Gary R, First of all, no offence taken.
This is a nice example of a intentional and a effectual representant standing asunder. I did not write 'nasty webmail' in response to the content of your mail. Always nice to see a native writer toying around with words. Jon Awbry is a master at it. I did write it because I was fed up with my webmail that has an inclination to pick a mailadres that is not recognized by the list. The mail you responded to on list was not send to the list, so listers might be surprised. And when I replied on your mail, again the adress went wrong the first time. Best, Auke > Op 3 mei 2020 om 22:38 schreef Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, > > I apologize for appearing to be 'nasty' in my recent post addressed to > you. I didn't mean to be while, admittedly, meaning to "pull your leg" a bit > as the English idiom would have it. I should have learned long ago that it's > near impossible to get humor across in an email and clearly my smiley face > didn't do it for you. > > In truth, I haven't had Dutch beer since I visited my Dutch friend, Aldo, > in Tilburg many years ago (I'm not much of a beer drinker) when we went to a > monastery where the monks make beer. We thoroughly enjoyed ourselves and the > beer! Another Dutch friend, Merel, who lives in Gouda has brought me tasty > samples not only of the cheese famously named after her town, but also > delicious chocolates as well. I must admit that the very best chocolate I've > had was hand made in small amounts in a town near Brussels, but for the most > part I couldn't tell Belgian from Dutch chocolate if you paid me! As for > pommes de terre, I like both the Belgian and the Dutch varieties. I should > note parenthetically that one of my very favorite spirits is Genever which I > was introduced to in Holland and, btw, the Belgian variety doesn't come close. > > I see that I should have stuck to my original thought for a concluding > paragraph. Still meaning to have some fun with the chocolate idea, I was > going to make the thought experiment of deciding to paint my den. I go to my > local paint store and the proprietor asks, "What color are you planning to > paint your den?" I say definitively, "Chocolate!" He brings out a swatch of > color and says, "OK here's our most popular chocolate paint; what do you > think?" I say, "Well I think it's rather too light" at which point he laughs > and says, "Ah, so I take it that you prefer dark chocolate to milk chocolate." > > In any event, I certainly didn't mean to offend. I love Holland, have > several beloved Dutch friends there, enjoy the cozy bars in Amsterdam, eating > delicious Dutch food in outdoor restaurants, especially those in the center > of Tilburg, and you can be certain that when in Holland I top off many a > night clinking glasses of Genever and toasting "Proost!" > > Well, I'm disappointed that I didn't win the chocolate. But perhaps I can > keep trying? > > Again, take this message to be a heartfelt apology as I never meant to > offend, just to play a little game that, sadly, went bad. > > Best, > > Gary > > > > > "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 7:41 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: > > > > > > Nasty webmail. > > > > Gary R, > > > > With that you do not earn the box. It are not my heat lightnings > > (see below the Hausman quote) you utilized. > > > > The qualisign aspect is a medad or collection of medads brought > > together by the mind in the pure icon, the icon being not caused by the > > medads themselves, but by our habits of interpretation. > > > > For some fine remarks: Charles S. Peirce's Evolutionary Philosophy > > By Carl R. Hausman > > > > p. 122 > > > > "What then is the relevance of the idea of a medad for the > > categories? Specifically what is its relevance for explaining firstness? > > This point depends on the idea that a medad may be thought of as a charge > > that is unattachable to any atom or any particle. Such a charge, as Peirce > > suggests in his figurative description, would be like a heat charge that > > has no effect. etc.." > > > > The quality is monadic, involving qualisigns, involving quale: > > > > i) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Qualisign [1.1] (e.g., a feeling > > of \red") is any > > quality in so far as it is a sign. Since a quality is whatever it > > is positively in itself, a > > quality can only denote an object by virtue of some common > > ingredient or similarity; > > so that a Qualisign is necessarily an Icon. Further, since a > > quality is a mere logical > > possibility, it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that > > is, as a Rheme > > > > ii) A Rhematic [3.1] Iconic [2.1] Sinsign [1.2] (e.g., an > > individual diagram) is any > > object of experience in so far as some quality of it makes it > > determine the idea of an > > object. Being an Icon, and thus a sign by likeness purely of > > whatever it may be like, > > it can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, or Rheme. It will > > embody a Qualisign. > > > > Taken from CP. 2.254-2.263. > > > > - > > > > You cannot utilize the heat charges that were the occasion for my > > experience of green on a specific occasion. For an early take on the medad: > > > > [...] the immediate (and therefore in itself insusceptible of > > mediation > > -the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the Unintellectual ) runs in a > > continuous stream through our lives. W. II, p. 227 (1868) > > > > Best, Auke > > > > > > Op 3 mei 2020 om 12:31 schreef Gary Richmond > > <gary.richm...@gmail.com mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com >: Auke, list, > > > > > > What is funny -- in the sense not of your 'hilarious', but of my > > 'strange' -- is that well over a decade ago on this list I used the same > > example, an " im[p]ression of green the moment I look at the trees out of > > my window," (well, in truth, my impression(s) occurred as one late Spring > > afternoon I lay on my back in a bed of silky soft grass and moss and > > staring up at tree branches -- their leaves in particular -- at a scenic > > spot on top of one of the foothills of the Catskill Mountains of New York > > overlooking the Tappan Zee where the Hudson River becomes as expansive as a > > 10 mile wide lake). > > > > Rather intent on musing a bit, or even doing some phenomenology, I > > looked up at the canopy where the rapidly passing clouds made the myriad > > leaves look to be various shades of green, such as olive, lime, emerald, > > even sage (which is almost gray), as well as deep yellow, a kind of brown > > and even a dark purple nearing black. I thought (very short moments later) > > something like "those considerable variations in color are both the > > consequence of the play of light and clouds and sky and tree leaves in > > nature 'outside' of me and simultaneously affecting me with 'internal' > > color impressions" -- again none of those hues and shades were named then, > > that is, when or as experienced, but only in retrospect-- a kind of > > double-sided nature, both 'there' in 'external' nature as well as within my > > 'internal' experience of that nature. > > > > But note: there were only those, perhaps hundreds or even > > thousands, of possible (1ns) variations of color -- but, for example, no > > blues or pinks whatsoever. I later thought that just those hues and shades > > (or at least a, perhaps, rather large range of them) were possible for me > > ( no possibility of, say, cerulean blue -- the color of a clear sky itself > > -- no cerulean leaves!) nor perhaps for any person with a normal color > > sense (i.e. not color blind, etc.) who might be looking up from such a spot. > > > > I love dark chocolate (which, of course, also is never cerulean > > (not even such a deep, dark blue as cobalt blue), but prefer Belgian rather > > than Dutch bars of it, if you please, as I find the flavor of most fine > > Belgian chocolate somewhat subtler than the Dutch variety (same with beer > > and French fries and mayonnaise). :-) > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > * > > > > "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox > > > > > > > > Gary Richmond > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > > Communication Studies > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sun, May 3, 2020 at 4:29 AM Auke van Breemen < > > a.bree...@upcmail.nl mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl > wrote: > > > > Gary R, > > > > Don't miss the distinction between qualities like 'hard' and the > > qualisigns. If you do the discussion becomes hilarious indeed. > > > > You earn a box of bars of dark chocolate if you are able to scratch > > anything with the qualities involved in my imression of green the moment I > > look at the trees out of my window. > > > > best, Auke > > > > > > Op 3 mei 2020 om 4:14 schreef Gary Richmond < > > gary.richm...@gmail.com mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com >: > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt concluded: > > > > We have to distinguish the quality in itself as a real > > possibility (1ns) from both its inherence in something that exists (2ns) > > and our physical sensation of it (also 2ns), as well as our perceptual > > judgments about it (3ns) and any subsequent reasoning about it (also 3ns). > > > > From my point of view this is pretty basic trichotomic stuff. > > > > The quality, 'hard', can possibly (1ns) appear in many disparate > > things (2ns) such as diamonds, hammers, and rocks, while my physical > > sensation (2ns), the result of, say, having a rock thrown at and hitting my > > head may result is such perceptual judgments (3ns) as "ouch!" at the > > experience of pain, and such "subsequent reasoning about it" such as, "what > > direction did that rock come from?" and "who the heck threw that rock at > > me?" > > > > Best, > > > > Gary > > > > "Time is not a renewable resource." gnox > > > > Gary Richmond > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > > Communication Studies > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 9:29 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > > jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > > John, Auke, List: > > > > I agree that the conclusions of semeiotic are "eminently fallible," > > as Peirce himself described them. That is why we are not locked into > > treating his speculative grammar as rigid dogma but are free to make > > adjustments that we deem appropriate in accordance with the results of our > > own investigations. We simply need to be clear about those deviations and > > acknowledge that they are deviations, which is what I have tried to do. > > By the way, according to Peirce, the conclusions of every science are > > fallible--including mathematics and formal/mathematical logic. > > > > CSP: Theoretically, I grant you, there is no possibility of error > > in necessary reasoning. But to speak thus "theoretically," is to use > > language in a Pickwickian sense. In practice and in fact, mathematics is > > not exempt from that liability to error that affects everything that man > > does. Strictly speaking, it is not certain that twice two is four. (CP > > 5.577, EP 2:44, 1898) > > > > I disagree that my analytical approach is "detached from reality" > > merely because it is "strictly formal." I recognize that it relies on > > abstraction, but that is true of any purportedly factual proposition that > > anyone ever composes. The object of every proposition is "the all of > > reality," while its interpretant is "an abstract constituent part of > > reality" and "a prescissively abstract state of things" (CP 5.549, EP > > 2:378, 1906). Its parts are its predicate and its subjects, likewise > > "creations of thought"--prescissive and hypostatic abstractions, > > respectively--derived from our experience as it is "forced upon us in the > > form of a flow of images," which in itself "has no parts, least of all > > predicates" (NEM 3:917, 1904). Again, the minimum of real semeiosis is a > > continuous argument. > > > > I also disagree that qualities "can be looked at as nerve firings > > or agitations," because the latter are quite clearly reactions instead. We > > have to distinguish the quality in itself as a real possibility (1ns) from > > both its inherence in something that exists (2ns) and our physical > > sensation of it (also 2ns), as well as our perceptual judgments about it > > (3ns) and any subsequent reasoning about it (also 3ns). > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran > > Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > On Sat, May 2, 2020 at 11:15 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl > > mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: > > > > John, Edwina, list, > > > > looking at the subject line: > > > > I did introduce the nonagons in my reply to Jon Alan because I > > think that besides discussing theory with the help of examples, in order to > > stay grounded, it is needed to look from what perspective and with what > > interest we discuss the terminology and the measure in which what we state > > is compatible with Peirce's text. A main devide being an object orientation > > or a process interpretation of semiotics, both have their value. But there > > also are more subtle ones. > > > > Let me take my discussion with Jon Alan as an example. He is not > > wrong in my opinion, but has a very broad scope, in the sense that he is > > not interested in the meaning issue (semantical dimension) and the > > effectiviness issue (pragmatical dimension). It can be illustrated by an > > example. > > > > JAS to GF: I agree, but as I stated, "My purpose is to analyze the > > process of semeiosis in general"; i.e., the aspects of semeiosis that are > > operative in every context. > > > > While a student I read, in a psycholingistics journal, some > > recordings of and discussions about schizophrenics conversating. It was > > impossible to make sense of the conversation, but they adhered to the > > speaking conventions and constructed their sentences as correctly as in > > 'normal' conversations. It seemed to me that they conversed without a > > common goal and a goal that, individually, might shift for each new > > sentence they met with. Jon Alan, so it seems to me, restricts himself to > > that kind of 'anything goes as long as it adhers to the most basic rules' > > kind of approach. It is detached from reality, strictly formal and devoid > > of interaction. But not 'wrong' in its domain.And indeed, it make sense to > > only distinguish three interpretants. > > > > Jon Alan's denial of qualisigns, and personal choice to talk about > > tones instead, is of theoretical interest because it sheds light on the > > point at which we may differentiate between a totally context free > > semiotics and a "the proces of semiosis" covering semiotics (process > > implying a goal and context). Qualities, that can be looked at as nerve > > firings or agitations, that run unintellectual in a continuous stream > > through our sheets. Collections (pure icon) of firings (sinsigns) may > > have a familiar pattern (legisign). If one leaves out the qualisigns, one > > is context free. One could wonder whether semiotically speaking a > > characteristic of schizophrenics is, that their ability to sort out the > > collections of qualities got meddled, only the context free rules count. > > > > Comming back to the orientations in semiotic analyzis: object ( a > > kind of secondness, Claudio and I would suggest your graph work, but in > > different ways), process (a kind of thirdness orientation, Gary F, Edwina > > and I), distinction. Jon Alan can be understood to work looking at the sign > > only (firstness orientation). Note that each approach is needed, and of > > course, each approach is represented by a lot of other persons in a variety > > of shades. > > > > It is almost tempting to try to collectively make a nonagon with > > semiotics in the center by asking listers to score their primary focus. And > > to provide their reasons. In an extended version it could be asked to score > > others, and provide reasons. I would class Claudio and John bot in the > > object range in the symbol field, in the shade iconic symbol. But Claudio > > more at the iconic side and John more at the symbolic side. Why, one could > > ask? > > > > I keep it at this, a rhematic adress of the reader that the above > > alinea is intended to have. > > > > The main problem of peircean semiotics is that it didn't grow into > > a research program in the sense of Lakatos. That is because the different > > proponents of the different viewpoints didn't succeed in finding common > > ground. > > > > Auke > > > > Op 2 mei 2020 om 16:37 schreef "John F. Sowa" < s...@bestweb.net > > mailto:s...@bestweb.net >: > > > > > > Edwina, Gary F, Jon AS, > > > > ET> My question about 'pure theorizing' so to speak, also arises > > from the quote below: > > > > "Now the whole process of development among the community of > > students of those formulations by abstractive observation and reasoning of > > the truths which must hold good of all signs used by a scientific > > intelligence is an observational science, like any other positive science, > > notwithstanding its strong contrast to all the special sciences which > > arises from its aiming to find out what must be and not merely what is in > > the actual world. (CP 2.227, c. 1897; my emphasis] > > > > Yes. Every science, including semeiotic, must begin with > > observational data. That is why I have insisted on examples. Without > > data, it's impossible to discover, test, evaluate, or even discuss any > > scientific claims. > > > > ET> After all - since mankind's emergence- we have had multiple > > theories about our reality - most of which have a logical basis, are > > reasonably coherent and yet - have no capacity other than their own > > insistence and our acceptance - to move out of a pure Argument and into the > > real world of Secondness and explain what is going on in this real world. > > > > Yes. For Peirce, semeiotic is a fallible science. It *aims* to > > find out what must be. But as we can see from physics -- the most advanced > > of all the special sciences -- every theory that has been proposed is > > eventually shown to be limited to the kinds of observations on which is has > > been tested. > > > > ET> many different research disciplines are exploring this real > > world - and their vocabulary differs - even though they are talking about > > the same processes! Therefore - I think that the Peircean world should not > > reject the research of other disciplines merely because the terms are > > different. The analysis is dealing with the very same processes - and it > > can be shown that the logical and pragmatic infrastructure of the Peircean > > framework is similar to that of these other disciplines. > > > > In his 1903 classification, Peirce made room for those sciences. > > He admitted that he had not done much work in many of them, but he did not > > say that their work or terminology was unworthy of being considered a > > science. > > > > GF> I simply find myself unable to come up with an individual > > experience that could be referred to as a “sign token” and has no context. > > Every example of a sign that I can remember or imagine experiencing has > > some kind of context which limits the kind of interpretant(s) it can > > generate. > > > > Yes. Science begins with data and is tested on data. The best > > theories are true of a wider context than the examples from which they were > > derived. But it's not possible to make claims beyond the range that has > > been tested. > > > > GF>: First, in the real world there is no disembodied mind and no > > disembodied semiosis. Hence there is no context-free semiosis. > > > > Yes. > > > > John > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > > mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY > > of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY > > ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > > mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY > > of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > >
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