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JAS- This is what I was responding to: You wrote:
"As with any logical or mathematical "proof"--i.e., any deductive
argumentation--the conclusion is only as strong as the premisses. If
one premiss is false, then the conclusion is false, or at least
unwarranted on the basis of that premiss; but anyone who affirms all
of the premisses is rationally required to affirm the conclusion, as
well."
You said nothing about the form of the argument; you based your
assertion only on the premises and clearly stated that if one accepts
the premises as true, then, one is 'rationally required to affirm the
conclusion'.
I merely showed you some examples where the premises were all true -
but one couldn't consider the conclusion as true. Once I had done that
- you then introduced the requirement for 'logical form'.
2] My interest in this thread is to reject the idea of an external
metaphysical agency for the Universe [aka God] and to focus instead
on the self-generating and self-organizing properties of the semiosic
process. .As outlined, for example, in Peirce's description of the
emergence of the Universe [1.412]
Edwina
On Tue 21/05/19 6:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, List:
ET: My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility.
Then your definition of "science" is narrower than Peirce's.
ET: Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion.
No, for (at least) the third time, the requirement is that the
premisses are true and the form of argumentation is valid. Your
examples met the first criterion, but not the second. My Semeiotic
Argumentation meets both.
ET: I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to
my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have
the right to tell me to stop having this opinion.
The double standard appears again. What precludes someone from
making exactly the same statement, but substituting "unPeircean" for
"reductionism"? What makes some such opinions acceptable, and others
out of bounds? Who gets to decide where that line is drawn--i.e.,
whose opinion about this is authoritative?
ET: I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of
the Universe etc.
In that case, given its subject line, why are you participating in
this thread at all?
Regards,
Jon S.
On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:16 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Please see my responses below
On Tue 21/05/19 3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
Edwina, List:
1] ET: I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic
have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and
science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are
sciences, so their content is scientific content; but not religion.
Of course, the line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp,
especially when the topic of discussion is the Reality of God.
EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on
objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative
measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these
criteria apply to any of the discussions we've had.
2] ET: Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true,
in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set
up as, in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument.
JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the
argumentation is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true;
i.e., the argumentation as a whole is sound. This is the most basic
logical leading principle of all deductive syllogisms. We can
certainly disagree on whether each of the premisses is true, but
someone who endorses all of them is rationally required to endorse
the conclusion, as well.
EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and
you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must
be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your
assertion.
3] ET: I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's
insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is
perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept
that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to
conclude that the Universe is A single Sign.
JAS: Peirce's theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to
be considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected
constitute one Sign. Consequently, according to Peirce, if the
entire Universe consists of connected Signs, then the Universe is one
Sign; and as I keep pointing out, he explicitly affirmed not only
that "the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that
Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903),
but also that "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all
thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904).
EDWINA I'm not going to get into diversions of semantics - ie
between 'merged' and 'connected'. The point is, that the
Representamen is a mediative function - an ACTION - and I
ackknowledge that the Universe is one vast ACTION of semiosis, but
the nature of the representamen, as a system of LAWS - is not
homogeneous. That is, the laws of organization of matter are NOT
identical - ie the laws which produce a tree are quite different from
the laws that produce a giraffe. So, to my interpretation, 'the
universe is a vast mediative function-of-the-production-of-laws. But
these laws are not identical.
4] ET: I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual
complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis
...
JAS:I have asked you before, and now ask you again, to stop calling
it "reductionism." If the entire Universe is indeed a
Sign--specifically, an Argument, a continuous "inferential process"
of semeiosis--that indicates nothing whatsoever about its
complexity. On the contrary, it reveals just how vast and complex a
Sign can be, rather than implying that the Universe is any simpler
than we otherwise would have suspected.
EDWINA I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right
to my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you
have the right to tell me to stop having this opinion. I consider
that semeiosis, i.e., the fact that the Representamen has the ability
to transform input data from an external Object [or Objects] and, via
its generative habits/laws...produce something quite unique as an
Interpretant - I consider that this freedom enables complexity.
5] ET: I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a
sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact.
JAS: I thought we agreed that every Sign is determined by an
external Object. However, the Sign and its Object do not interact,
since that would imply both of them acting on each other; by
contrast, Peirce explicitly affirmed that while the Object acts on
the Sign, the Sign has no effect on its Object.
CSP: For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a
Medium for the communication of a Form ... As a medium, the Sign is
essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it,
and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the
Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to
the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object
remaining unaffected. (EP 2:544n22; 1906)
The Sign does have an effect on its Interpretant; in fact, it
fulfills the function of a Sign precisely to the degree that it has
the same effect on the Interpretant as the Object itself would have
had in the right conditions.
CSP: On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the
Sign is active, determining the Interpretant without being itself
thereby affected ... in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign
produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the
Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22;
1906)
CSP: A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the
function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the
definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the
object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon
the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its
function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other
than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it.
(EP 2:391; 1906)
This is not at all a "linear" or "mechanical" process consisting of
sequential dyadic relations, but rather a mediative process
consisting of an irreducible triadic relation.
CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of
being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it
is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and
determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise
as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through
the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410; 1907)
In my opinion, all of this is fundamental to Peirce's entire
Semeiotic.
EDWINA And? I'm not denying any of Peirce's comments.
6] ET: BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an
integral part of the semiosic interaction....and becomes an Immediate
Object. Therefore - does this externality, God, have any reality
before being part of the Universe as its Immediate Object?
JAS: An external Object is, by definition, a Dynamic Object; while
an Immediate Object is, by definition, internal to the Sign.
Moreover, the reality of a Dynamic Object is independent of its
representation in any Sign by means of an Immediate Object. In
fact, according to Peirce, that is what it means for something to be
real--it possesses its characters regardless of whether any
individual mind or finite group of minds attributes them to it.
However, I agree that we cannot properly call something a Dynamic
Object unless and until it is represented by a Sign, because it must
be the Dynamic Object of some particular Sign. From that standpoint,
God was indeed real before creating the Universe, but did not become
its Dynamic Object until He created it. Of course, the tenses in
that statement are problematic, since (ex hypothesi) time itself is
part of the Universe that God created.
ET: If it is forever outside the realm of immanent semiosic
interaction - does it have any reality?
JAS:Again, interaction is not a characteristic of semeiosis, at
least according to Peirce; but if the Universe is a Sign, then it has
an external (Dynamic) Object that determines it--i.e., acts upon it.
And if the Universe is what Peirce called a perfect Sign, as I have
suggested--"the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which
its occurrence carries with it"--then that Object is perpetually
acting upon it by adding new Signs, bringing fresh energy, and
rekindling its dormant energy (EP 2:545n25; 1906), thus preventing
"the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling
and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201;
1898). I equate this to "The creation of the universe, which ... is
going on today and never will be done" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903).
EDWINA I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation
of the Universe etc.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [3] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [4]
On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 7:48 AM Edwina Taborsky wrote:
Gary R, list
I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these
discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging
the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific
content whatsoever.
Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the
sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up
as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic
placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument
true. It merely sets up a valid argument.
I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence
that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with
signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple
signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that
the Universe is A single Sign. I question such reductionism, for
that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the
functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions
- the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than
simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but
can we make this an existential simplicity?
I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign
requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that,
indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a
'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is
only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic
interaction....and becomes an Immediate Object. Therefore - does
this externality, God, have any reality before being part of the
Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever outside the realm
of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any reality?
And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not
necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad.
Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these
discussions.
Edwina
Links:
------
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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