Jon, I guess I’d better restate my point about semiotic “analysis” as simply as I can:
First, in the real world there is no disembodied mind and no disembodied semiosis. Hence there is no context-free semiosis. Analysis of an instance of semiosis, whether that instance is observed or merely imagined, must take the context of that instance into account in order to explain how that actual process of semiosis works. I quoted an example of semiosis which Peirce analyzed: a bit of conversation with his wife. That was an example of communicative semiosis, and he analyzed it accordingly. If, as you said, you do not find that analysis helpful, i think it's because you are trying to construct a context-free analysis, based on an abstract mathematical schema. I just don't see how that kind of analysis serves any pragmatic purpose. In that same post i gave another example, this time of perceptual semiosis, which is embodied quite differently from communicational semiosis. This is the one you were referring to when you wrote that “Gary F.'s stated purpose is to analyze "a semiosic process going on in a single brain."” — as if that were the only kind of semiosic process I had in mind. That was a misreading on your part. The point I was trying to make, the (unstated) purpose of my post, was to make the rather simple assertion that the component parts of a semiosic process will naturally vary somewhat depending on the context of that process (communication, perception, deductive inference, etc.) You on the other hand think that the variations in Peirce’s terms for “the three interpretants” represent his experimenting with different naming schemes for a triad of interpretants which are always the same regardless of the context of the semiosis. That, and not a difference of “stated purposes,” is the difference between our views in this exchange. (Of course I can’t speak for Auke on this matter.) When you talk about “the analysis of an individual sign token” I really have no idea what you’re talking about. Gary f. From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: 30-Apr-20 21:31 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Different Semeiotic Analyses (was tree-structure) Auke, Gary F., List: I think it is clear by now that we indeed have different purposes for our analyses, and I continue to believe that this is why we reach different conclusions, which are not necessarily conflicting such that someone must be "wrong." Auke's stated purpose is "to semiotically analyze the process of interpreting signs that offer themselves for interpretation." Gary F.'s stated purpose is to analyze "a semiosic process going on in a single brain." My purpose is to analyze the process of semeiosis in general, admittedly a much more abstract pursuit--which is why I describe my project as falling within speculative (i.e., theoretical) grammar, rather than a special science such as communication theory or neurobiology. When I say that in my speculative grammar there are exactly three interpretants (immediate/dynamical/final), I am talking about the analysis of an individual sign token. Its immediate interpretant is what any token of the same type possibly could signify to someone acquainted with the system of signs to which it belongs. Its dynamical interpretant is what this particular token actually does signify to someone on this particular occasion. Its final interpretant is what any token of any type of the same sign necessarily would signify to someone under ideal circumstances, in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community. I suggest that these three levels of knowledge and associated habits of interpretation correspond at least roughly to the states of information that Peirce respectively called essential, informed, and substantial (CP 2.409, 1867; CP 4.67, 1893). AvB: The object of the collection of qualisigns is the sign that offers itself for interpretation. The object of the pure icon you are writing about has the collection of qualisigns as its object. The object of the pure sinsign is the actually inhering of the qualisign/icon combination in my sheet of semiosis (or mind if you wish) as its object. The index glues icon and sinsign together. By being indexically connected the sinsign icon may have the legisign as its interpretant (this depends on whether the sign that has to be interpreted is familiar or not), while the iconic sinsign has the rheme as its interpretant. The legisign has the sinsign icon as its object and the symbol as its interpretant. The Rheme has the icon sinsign as its object and the symbol as its interpretant. To be honest, none of this makes much sense to me, which is not to say that it is incorrect--again, I suspect that it simply reflects my different purpose, different standpoint, and different overall way of thinking. For example, my speculative grammar does not include qualisigns at all, for the reason that I already stated--a quality in itself cannot represent something else as its object, it can only present itself. Instead, I consider tones to be qualities of tokens that can affect the dynamical interpretant that it determines--voice inflections, punctuation marks, font changes for emphasis, etc. Moreover, the object of a sign is not necessarily another sign, and the object of an interpretant is always the same as the object of the sign that determines it. In my speculative grammar, the immediate object of a term is what any token of the same type possibly could denote to someone with the requisite collateral experience in the past (for descriptives) or collateral observation in the present (for designatives); while the dynamical object is what a particular token actually does denote on a particular occasion, whether a quality (for abstractives) or a thing (for concretives). The immediate object of a proposition or an argument is "the logical universe of discourse" (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903), which is the collection of the immediate objects of the terms that it involves; while the dynamical object is "the universe of all universes" (CP 5.506, c. 1905), which is "the totality of all real objects" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903). AvB: And here we see why besides the immediate, dynamical and final interpetant, we need interpretants like the intentional, effectual and communicational/cominterpretant if we want to understand and discuss communication as an open ended process. Fair enough, but I see a distinction between the (exactly three) different kinds of interpretants that every individual sign token must have (immediate/dynamical/final) and three different functions that these interpretants can have (intentional/effectual/communicational) within the specific context of communication. In other words, for me they are not different interpretants, but rather the same interpretants as characterized from different analytical perspectives. AvB: By the way, the effectual interpretant in effect is not a habit change but the resolution of doubt into belief. In my view, since a belief is a habit, "the resolution of doubt into belief" is a habit-change. In my speculative grammar, the final interpretant of any term is association, which is a habit of feeling; the final interpretant of any proposition is belief, which is a habit of conduct; and the final interpretant of any argument is persuasion, which is a habit-change.
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