Jon Schmidt, John Sowa, Gary Fuhrman, Gary Richmond, Robert Marty, List,
Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction between principles and laws. Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point. See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term. Here is a famous passage where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian distinction. It is especially pertinent to the passage you've quoted: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. ... Among other regular facts that have to be explained is law or regularity itself. (1.405-6) I am confident that each of us is capable of looking up and analyzing other passages that use the terms "law", "principle" and "logic" in the CP. As such, I won't offer a laundry list of such passages. For my part, I don't think the distinction is new with Kant. In fact it is quite old. Kant simply tried to clarify well-established use of the conceptions. Notice how easily we slide from talking about the principles expressed in a theory, such as the principles of mechanics in Newton's theory of physics, to talk about the laws. Doing so is often elliptical. We are often saying on the supposition that this theory is true then the principles express the real laws in nature. It is not odd to say that the principles in a given theory turned out to be false. It is odd, however, to say the laws turned out to be false. Rather, we say our supposition that the laws taken to be real in given theory turned out to be false. One reason there the meaning of these two terms appears to have changed over time is that an original use of the term "law" is its juridical use. It appears that the English term of a legal requirement was later applied to the real regularities in nature. The order of Peirce's definitions suggests that he understands the history of this term. Notice the apparent differences in our respective approaches to reading these texts. In my post, I was drawing on a secondary reference that I hold in high esteem. Let me state the reference now, which is Richard Smyth's Reading Peirce Reading. In his interpretation of the early essays, he interprets key arguments in Peirce's justification of the validity of the laws of logic drawing on Kantian ideas. This is not surprising given the weight Peirce places on his reading of Kant's Critiques at this stage in the development of the theory of critical logic. When I'm trying to make sense of Peirce's writings, I find it is essential to draw on the secondary literature and to sort out what seems more and less helpful. At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's saying. John Sowa suggests that a richer understanding of Peirce's inquiries can be gained by seeing where they have taken later reachers who have followed in his wake. As such, there are five sources that seem important to reading Peirce: 1. the texts themselves; 2. the secondary literature on Peirce; 3. the inquiries of philosophers, scientists, mathematicians (etc.) Peirce was reading--especially those he was drawing on in a sustained manner; 4. the inquiries of those following in Peirce's wake (self-consciously or not). In addition to asking how Peirce used this or that term in a given text (as in 1, above), I think that it is essential that we (5) try to reconstruct his arguments and, at the same time, engage in the inquiries ourselves. After all, Peirce's writings were not written for armchair philosophers. Rather, they were written for inquirers willing to engage in philosophy as an experimental science. Are there other resources not on this list that should be considered when interpreting Peirce's arguments and inquiries? If so, then I think it is worth saying so. That way, we can talk about the relative importance of these different resources in our respective approaches. My hope is that we can compare notes, acknowledge our differences, and learn from one another. Doing so will put us all in a better position to engage with philosophers and other inquirers who are not following in Peirce's wake--and who insist that they have more fruitful assumptions and better methods than the pragmatic methods we are looking to Peirce for guidance in putting to better use. Hope that helps. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Thursday, August 6, 2020 6:36:03 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs) Jeff, List: JAS: In other words, Peirce denies that excluded middle is an absolutely exceptionless law (NEM 4:xiii, no date), which is presumably why he typically prefers to call it a principle instead. JD: On its face, I believe this expresses some confusion about the differences between principles and laws. Here is the passage by Peirce that I cited but did not quote. CSP: Logic requires us, with reference to each question we have in hand, to hope some definite answer to it may be true. That hope with reference to each case as it comes up is, by a saltus, stated by logicians as a law concerning all cases, namely, the law of excluded middle. This law amounts to saying that the universe has a perfect reality. (NEM 4:xiii, no date) Logicians typically treat excluded middle "as a law concerning all cases," but Peirce recognizes that this is "a saltus" (leap) grounded in the regulative hope that every question has a definite answer, which is only true if "the universe has a perfect reality." Eisele references R 140, but this excerpt does not actually appear in that manuscript, and Robert Lane states in Peirce on Realism and Idealism, "I have not been able to identify its actual source" (p. 179 n. 17). As far as I know, it is the only place in Peirce's vast corpus where he uses "law of excluded middle," although he discusses the "law of excluded third" as one of "the three fundamental laws of logic" according to "Boole's system" in a very early manuscript (NEM 3:316-318, 1865-6). By contrast, "law of contradiction" appears five times in CP and is affirmed as such in each instance. JD: According to a neo-Kantian view of rational laws, a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law. To clarify, are you claiming that this was Peirce's view of the relationship between principles and laws, or suggesting that it is how we should distinguish them? If the former, what specific passages in Peirce's writings do you interpret as endorsing such a view? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Wed, Aug 5, 2020 at 11:09 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Jon Schmidt, List, I'd like to take up the distinction between principles and laws. Jon S: "In other words, Peirce denies that excluded middle is an absolutely exceptionless law (NEM 4:xiii, no date), which is presumably why he typically prefers to call it a principle instead." On its face, I believe this expresses some confusion about the differences between principles and laws. I think Peirce makes the following sort of distinction between the two. Consider the following argument, which is from the second section of Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is nothing other than practical reason. (Ak 412) According to a neo-Kantian view of rational laws, a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law. A logic utens consists of the habits of inference that embody such principles. Those principles are subject to criticism precisely because they may not match up with the laws of logic themselves. The purpose of a philosophical theory of logic (i.e., a logica docens) is to build on the criticism of our common sense principles for the sake of arriving at a more adequate theoretical representation of the truth concerning the real laws that govern the logical relations between such facts. As such, we can distinguish between the principles embodied in our logica utens and the principles embodied in a philosophical theory of logic--and either or both of these may deviate in some respects from the real laws of logic. This distinction is at the root of the classification of genuine triadic relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within". In this classificatory scheme, the laws of logic function as laws of fact insofar as they govern those facts directly, and they are in a genuinely triadic relation to the actual facts and those that are possible (i.e., in the future). The principles of logic, on the other hand, function as symbolic representations that govern the self-controlled growth of our understanding. The principles of logic, Peirce points out, do not govern brute facts with mere necessity. Rather, they function as imperatives that dictate how we ought to think. As such, the principles of logic differ from the laws of logic insofar as they are in thoroughly genuine triadic relations to the premisses and conclusions that are part of our inquiries. The principles that govern our deductive inferences are capable of growth even if the laws of deductive logic are, in some sense, necessary laws. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
