate. JAS > That is why all Semeiotic, including Speculative Grammar, is a branch > of the former [Normative Science], not the latter [Phaneroscopy]. Absolutely not! That is a total distortion of everything that Peirce wrote about semeiotic from his earliest writings to his latest. Peirce admitted that his formal logic was just a small part in comparison to the much more important logic as semeiotic. But it's essential to recognize the dependencies: Without logic, there is no mathematics. Without mathematics, there is no basis for any kind of detailed analysis of the phaneron. Without that analysis, there is no basis for the normative sciences. I certainly recognize the importance of the normative sciences. But they are the result of a long chain of analysis, not the foundation for it. John
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
