Jon, I think we agree on the continuity of the process of semiosis, but I find it as difficult to get interested in the minute semiotic analysis of it as it is for you to get interested in how the whole experiential process is embodied in the brain (or other biological quasi-mind). So I only have one small suggestion to offer. You wrote, “This combination requires the trichotomy for the final interpretant to come before the other two, as it does in my logical order of determination, rather than after them, as it does in Robert's.” It seems to me that the final interpretant (like a final cause) operates over a longer time-scale than the other two — which would imply that its mode of being “comes” both before and after them.
Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: 21-Apr-20 21:15 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categories at work within the signs Gary F., List: Thanks for posting this interesting analysis. It probably will not surprise anyone that I am responding mainly to your last statement. GF: I will leave it to the reader to reconsider the signs, objects and interpretants identified by Peirce in the conversational example above, and judge for him- or herself whether a single linear order of determination applies to its six components. In accordance with Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, both examples are obviously replicas of propositions; i.e., dicent symbols, and therefore legisigns. In accordance with the hexad, both examples are tokens of symbolic types, and therefore must be collectives according to the dynamical object and copulatives according to the immediate object. That does not seem to square with Peirce's identification of the dynamical objects as "the impression which I have presumably derived from peeping between the window-curtains" and "the identity of the actual and Real meteorological conditions at the moment." However, it is consistent with his statements elsewhere that the dynamical object of every proposition is the entire universe, while the immediate object is the universe of discourse--the collection of whatever possibly could be denoted by the terms that the proposition involves. The latter matches up reasonably well with "the weather at that time" and "the notion of the present weather so far as this is common to her mind and mine." Again, I do not believe that a linear sequence of trichotomies is ultimately the right approach for speculative grammar, especially when it comes to the two objects and the sign itself. For one thing, I consider the S-Od division to be a matter of degree, rather than a sharp distinction; signs are iconic, indexical, and symbolic, rather than pure icons, indices, or symbols. For another, in my view symbolic signs are clearly not limited to being collectives, copulatives, and types. For example, the dynamical object of a symbolic term can be an abstract quality (abstractive), a concrete thing (concretive), or an ens rationis (collective); it can identify its immediate object by relying on past collateral experience (descriptive) or present collateral observation (designative); and in itself, like all types, it exists only in its tokens. As for the interpretants, in the first example Peirce says that the immediate is "the quality of the weather," the dynamical is "my answering her question" (not the answer itself), and the final is "her purpose in asking it, what effect its answer will have as to her plans for the ensuing day." This seems to indicate that his wife's question, "What sort of a day is it?" is a categorical (graphed with one line of identity), a percussive (actual effect is an exertion), and a temperative (intended to produce self-control). However, I am inclined to say that the purpose of every question, unless it is strictly rhetorical, is to elicit an answer--i.e., to produce an action--which would make it an actuous, rather than a temperative. This combination is possible regardless of the order of the interpretant trichotomies, since all three are existents. In the second example, Peirce says that the immediate interpretant is "the schema in her imagination, i.e., the vague Image of what there is in common to the different Images of a stormy day"; the dynamical is "the disappointment or whatever actual effect it at once has upon her"; and the final is "the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc." This seems to indicate that his response, "It is a stormy day," is a categorical, a percussive, and a temperative; I consider his wife's disappointment to be an exertion, rather than a feeling, because it is a physical response. This combination requires the trichotomy for the final interpretant to come before the other two, as it does in my logical order of determination, rather than after them, as it does in Robert's. There are two remaining divisions in Peirce's 1905-1909 taxonomies--the manner of appeal, which corresponds to the relation between the sign and the dynamical interpretant; and the nature of assurance, which corresponds to the triadic relation between the dynamical object, the sign itself, and the final interpretant. When he first revealed that every sign has two objects and three interpretants in a 1904 letter to Lady Welby, he also spelled out the proper relationship between the two trichotomies according to the sign's relations with its final and dynamical interpretants. CSP: According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument only may be submitted to its interpretant, as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent may be urged upon the interpretant by an act of insistence. 3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme can only be, presented to the interpretant for contemplation. (CP 8.338, 1904) This makes perfect sense and implies that S-If comes before S-Id in the logical order of determination. Again, both examples are propositions, but I am inclined to classify the question as a suggestive (presented) and the answer as an imperative (urged) on the basis of the different tones that accompany their tokens--a question mark vs. a period at the end when written, and different voice inflections when spoken. As for Od-S-If, its trichotomy most obviously applies to indicative (submitted) arguments as abducent/inducent/deducent--i.e., retroductive/inductive/deductive--so it must come last. The question as a suggestive is necessarily an abducent, and I consider the answer to be an inducent because it is an assertion of fact rather than value. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt <http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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