Edwina, List: ET: My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative measurements and fallibility.
Then your definition of "science" is narrower than Peirce's. ET: Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and you declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. I simply showed you some examples which invalidated your assertion. No, for (at least) the third time, the requirement is that the premisses are true *and *the form of argumentation is valid. Your examples met the first criterion, but not the second. My Semeiotic Argumentation meets both. ET: I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to my opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have the right to tell me to stop having this opinion. The double standard appears again. What precludes someone from making exactly the same statement, but substituting "unPeircean" for "reductionism"? What makes some such opinions acceptable, and others out of bounds? Who gets to decide where that line is drawn--i.e., whose *opinion *about this is authoritative? ET: I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of the Universe etc. In that case, given its subject line, why are you participating in this thread at all? Regards, Jon S. On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 3:16 PM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Please see my responses below > > On Tue 21/05/19 3:12 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent: > > Edwina, List: > > 1] ET: I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have > anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They > have no scientific content whatsoever. > > JAS] Peirce held that both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics are sciences, > so their content is scientific content; but not religion. Of course, the > line between Metaphysics and religion is not sharp, especially when the > topic of discussion is the Reality of God. > > EDWINA My understanding of science is that its axioms are based on > objective empirical evidence; repeatable observations; quantitative > measurements and fallibility. I don't think that any of these criteria > apply to any of the discussions we've had. > > 2] ET: Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in > the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, > in themselves, true--and the format of their syllogistic placement is > valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets > up a valid argument. > > JAS: Again, if the premisses are true and the form of the argumentation > is valid, then the conclusion is necessarily true; i.e., the > argumentation as a whole is sound. This is the most basic logical > leading principle of all deductive syllogisms. We can certainly disagree > on whether each of the premisses is true, but someone who endorses all of > them is rationally required to endorse the conclusion, as well. > > EDWINA Your comments referred only to the premises being true - and you > declared that if the premises are true then the conclusion must be true. I > simply showed you some examples which invalidated your assertion. > > 3] ET: I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's > insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused > with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple > signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the > Universe is A single Sign. > > JAS: Peirce's theorem was not that multiple Signs can be merged to be > considered one Sign; it is that multiple Signs that are connected > constitute one Sign. Consequently, according to Peirce, if the entire > Universe consists of connected Signs, then the Universe is one Sign; and > as I keep pointing out, he explicitly affirmed not only that "the > Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... that Universe being > precisely an argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903), but also that "the > entire body of all thought is a sign, supposing all thought to be more or > less connected" (R 1476:36[5-1/2]; c. 1904). > > EDWINA I'm not going to get into diversions of semantics - ie between > 'merged' and 'connected'. The point is, that the Representamen is a > mediative function - an ACTION - and I ackknowledge that the Universe is > one vast ACTION of semiosis, but the nature of the representamen, as a > system of LAWS - is not homogeneous. That is, the laws of organization of > matter are NOT identical - ie the laws which produce a tree are quite > different from the laws that produce a giraffe. So, to my interpretation, > 'the universe is a vast mediative function-of-the-production-of-laws. But > these laws are not identical. > > 4] ET: I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual > complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis ... > > JAS:I have asked you before, and now ask you again, to stop calling it > "reductionism." If the entire Universe is indeed a Sign--specifically, an > Argument, a continuous "inferential process" of semeiosis--that indicates > nothing > whatsoever about its complexity. On the contrary, it reveals just how > vast and complex a Sign can be, rather than implying that the Universe is > any simpler than we otherwise would have suspected. > > EDWINA I consider it reductionism - and therefore, have every right to my > opinion. You may reject it, but I don't really think that you have the > right to tell me to stop having this opinion. I consider that semeiosis, > i.e., the fact that the Representamen has the ability to transform input > data from an external Object [or Objects] and, via its generative > habits/laws...produce something quite unique as an Interpretant - I > consider that this freedom enables complexity. > > 5] ET: I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign > requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the > semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not > this' which interact. > > JAS: I thought we agreed that every Sign is determined by an external > Object. However, the Sign and its Object do not interact, since that > would imply both of them acting on each other; by contrast, Peirce explicitly > affirmed that while the Object acts on the Sign, the Sign has no effect on > its Object. > > CSP: For the purpose of this inquiry a Sign may be defined as a Medium > for the communication of a Form ... As a medium, the Sign is essentially > in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its > Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign > is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought > about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. (EP > 2:544n22; 1906) > > > The Sign does have an effect on its Interpretant; in fact, it fulfills > the function of a Sign precisely to the degree that it has the same effect > on the Interpretant as the Object itself would have had in the right > conditions. > > CSP: On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is > active, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby > affected ... in respect to the Form communicated, the Sign produces upon > the Interpretant an effect similar to that which the Object itself would > under favorable circumstances. (EP 2:544n22; 1906) > > CSP: A sign, on the other hand, just in so far as it fulfills the > function of a sign, and none other, perfectly conforms to the definition of > a medium of communication. It is determined by the object, but in no other > respect than goes to enable it to act upon the interpreting quasi-mind; and > the more perfectly it fulfills its function as a sign, the less effect it > has upon that quasi-mind other than that of determining it as if the object > itself had acted upon it. (EP 2:391; 1906) > > > This is not at all a "linear" or "mechanical" process consisting of > sequential dyadic relations, but rather a mediative process consisting of > an irreducible triadic relation. > > CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, > which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both > determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines > the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the > interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this > "sign." (EP 2:410; 1907) > > > In my opinion, all of this is fundamental to Peirce's entire Semeiotic. > > EDWINA And? I'm not denying any of Peirce's comments. > > 6] ET: BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an integral > part of the semiosic interaction....and becomes an Immediate Object. > Therefore - does this externality, God, have any reality before being part > of the Universe as its Immediate Object? > > JAS: An external Object is, by definition, a Dynamic Object; while an > Immediate > Object is, by definition, internal to the Sign. Moreover, the reality of > a Dynamic Object is independent of its representation in any Sign by > means of an Immediate Object. In fact, according to Peirce, that is what > it means for something to be real--it possesses its characters regardless > of whether any individual mind or finite group of minds attributes them > to it. However, I agree that we cannot properly call something a Dynamic > Object unless and until it is represented by a Sign, because it must be > the Dynamic Object of some particular Sign. From that standpoint, God was > indeed real before creating the Universe, but did not become its Dynamic > Object until He created it. Of course, the tenses in that statement are > problematic, since (ex hypothesi) time itself is part of the Universe > that God created. > > ET: If it is forever outside the realm of immanent semiosic interaction - > does it have any reality? > > > JAS:Again, interaction is not a characteristic of semeiosis, at least > according to Peirce; but if the Universe is a Sign, then it has an external > (Dynamic) Object that determines it--i.e., acts upon it. And if the > Universe is what Peirce called a perfect Sign, as I have suggested--"the > aggregate formed by a sign and all the signs which its occurrence carries > with it"--then that Object is perpetually acting upon it by adding new > Signs, bringing fresh energy, and rekindling its dormant energy (EP > 2:545n25; 1906), thus preventing "the complete induration of habit reducing > the free play of feeling and the brute irrationality of effort to complete > death" (CP 6.201; 1898). I equate this to "The creation of the universe, > which ... is going on today and never will be done" (CP 1.615, EP 2:255; > 1903). > > EDWINA I'm not going to get into any discussion of God or creation of the > Universe etc. > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 7:48 AM Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Gary R, list >> >> I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these >> discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the >> chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content >> whatsoever. >> >> Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the sense >> that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in >> themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid, >> this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a >> valid argument. >> >> I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence >> that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs' >> and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be >> 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A >> single Sign. I question such reductionism, for that denies the >> actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis >> - which includes, among its other functions - the ability and necessity to >> 'make matter complex' rather than simple. We can intellectually reduce a >> complexity to singularity but can we make this an existential simplicity? >> >> I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires an >> external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic >> function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this' >> which interact. BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an >> integral part of the semiosic interaction....and becomes an Immediate >> Object. Therefore - does this externality, God, have any reality before >> being part of the Universe as its Immediate Object? If it is forever >> outside the realm of immanent semiosic interaction - does it have any >> reality? >> >> And - as Jeff D has pointed out, a so-called external Object is not >> necessarily morphologically external to the semiosic Triad. >> >> Therefore, I think that we have to be very cautious about these >> discussions. >> >> Edwina >> >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
