Jon Alan,

Since it proves a recurrent theme, I  suggest we ought to try to find out what 
exactly is the meaning you attribute to the concept of God. 

You wrote:

God as the real and independent object that determines the entire universe as a 
sign.

--

And earlier you cited:

As for scale, he stated that the entire universe is a sign, specifically an 
argument--"a vast representamen, a great symbol of God's purpose, working out 
its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903).

--

I'd like to add to this Peirce's remark 'we have to choose between mammon 
(Greed, Trumps basic strategy, individualistic and setting communities against 
each other in a zero sum game) and god (conceived as pure reasonableness 
[community of investigators needed] that argumentatively works out its 
conclusions in living realities, Independend of what any individual might think 
but dependent on thought in general and thus realizes itself)'.  Along these 
lines Peirce's concept of god is a refinement of Comte who too bluntly equated 
the truth of science and god. And also of Spiniza who equated god=nature. 

What other characteristics do you attribute to the conception of god?

And what are the premisses of the argument in your take?

For me Peirce's conception of god is primarily to be looked at as the 
foundation (the recognition of reasonableness functioning somehow as the 
sublime in Kant) of a code of conduct and an urge not to rely on tenacity, 
authority or first principles, but on scientific method in the fixation of 
belief. In this case the premisses of the argument are 'reasonableness' and 
'living reality' that in their interaction determine the universe to be a sign.

best, Auke

> Op 18 april 2020 om 3:29 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>:
> 
>     John, Edwina, Daniel, List:
> 
>     Indeed, and I have never suggested any such thing, either; after all, it 
> would wrongly imply that metaphysics comes before semeiotic in a proper 
> classification of the sciences.  Peirce unambiguously has it the other way 
> around--"Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of 
> logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" 
> (CP 1.487, c. 1896).  Accordingly, what I have suggested previously is that 
> semeiotic is sufficiently robust to prompt the plausible hypothesis of God as 
> the real and independent object that determines the entire universe as a 
> sign.  I know that you disagree with this, but we have debated it 
> sufficiently in the past and need not rehash those arguments.
> 
>     Regards,
>      
> 
>     Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>     Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
>     -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
>     On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 10:03 AM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca 
> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca > wrote:
> 
>         > > 
> >         John - thanks for your comment. I think that's an important point.
> > 
> >         " Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic useful for 
> > analyzing theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, has 
> > suggested that theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently 
> > robust to be used as a foundation for developing semeiotic."
> > 
> >         Edwina 
> > 
> >         On Fri 17/04/20 10:50 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net 
> > mailto:s...@bestweb.net sent:
> > 
> >             > > > 
> > >             Auke and Jon AS,
> > > 
> > >             I strongly agree with Auke's analysis.  I would also like to 
> > > comment on the following point:
> > > 
> > >             AvB> God or the  conception of god do not deliver valid 
> > > arguments in semiotics. My interest is systematical not biographical.
> > > 
> > >             A biographical analysis can be useful for clarifying what 
> > > Peirce meant in his voluminous writings.  That is an important task for 
> > > Peirce scholars.   Many theologians have considered Peirce's semeiotic 
> > > useful for analyzing theological arguments.  But nobody, not even Peirce, 
> > > has suggested that theology or any theological hypothesis is sufficiently 
> > > robust to be used as a foundation for developing semeiotic.
> > > 
> > >             John
> > > 
> > >         > > 
> >     > 
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