Gary F., List: GF: First, in the real world there is no disembodied mind and no disembodied semiosis. Hence there is no context-free semiosis.
I agree, but as I stated, "My purpose is to analyze the process of semeiosis *in general*"; i.e., the aspects of semeiosis that are operative in *every *context. I also admitted that this is "a much more abstract pursuit" that falls "within speculative (i.e., theoretical) grammar, rather than a special science." I had in mind this particular passage by Peirce. CSP: Logic, in its general sense, is, as I believe I have shown, only another name for *semiotic* (σημειωτική), the quasi-necessary, or formal, doctrine of signs. By describing the doctrine as "quasi-necessary," or formal, I mean that we observe the characters of such signs as we know, and from such an observation, by a process which I will not object to naming Abstraction, we are led to statements, eminently fallible, and therefore in one sense by no means necessary, as to what *must *be the characters of all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. ... Now the whole process of development among the community of students of those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the truths which *must* hold good of all signs used by a scientific intelligence is an observational science, like any other positive science, notwithstanding its strong contrast to all the special sciences which arises from its aiming to find out what *must be* and not merely what *is* in the actual world. (CP 2.227, c. 1897) The fundamental difference between the normative science of semeiotic--specifically its formal branch, which is speculative grammar--and any special science is that they have different *purposes*. According to Peirce, "all the special sciences" aim to find out "merely what *is *in the actual world." That is where semeiosis is analyzed in various *specific *contexts, as an *application *of semeiotic. By contrast, semeiotic *itself *employs abstraction to formulate, explicate, and evaluate plausible but "eminently fallible" hypotheses about "what *must* be the characters of all signs" and "the truths which *must *hold good of all signs," regardless of the context. Here is how Peirce described the requisite task of "abstractive observation" at the ellipsis in the quote above. CSP: As to that process of abstraction, it is itself a sort of observation. The faculty which I call abstractive observation is one which ordinary people perfectly recognize, but for which the theories of philosophers sometimes hardly leave room. It is a familiar experience to every human being to wish for something quite beyond his present means, and to follow that wish by the question, "Should I wish for that thing just the same, if I had ample means to gratify it?" To answer that question, he searches his heart, and in doing so makes what I term an abstractive observation. He makes in his imagination a sort of skeleton diagram, or outline sketch, of himself, considers what modifications the hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is, *observes *what he has imagined, to see whether the same ardent desire is there to be discerned. By such a process, which is at bottom very much like mathematical reasoning, we can reach conclusions as to what *would be* true of signs in all cases, so long as the intelligence using them was scientific. (ibid) The only qualification here is that the signs being studied are those "used by a 'scientific' intelligence ... capable of learning by experience." However, this is not really much of a limitation, and by no means confined to *human *intelligence. In fact, there is a sense in which the evolution of the *entire universe* is an ongoing process of "learning by experience." As I have often suggested before, since "Logic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable establishment of beliefs" (CP 3.429, 1896), "Logic ... is ... another name for *semiotic*" (CP 2.227, c. 1897), and "The essence of belief is the establishment of a habit" (CP 5.398, EP 1:129, 1878), *semeiotic *may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable establishment of *habits*. Moreover, "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293, 1891), such that the habits of matter are outcomes of semeiosis--i.e., interpretants--just as much as the habits of mind. GF: I quoted an example of semiosis which Peirce analyzed: a bit of conversation with his wife. ... If, as you said, you do not find that analysis helpful, i think it's because you are trying to construct a context-free analysis, based on an abstract mathematical schema. I just don't see how that kind of analysis serves any pragmatic purpose. Although in the past I have found that particular example more perplexing than enlightening, I took a stab at analyzing it in accordance with my own speculative grammar in a recent List post, resulting in some conclusions that were consistent with Peirce's own remarks and others that were inconsistent with them. As I have acknowledged repeatedly, my speculative grammar is not *identical *to his, but I sincerely believe that it remains recognizably *Peircean*. In any case, again, my purpose is primarily *theoretical *rather than pragmatic; and as such, it is indeed "based on an abstract mathematical schema" resulting from "abstractive observation," as Peirce himself advocated. GF: In that same post i gave another example, this time of perceptual semiosis, which is embodied quite differently from communicational semiosis. This is the one you were referring to when you wrote that “Gary F.'s stated purpose is to analyze 'a semiosic process going on in a single brain'"--as if that were the *only* kind of semiosic process I had in mind. That was a misreading on your part. My apologies, I did not mean to imply that it was "the *only *kind of semiosic process [you] had in mind"; just that it was the specific kind of semeiosic process you had in mind with that specific example. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 8:33 AM <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote: > Jon, I guess I’d better restate my point about semiotic “analysis” as > simply as I can: > > First, in the real world there is no disembodied mind and no disembodied > semiosis. Hence there is no context-free semiosis. Analysis of an > *instance* of semiosis, whether that instance is observed or merely > imagined, must take the context of that instance into account in order to > explain how that actual *process* of semiosis works. > > I quoted an example of semiosis which Peirce analyzed: a bit of > conversation with his wife. That was an example of communicative semiosis, > and he analyzed it accordingly. If, as you said, you do not find that > analysis helpful, i think it's because you are trying to construct a > context-free analysis, based on an abstract mathematical schema. I just > don't see how that kind of analysis serves any pragmatic purpose. > > In that same post i gave another example, this time of perceptual > semiosis, which is embodied quite differently from communicational > semiosis. This is the one you were referring to when you wrote that “Gary > F.'s stated purpose is to analyze "a semiosic process going on in a single > brain."” — as if that were the *only* kind of semiosic process I had in > mind. That was a misreading on your part. The point I was trying to make, > the (unstated) *purpose of my post*, was to make the rather simple > assertion that the component parts of a semiosic process will naturally > vary somewhat depending on the context of that process (communication, > perception, deductive inference, etc.) You on the other hand think that the > variations in Peirce’s terms for “the three interpretants” represent his > experimenting with different naming schemes for a triad of interpretants > which are *always the same regardless of the context* of the semiosis. > That, and not a difference of “stated purposes,” is the difference between > our views in this exchange. (Of course I can’t speak for Auke on this > matter.) When you talk about “the analysis of an *individual* sign token” > I really have no idea what you’re talking about. > > Gary f. >
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