Jon, You wrote:
Peirce consistently maintains that there are exactly three interpretants. - This sentence most certainly is not true. In the alpha part of semiotics it may seem so, but not in the beta part (see my other mail) where he deals with the interprtetation of the sign. lets do the count: 1. emotional interpretant, the interpretive view on the qualisign aspect Heading for a subdivision: energetic interpretant to be subdivided into 2. mental interpretant (iconic signaspect) and 3. effort interpretant (sinsign aspect) heading for a subdivision: logical intepretant to be sub-divided into: 4. immediate interpretant (rheme aspect) 5. dynamical interpretant (dicent aspect) 6. normal interpretant (the argument aspects in which all lower aspects are involved). Peirce hemself did not connect them directly. Probably because as a logicean with an eye on the sheet of assertion he did not take the apprehension of the sign as an object into account. Notice that the index, the symbol and the legisign aspect are still missing. Those emerge in the gamma part, that deals with the interaction of two signs. What follows has to be read as an analytical reconstruction in fragments only. Suppose our interaction as a communication between two semiotic sheets A and B, and that our conversation by mail is the intersection of our sheets. Lets further accept that Shannon covers the transmission of the sign as an object (i.e. qualisign, sinsign and icon aspect of our words). Lets take the word 'god'. On the pc the legisign is covered by the asci value of the signs to be transmitted and the interoperability in their value interpretation on both our computers. For our reading the screen, the legisign aspect is not covered. Each of the sheets develops out of its inscripton (reading the screen) the emotional, mental and physical interpretants for further processing as a legisign. It is by being inscribed in our respective sheets, that we are able to develop the import of the sign for our respective universes of discourse. The indexical sign aspect covers this, but we have to distinguish index A from index B, for instance by tincture as in the gamma part of EG. The legisign aspect is the habit of interpretation that is pertinent to our respective sheets if we technically read the sign. I don't expect much difference here between A and B, both will notice a difference in capitalization in different occurences, but that is all that has to be covered by the legisign. With the symbol things differ. A person consistently writing 'God' may be expected to have other concepts evoked than a person consistently writing 'god'. If we want to know the difference, we have to look at the dynamical interpretant aspects developed out of the rhematic possibilities the sign offers for A and for those in B. If the dynamical interpretants agree to sufficient degree they will be the same, i.e. we evolved the same symbol aspect of the sign 'god'. But how can we know? We need the argument, on each sheet, that connects all involved aspects to produce a response. The response being a sign on the intersection of sheet A and B, which is the screen. The alpha part of semiotics may be indifferent to the differences between sheets, it abstracts. But in gamma we need to make sure to keep count of the sheets to which the signs are connected. Your representational interpretant of 'God' as a symbol probably differs from mine in a lot of respects, leading to differences in response. They add up in different ways on the sheets A and B. And habit change may occur on both. Not neccesarilly in any intended direction. By being indexically commected with the respective sheets, the incriptions may becomme relevant for other exchanges of sheet A and B in other processes with C, etc., by becomming relevant for the representational interpretant of that other proces's goal. Best, Auke > Op 18 april 2020 om 3:24 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, List: > > > > > AvB: I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as > the terms choosen already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'. > > > > > > Understood, but by contrast I read "eventual interpretant" and "normal > interpretant" as two tentative terms (with tentative definitions) for the > same concept, which were eventually superseded by "final interpretant." > While the names vary over time, Peirce consistently maintains that there are > exactly three interpretants, since this is required by his categorial > analysis as Robert's podium diagram helpfully illustrates. > > > > > AvB: I suggested a distinction between 'dynamical > interpretant' (aspectual) and 'dynamical interpretant response' (typical) for > disambiguation pusposes. > > > > > > Again, I do not read Peirce as defining two different "dynamical > interpretants," but rather working out in his Logic Notebook some candidate > ideas for defining the dynamical interpretant. In this case, a dynamical > interpretant as "the determination of a field of consciousness" is a logical > interpretant producing a further sign in the interpreter such that the sign > itself is a usual, while a dynamical interpretant as "the commanded act in > the mere doing of it" is an energetic interpretant producing an effort in the > interpreter such that the sign itself is a percussive. > > > > > AvB (in another thread): Semiotics must be developed by > a study of signs and sign processes, not by speculations on particular > concepts of god, not even Peirce's. > > > > > > I agree, and my point was not to say anything one way or the other about > theism--only that Peirce considers the entire universe to be a sign, > specifically an argument; and as such, like every sign, it necessarily has a > final interpretant. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran > Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 3:11 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: > > > > > > Jon Alen, > > > > This comment probably does not come as a surprise. > > > > > > > CSP: The Eventual Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that > > General Truth that it destines, in view of the other general truths of the > > universe, conditionally upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and > > substance of all the real difference that its acceptance will make. ... Any > > Eventual Interpretant must be of the nature of a Habit or Law. (RS 46:6-7, > > c. 1906) > > > > > > > > > > > > > CSP: …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the > > true Interpretand, which the sign ought to produce. Its true value. Take, > > for example, a witness in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is the > > modification of the verdict of the jury in which this testimony ought > > logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 1906) > > > > > > > > > > I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms > > choosen already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'. The normal is judged > > by the truth value: is the interpretant the effect the sign (sic) ought to > > produce. It is an understanding of the import of this sign. It is > > restricted to the interpretation prosesses goals at hand. > > > > The eventual is not thus restricted: all general truth that it > > destines, in view of other general truths of the universe. It is the sum > > and substance of all the real difference that its acceptance will make, it > > must be a habit. It is what the normal interpretant of my former alinea > > might mean in other processes too. This difference can be looked at as a > > difference between an involved dicent aspect (of the normal i) of the sign > > and a rheme aspect (involved in eventual i,), the latter enabling its to > > involvement in other processes. The lines of identity that connect the > > processes (involved index element of legisigns and immediate interpretants > > that of themself act as a sign alike guaranty the possibility of this to > > actually happen). > > > > On the terminological side I regard Peirce as a ballerina that is > > able to make the finest and clearest distinctions between closely related > > gestures. He is not the butcher that only knows to make minced meat. He > > looks at each joint from all relevant (semiotically) perspectives and > > describes what you find if you cut from those perspectives. > > > > Closely related to this issue is the interpretation of 'dynamical > > interpretant'. I found passage's in Logical notebooks: > > > > The dynamical interpretant is the determination of a field of > > representation > > exterior to the sign. This eld is an interpreter's consciousness > > which > > determination is a ected by the sign (MS 339, 253r, October 8, > > 1905). > > > > The dynamical interpretant is just what is drawn from the sign by a > > given individual interpreter, [. . . ] (MS 339, 276r, April 2, > > 1906). > > > > I also found another shade of meaning in the first sentence below: > > > > The commanded act in the mere doing of it as in uenced by the > > command > > is the dynamical interpretant. (DIR; AvB) But insofar as that > > conduct > > involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and > > recognizes > > this correctly, it is the representative interpretant (MS 339, 253r, > > October 9, 1905). > > > > 1. Note that the normal interpretant, is calles here the > > representative. not without reason because with normal Peirce looks at it > > from a truth functional perspective and with normal from a representative. > > > > 2. More improtant, you will notice the difference between: > > > > A. > > > > The dynamical interpretant as 'the determination of a field of > > consciousness' (The immediate interpretant/rheme got its index and became > > propositional for this interpreter. But still needed the representative > > content to enter the argument, being put under the general rule of > > inference (representational interpretant) and judged on its truth value > > (normal i). It indicates a moment in a process of interpretation. > > > > and B. > > > > Dynamical interpretant as "The commanded act in the mere doing of > > it." In this case A must be fullfiled for B to happen. In A we are speaking > > in terms of sign aspects about the dynamical interpretant. In B it is a > > sign type, and it is the intended signtype in this argument (process) if > > communication is succesful. > > > > I suggested a distinction between 'dynamical interpretant' > > (aspectual) and 'dynamical interpretant response' (typical) for > > disambiguation pusposes. > > > > Best regards, > > > > Auke van Breemen > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
