Edwina, List: ET: I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content whatsoever.
Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are *sciences*, so their content is *scientific *content; but not religion. Of course, the line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp, especially when the topic of discussion is the Reality of God. ET: Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a valid argument. Again, if the premisses are true and the *form *of the argumentation is valid, then the conclusion is *necessarily *true; i.e., the argumentation as a whole is *sound*. This is the most basic logical leading principle of all deductive syllogisms. We can certainly disagree on whether each of the premisses is true, but someone who endorses *all *of them is *rationally required* to endorse the conclusion, as well. ET: I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A single Sign. Peirce's *theorem *was not that multiple Signs *can be* merged to *be considered* one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that *are *connected *constitute *one Sign. Consequently, according to Peirce, if the entire Universe *consists *of connected Signs, then the Universe is *one *Sign; and as I keep pointing out, he *explicitly *affirmed not only that "the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that Universe being precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903), but also that "the entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904). ET: I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis ... I have asked you before, and now ask you again, to stop calling it "reductionism." If the entire Universe is indeed a Sign--specifically, an Argument, a continuous "inferential process" of semeiosis--that indicates *nothing whatsoever* about its complexity. On the contrary, it reveals just how vast and complex a Sign can be, rather than implying that the Universe is any simpler than we otherwise would have suspected. ET: I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this' which interact. I thought we agreed that every Sign is determined by an external Object. However, the Sign and its Object do not *interact*, since that would imply *both *of them acting on *each other*; by contrast, Peirce *explicitly *affirmed that while the Object acts on the Sign, the Sign has *no effect *on its Object. CSP: For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form ... As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. (EP 2:544n22; 1906) The Sign *does *have an effect on its *Interpretant*; in fact, it fulfills the function of a Sign precisely to the degree that it has the *same *effect on the Interpretant as the Object *itself *would have had in the right conditions. CSP: On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected ... in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22; 1906) CSP: A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object itself had acted upon it. (EP 2:391; 1906) This is not at all a "linear" or "mechanical" process consisting of sequential *dyadic *relations, but rather a *mediative *process consisting of an irreducible *triadic *relation. CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410; 1907) In my opinion, all of this is fundamental to Peirce's entire Semeiotic. ET: BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic interaction....and becomes an Immediate Object. Therefore - does this externality, God, have any reality before being part of the Universe as its Immediate Object? An *external *Object is, by definition, a *Dynamic *Object; while an *Immediate *Object is, by definition, *internal *to the Sign. Moreover, the *reality *of a Dynamic Object is *independent *of its representation in *any *Sign by means of an Immediate Object. In fact, according to Peirce, that is what it *means* for something to be *real*--it possesses its characters regardless of whether any individual mind or finite group of minds *attributes *them to it. However, I agree that we cannot properly *call *something a Dynamic Object unless and until it is represented by a Sign, because it must be *the *Dynamic Object *of *some particular Sign. From that standpoint, God *was *indeed real *before *creating the Universe, but did not *become *its Dynamic Object *until *He created it. Of course, the tenses in that statement are problematic, since (*ex hypothesi*) time itself is part of the Universe that God created. ET: If it is forever outside the realm of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any reality? Again, *interaction *is not a characteristic of semeiosis, at least according to Peirce; but if the Universe is a Sign, then it has an external (Dynamic) Object that *determines *it--i.e., *acts *upon it. And if the Universe is what Peirce called a *perfect *Sign, as I have suggested--"the aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries with it"--then that Object is *perpetually *acting upon it by adding new Signs, bringing fresh energy, and rekindling its dormant energy (EP 2:545n25; 1906), thus preventing "the complete induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201; 1898). I equate this to "The creation of the universe, which ... is going on today and never will be done" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; 1903). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 7:48 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Gary R, list > > I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these > discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the > chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content > whatsoever. > > Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the sense > that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in > themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid, > this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a > valid argument. > > I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence > that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs' > and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be > 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A > single Sign. I question such reductionism, for that denies the > actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis > - which includes, among its other functions - the ability and necessity to > 'make matter complex' rather than simple. We can intellectually reduce a > complexity to singularity but can we make this an existential simplicity? > > I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires an > external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic > function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this' > which interact. BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an > integral part of the semiosic interaction....and becomes an Immediate > Object. Therefore - does this externality, God, have any reality before > being part of the Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever > outside the realm of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any > reality? > > And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not > necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad. > > Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these > discussions. > > Edwina >
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