Auke, list, What is funny -- in the sense not of your 'hilarious', but of my 'strange' -- is that well over a decade ago on this list I used the same example, an "im[p]ression of green the moment I look at the trees out of my window," (well, in truth, my impression(s) occurred as one late Spring afternoon I lay on my back in a bed of silky soft grass and moss and staring up at tree branches -- their leaves in particular -- at a scenic spot on top of one of the foothills of the Catskill Mountains of New York overlooking the Tappan Zee where the Hudson River becomes as expansive as a 10 mile wide lake).
Rather intent on musing a bit, or even doing some phenomenology, I looked up at the canopy where the rapidly passing clouds made the myriad leaves look to be various shades of green, such as olive, lime, emerald, even sage (which is almost gray), as well as deep yellow, a kind of brown and even a dark purple nearing black. I thought (very short moments later) something like "those considerable variations in color are *both* the consequence of the play of light and clouds and sky and tree leaves in nature 'outside' of me and *simultaneously* affecting me with 'internal' color impressions" -- again none of those hues and shades were named then, that is, *when *or* as *experienced, but only in retrospect-- a kind of *double-sided nature*, both 'there' in 'external' nature as well as within my 'internal' experience of that nature. But note: there were only *those*, perhaps hundreds or even thousands, of possible (1ns) variations of color -- but, for example, *no* blues or pinks whatsoever. I later thought that *just* those hues and shades (or at least a, perhaps, rather large range of them) were *possible* for me (*no* possibility of, say, cerulean blue -- the color of a clear sky itself -- no cerulean leaves!) nor perhaps for any person with a normal color sense (i.e. not color blind, etc.) who might be looking up from such a spot. I love dark chocolate (which, of course, also is never cerulean (not even such a deep, dark blue as cobalt blue), but prefer Belgian rather than Dutch bars of it, if you please, as I find the flavor of most fine Belgian chocolate somewhat subtler than the Dutch variety (same with beer and French fries and mayonnaise). :-) Best, Gary - "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 4:29 AM Auke van Breemen <a.bree...@upcmail.nl> wrote: > Gary R, > > Don't miss the distinction between qualities like 'hard' and the > qualisigns. If you do the discussion becomes hilarious indeed. > > You earn a box of bars of dark chocolate if you are able to scratch > anything with the qualities involved in my imression of green the moment I > look at the trees out of my window. > > best, Auke > > > Op 3 mei 2020 om 4:14 schreef Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>: > > Jon Alan Schmidt concluded: > > We have to distinguish the quality *in itself* as a real possibility > (1ns) from both its inherence in something that exists (2ns) and our > physical sensation of it (also 2ns), as well as our perceptual judgments > about it (3ns) and any subsequent reasoning about it (also 3ns). > > > From my point of view this is pretty basic trichotomic stuff. > > The quality, 'hard', can possibly (1ns) appear in many disparate things > (2ns) such as diamonds, hammers, and rocks, while my physical sensation > (2ns), the result of, say, having a rock thrown at and hitting my head > may result is such perceptual judgments (3ns) as "ouch!" at the experience > of pain, and such "subsequent reasoning about it" such as, "what direction > did that rock come from?" and "who the heck threw that rock at me?" > > Best, > > Gary > > "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > > > > > > > > On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 9:29 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > John, Auke, List: > > I agree that the conclusions of semeiotic are "eminently fallible," as > Peirce himself described them. That is why we are not locked into > treating *his * speculative grammar as rigid dogma but are free to make > adjustments that we deem appropriate in accordance with the results of our > own investigations. We simply need to be clear about those deviations and > acknowledge that they *are * deviations, which is what I have tried to > do. By the way, according to Peirce, the conclusions of *every *science > are fallible--including mathematics and formal/mathematical logic. > > CSP: *Theoretically*, I grant you, there is no possibility of error in > necessary reasoning. But to speak thus "theoretically," is to use language > in a Pickwickian sense. In practice and in fact, mathematics is not exempt > from that liability to error that affects everything that man does. > Strictly speaking, it is not certain that twice two is four. (CP 5.577, EP > 2:44, 1898) > > > I disagree that my analytical approach is "detached from reality" merely > because it is "strictly formal." I recognize that it relies on > abstraction, but that is true of any purportedly factual proposition that > anyone ever composes. The object of every proposition is "the all of > reality," while its interpretant is "an abstract constituent part of > reality" and "a prescissively abstract state of things" (CP 5.549, EP > 2:378, 1906). Its parts are its predicate and its subjects, likewise > "creations of thought"--prescissive and hypostatic abstractions, > respectively--derived from our experience as it is "forced upon us in the > form of a flow of images," which in itself "has no parts, least of all > predicates" (NEM 3:917, 1904). Again, the minimum of *real *semeiosis is > a *continuous *argument. > > I also disagree that qualities "can be looked at as nerve firings or > agitations," because the latter are quite clearly *reactions* instead. > We have to distinguish the quality *in itself* as a real possibility > (1ns) from both its inherence in something that exists (2ns) and our > physical sensation of it (also 2ns), as well as our perceptual judgments > about it (3ns) and any subsequent reasoning about it (also 3ns). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 11:15 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > > John, Edwina, list, > > looking at the subject line: > > I did introduce the nonagons in my reply to Jon Alan because I think that > besides discussing theory with the help of examples, in order to stay > grounded, it is needed to look from what perspective and with what interest > we discuss the terminology and the measure in which what we state is > compatible with Peirce's text. A main devide being an object orientation or > a process interpretation of semiotics, both have their value. But there > also are more subtle ones. > > Let me take my discussion with Jon Alan as an example. He is not wrong in > my opinion, but has a very broad scope, in the sense that he is not > interested in the meaning issue (semantical dimension) and the > effectiviness issue (pragmatical dimension). It can be illustrated by an > example. > > JAS to GF: I agree, but as I stated, "My purpose is to analyze the process > of semeiosis *in general*"; i.e., the aspects of semeiosis that are > operative in *every *context. > > While a student I read, in a psycholingistics journal, some recordings of > and discussions about schizophrenics conversating. It was impossible to > make sense of the conversation, but they adhered to the speaking > conventions and constructed their sentences as correctly as in 'normal' > conversations. It seemed to me that they conversed without a common goal > and a goal that, individually, might shift for each new sentence they met > with. Jon Alan, so it seems to me, restricts himself to that kind of > 'anything goes as long as it adhers to the most basic rules' kind of > approach. It is detached from reality, strictly formal and devoid of > interaction. But not 'wrong' in its domain.And indeed, it make sense to > only distinguish three interpretants. > > Jon Alan's denial of qualisigns, and personal choice to talk about tones > instead, is of theoretical interest because it sheds light on the point at > which we may differentiate between a totally context free semiotics and a > "the proces of semiosis" covering semiotics (process implying a goal and > context). Qualities, that can be looked at as nerve firings or agitations, > that run unintellectual in a continuous stream through our sheets. > Collections (pure icon) of firings (sinsigns) may have a familiar pattern > (legisign). If one leaves out the qualisigns, one is context free. One > could wonder whether semiotically speaking a characteristic of > schizophrenics is, that their ability to sort out the collections of > qualities got meddled, only the context free rules count. > > Comming back to the orientations in semiotic analyzis: object ( a kind of > secondness, Claudio and I would suggest your graph work, but in different > ways), process (a kind of thirdness orientation, Gary F, Edwina and I), > distinction. Jon Alan can be understood to work looking at the sign only > (firstness orientation). Note that each approach is needed, and of course, > each approach is represented by a lot of other persons in a variety of > shades. > > It is almost tempting to try to collectively make a nonagon with semiotics > in the center by asking listers to score their primary focus. And to > provide their reasons. In an extended version it could be asked to score > others, and provide reasons. I would class Claudio and John bot in the > object range in the symbol field, in the shade iconic symbol. But Claudio > more at the iconic side and John more at the symbolic side. Why, one could > ask? > > I keep it at this, a rhematic adress of the reader that the above alinea > is intended to have. > > The main problem of peircean semiotics is that it didn't grow into a > research program in the sense of Lakatos. That is because the different > proponents of the different viewpoints didn't succeed in finding common > ground. > > Auke > > Op 2 mei 2020 om 16:37 schreef "John F. Sowa" < s...@bestweb.net>: > > Edwina, Gary F, Jon AS, > > ET> My question about 'pure theorizing' so to speak, also arises from the > quote below: > > "Now the whole process of development among the community of students of > those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of the truths > which must hold good of all signs used by a scientific intelligence is an > observational science, like any other positive science, notwithstanding its > strong contrast to all the special sciences which arises from its aiming > to find out what must be and not merely what is in the actual world. (CP > 2.227, c. 1897; my emphasis] > > Yes. Every science, including semeiotic, must begin with observational > data. That is why I have insisted on examples. Without data, it's > impossible to discover, test, evaluate, or even discuss any scientific > claims. > > ET> After all - since mankind's emergence- we have had multiple theories > about our reality - most of which have a logical basis, are reasonably > coherent and yet - have no capacity other than their own insistence and our > acceptance - to move out of a pure Argument and into the real world of > Secondness and explain what is going on in this real world. > > Yes. For Peirce, semeiotic is a fallible science. It *aims* to find out > what must be. But as we can see from physics -- the most advanced of all > the special sciences -- every theory that has been proposed is eventually > shown to be limited to the kinds of observations on which is has been > tested. > > ET> many different research disciplines are exploring this real world - > and their vocabulary differs - even though they are talking about the same > processes! Therefore - I think that the Peircean world should not reject > the research of other disciplines merely because the terms are different. > The analysis is dealing with the very same processes - and it can be shown > that the logical and pragmatic infrastructure of the Peircean framework is > similar to that of these other disciplines. > > In his 1903 classification, Peirce made room for those sciences. He > admitted that he had not done much work in many of them, but he did not say > that their work or terminology was unworthy of being considered a science. > GF> I simply find myself unable to come up with an individual experience > that could be referred to as a “sign token” and has no context. Every > example of a sign that I can remember or imagine experiencing has some kind > of context which limits the kind of interpretant(s) it can generate. > > Yes. Science begins with data and is tested on data. The best theories > are true of a wider context than the examples from which they were > derived. But it's not possible to make claims beyond the range that has > been tested. > > GF>: First, in the real world there is no disembodied mind and no > disembodied semiosis. Hence there is no context-free semiosis. > > Yes. > > John > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > >
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