John, List: I seem to recall a recent on-List assertion that "Peirce would cringe at most, if not all attempts to paraphrase his thoughts." That is exactly what the first sentence below constitutes, unless it can be supported by a direct quotation from Peirce in which he explicitly states that a theory being "fallible" does not mean that we are "free to make adjustments" to it.
I seem to recall another recent on-List assertion that Peirce "would be horrified at the thought that anybody would attempt to pick and choose some rigid set of quotations as a definitive formulation of his thought." Besides being another (presumably cringe-worthy) attempt to paraphrase his thoughts, this statement apparently prohibits us from taking his writings about semeiotic (or anything else) as a definitive formulation of his theory. In any case, Kuhn's concept of "normal science" is by no means limited to finding new applications of an established theory. If every theory is fallible, then every theory is susceptible of further theoretical adjustments, which need not overturn the *entire *theory. In other words, there is a huge difference between proposing changes to some of the *details *of the theory--which is all that I am doing--and advocating a fundamental paradigm shift. I have said several times now that one of the ways in which my speculative grammar deviates from Peirce's is by rejecting qualisigns, and I have given my primary reason for this each time--a quality *in itself* cannot represent something else, it can only present itself; and therefore, a quality *in itself *cannot be a sign. So far no one has actually *argued *against this position or offered any example of a quality that is a sign *in itself*, rather than a tone that inheres in a token. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 4:50 PM John F. Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > Jon, > > When Peirce called a theory 'fallible, he did not mean "free to make > adjustments". There is a huge difference between "free to apply to new > areas" and "free to adjust (i.e. change) the theory itself"', The first > (new applications) is "normal science" in Kuhn's terms. But the second is > a "paradigm shift" caused by some serious error in the foundations of the > theory. > > JAS> I agree that the conclusions of semeiotic are "eminently fallible," > as Peirce himself described them. That is why we are not locked into > treating *his *speculative grammar as rigid dogma but are free to make > adjustments that we deem appropriate in accordance with the results of our > own investigations. We simply need to be clear about those deviations and > acknowledge that they *are *deviations, > > Question: What flaws, errors, or discrepancies have you found in Peirce's > semeiotic? > > If you found some areas that Peirce did not cover, then doing further > research to cover those areas is "normal science". That would require new > data about aspects that Peirce did not address in his writings. > > But changing the theory (even "adjustments") is a very serious matter. > That would only be justified if you found some serious contradictions that > couldn't be covered by "normal science" -- i.e., making new observations > and adding some methods for adapting Peirce's theories to the new data. > > What are your reasons for the adjustments? > > John >
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