Jon S, List,
How important is it to consider the things Peirce is reading for the sake of understanding what he says? Let me start with a simple point. Can we understand what Peirce is explicitly saying about another author's views without reading the passages in their writings to which Peirce is referring? For the sake of satisfying my own curiosity, I've made a list of the number of pages in the CP that make reference to philosophers, scientists, mathematicians, and literary figures. Given the fact that the CP is only a small portion of his writings, it isn't comprehensive. What is more, it does not count the total number of references made to a given name, which is higher in many cases due to multiple references made on a single page. Nor does it take into consideration discussions of a view that continue for many pages without repetitive references to a specific name. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the CP consists of about 10% of his writings and that they are a representative sample. Under this supposition (which is not accurate), we would need to multiply the numbers below by a factor of 10 in order to approximate the number of pages that involve references to the writings of others. Here is the list: Top 12: Aristotle 227 Kant 218 Hegel 121 Boole 95 Schröder 76 Scotus 66 Plato 60+ Euclid 58 Royce 57 William James 50 Cantor 50 Berkeley 50 Philosophy Pythagoras 12 Parmenides 3 Heraclitus 1 Democritus 5 Zeno 12 Plato, Platonic, Platonism 60+ Aristotle, Aristotelian, Aristotelis 227 Diogenes, Cynic 6 Plotinus, neoplatonic 2 Stoic 16 Boethius 25 (6 in text, 19 in fn) Augustine 11 John of Salisbury 14 Abelard 17 Scotus 66 Ockham 34 Roger Bacon 11 Aquinas 27 Francis Bacon 17 Hobbes 26 Descartes 39 Pascal 5 Spinoza 12 Leibniz 35 Locke 37 Berkeley 50 Hume 40 Reid 19 Kant, Kantian 218 Friedrich Schiller 2 Fichte 6 Schelling 8 Hegel, Hegelian 121 Bentham 13 James Mill 11 Whewell 21 John Stuart Mill 17 William Hamilton 32 Schopenhauer 3 Nietzsche 0 Ferdinand (FCS) Schiller 24 Royce 57 William James 50 Dewey 13 Husserl 3 Science Copernicus 9 Galileo 21 Tycho Brahe 4 Kepler 20 Newton 34 Faraday 5 Clausius 11 Thomson 10 Maxwell 10 Ricardo 4 Adam Smith 1 Comte 22 Spencer, Spencerian 27 Darwin 34 Agassiz 6 Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 Mathematics Pappus 1 Eudoxus 0 Euclid, Euclidean 58 Archimedes 7 Fermat 28 Desargues 1 Bernoulli 9 Playfair, 7 Euler, Euler’s, Eulerian 31 Projective geometry 11 William Rowan Hamilton 38 Gauss 11 Riemann 6 Boole, Boole’s, Boolean 95 DeMorgan 4 Jevons 33 Peano 4 Dedekind 17 Cantor, Cantorian, 50 Kempe 14 Listing 13 Schröder 76 Whitehead 3 Bertrand Russell 2 Literature Homer 1 Aeschylus 0 Sophocles 0 Lucretius 4 Dante 4 Shakespeare 9 Milton 4 Henry James 5 Sherlock Holmes 1 Emerson 6 Religious Jesus 11 Buddha 5 Mohammed 1 Holy Ghost 1 Moses 0 Confuscius 0 Brahma 1 It is remarkable, I think, that Peirce makes so many references to Aristotle and Kant. As far as I can see, this is some evidence that he is grappling with their methods, inquiries, arguments and ideas in a more sustained fashion than any of the other philosophers on the list. So, for the sake of spelling out my own approach to interpreting Peirce's writings, I think that (1) reading the texts and (2) reading what he is reading go hand in hand. That is, reading what he is reading is essential to understanding the texts--at least in those places where he is explicitly or implicitly referring to, drawing on, or reacting to the ideas of others. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Saturday, August 8, 2020 1:35 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs) Jeff, List: JD: Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction between principles and laws. I specifically asked for references where Peirce supposedly endorses your claim that "a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law." JD: Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point. Quoting those definitions would have been appreciated, rather than expecting everyone on the List to look them up for ourselves, although Ben Udell kindly provided a link to the ones for "principle" (another is below). JD: See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. CSP: 4. A truth which is evident and general; a truth comprehending many subordinate truths; a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived: as, the principles of morality, of equity, of government, etc. In mathematical physics a principle commonly means a very widely useful theorem. ... 5. That which is professed or accepted as a law of action or a rule of conduct; one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of a system: as, the principles of the Stoics or the Epicureans; hence, a right rule of conduct; in general, equity; uprightness: as, a man of principle. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06&page=294&query=principle) There are no accompanying examples of uses by Aristotle, and the only one from Hamilton--which mentions Aristotle--is for the 2nd sense, not the 4th or 5th. CSP: 2. Cause, in the widest sense; that by which anything is in any way ultimately determined or regulated. ... "Without entering into the various meanings of the term Principle, which Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence anything exists, is produced, or is known, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive, principle." Sir W. Hamilton, Reid, Note A, §5, Supplementary Dissertations Aristotle and Hamilton evidently define "principle" as "that on which something else depends," such as "an original law." The 4th sense similarly defines it as "a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived." The 5th sense seems consistent with my interpretation, rather than yours--excluded middle "is professed or accepted as a law" within classical logic, such that it is "one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of [that] system." In any case, Peirce never defines a principle as our representation of a law; on the contrary ... JD: Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term. CSP: 3. A proposition which expresses the constant or regular order of certain phenomena, or the constant mode of action of a force; a general formula or rule to which all things, or all things or phenomena within the limits of a certain class or group, conform, precisely and without exception; a rule to which events really tend to conform. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04&page=705&query=law) It is a law, not a principle, that he defines as a proposition--i.e.,. a representation. He goes on to call it "a general formula or rule to which all things ... conform, precisely and without exception." As I said before, excluded middle is not a law, because it is not exceptionless. JD: Here is a famous passage [CP 1.405-406, c. 1896] where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian distinction. Where do you see such a distinction in that passage? The only mention of the word "law" in what you quoted is naming it as something that calls for an explanation. Meanwhile, Peirce straightforwardly equates "a regulative principle" with "an intellectual hope," which is perfectly consistent with his description of the principle of excluded middle as a hope rather than a law in what I quoted previously from NEM 4:xiii. JD: At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's saying. I have no doubt that it is helpful and insightful, but I disagree that it is necessary. Surely it is not a requirement for anyone who wants to understand Peirce's vast corpus of writings to read everything that he was reading at the time, which would obviously be another vast corpus of writings. And would we not then also need to read whatever all those other authors were reading when they wrote what they wrote, in order to understand what they were saying? And so on, ad infinitum. On the contrary, I believe that in most cases a good writer is capable of being understood on his/her own terms. As Gary Fuhrman once summarized<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-09/msg00179.html>, "I assume that he [Peirce] means exactly what he says and says exactly what he means, until I have sufficient reason to abandon that working assumption." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Aug 7, 2020 at 5:14 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Jon Schmidt, John Sowa, Gary Fuhrman, Gary Richmond, Robert Marty, List, Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction between principles and laws. Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point. See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term. Here is a famous passage where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian distinction. It is especially pertinent to the passage you've quoted: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. ... Among other regular facts that have to be explained is law or regularity itself. (1.405-6) I am confident that each of us is capable of looking up and analyzing other passages that use the terms "law", "principle" and "logic" in the CP. As such, I won't offer a laundry list of such passages. For my part, I don't think the distinction is new with Kant. In fact it is quite old. Kant simply tried to clarify well-established use of the conceptions. Notice how easily we slide from talking about the principles expressed in a theory, such as the principles of mechanics in Newton's theory of physics, to talk about the laws. Doing so is often elliptical. We are often saying on the supposition that this theory is true then the principles express the real laws in nature. It is not odd to say that the principles in a given theory turned out to be false. It is odd, however, to say the laws turned out to be false. Rather, we say our supposition that the laws taken to be real in given theory turned out to be false. One reason there the meaning of these two terms appears to have changed over time is that an original use of the term "law" is its juridical use. It appears that the English term of a legal requirement was later applied to the real regularities in nature. The order of Peirce's definitions suggests that he understands the history of this term. Notice the apparent differences in our respective approaches to reading these texts. In my post, I was drawing on a secondary reference that I hold in high esteem. Let me state the reference now, which is Richard Smyth's Reading Peirce Reading. In his interpretation of the early essays, he interprets key arguments in Peirce's justification of the validity of the laws of logic drawing on Kantian ideas. This is not surprising given the weight Peirce places on his reading of Kant's Critiques at this stage in the development of the theory of critical logic. When I'm trying to make sense of Peirce's writings, I find it is essential to draw on the secondary literature and to sort out what seems more and less helpful. At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's saying. John Sowa suggests that a richer understanding of Peirce's inquiries can be gained by seeing where they have taken later reachers who have followed in his wake. As such, there are five sources that seem important to reading Peirce: 1. the texts themselves; 2. the secondary literature on Peirce; 3. the inquiries of philosophers, scientists, mathematicians (etc.) Peirce was reading--especially those he was drawing on in a sustained manner; 4. the inquiries of those following in Peirce's wake (self-consciously or not). In addition to asking how Peirce used this or that term in a given text (as in 1, above), I think that it is essential that we (5) try to reconstruct his arguments and, at the same time, engage in the inquiries ourselves. After all, Peirce's writings were not written for armchair philosophers. Rather, they were written for inquirers willing to engage in philosophy as an experimental science. Are there other resources not on this list that should be considered when interpreting Peirce's arguments and inquiries? If so, then I think it is worth saying so. That way, we can talk about the relative importance of these different resources in our respective approaches. My hope is that we can compare notes, acknowledge our differences, and learn from one another. Doing so will put us all in a better position to engage with philosophers and other inquirers who are not following in Peirce's wake--and who insist that they have more fruitful assumptions and better methods than the pragmatic methods we are looking to Peirce for guidance in putting to better use. Hope that helps. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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