Jon, John, List Jon, thank you for pointing out that Jappy's work, which John referenced, is *not* about phaneroscopy but, rather, about semeiotic; and, similarly, that the Peirce snippets John quoted also -- as I see it, rather obviously -- concern semeiotic (specifically, semeiotic grammar) and not phaneroscopy/ phenomenology. I'll comment only on those three quotations here.
CSP: Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to the categories; but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does not imperatively call for any such division”(EP2 163, April 1903). Now this quotation is of considerable interest for several reasons. The entire short paragraph as it appears in EP2 reads: CSP: Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to the categories but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does not imperatively call for any such division. For a pure icon does not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It represents whatever it may represent, and, whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is an affair of suchness only. The icon/index/symbol trichotomy is introduced in Peirce's semeiotic grammar (along with two other trichotomies added somewhat later, namely, the qualisign/sinsign/legisign and the rheme/dicisign/argument). What is of interest to me here is that an icon "represent[ing] whatever it may represent, and, whatever it is like [and so being] an affair of suchness only," that this simplest of semeiotic structures in relation to the sign's object may, nonetheless, "undoubtedly be divided according to the [3] categories" is, on the face of it, a somewhat startling notion. So at some point in the slow read I'd like to take this up. The crucial distinction may be -- and as Joe Ransdell and I (and some others) discussed it on the List many years ago -- that between 'a *pure* icon' (does Peirce even regard a pure icon as really possible?) and 'iconicity' as, perhaps, the second passage John quoted suggests. CSP: But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon. (1903, CP 2.276) The third and last quotation John offered suggests that according to the trichotomic divisions of iconic signs, those 'hypoicons' partaking of "simple qualities" (images, such as paintings) are signs of "First Firstness;" while those representing (mainly) dyadic relations can similarly be considered signs of what we may now justifiably refer to as signs of 2nd firstness (diagrams); and finally that those hypoicons "which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else" (metaphors) may be considered signs of 3rd firstness. CSP: Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the mode of Firstness which they partake. Those which partake the simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors. (R478 62; EP2274, 1903) Whether or not one agrees with the details or the terminology or even the whole of the above trichotomic analysis (which, again, I'd rather postpone to much later in the slow read while, in fact, John didn't place his post in a slow read thread), yet, these quotations all refer to *applications of the categories* discovered in phenomenology to another science, viz., semeiotic, specifically, to the first branch of that science, semeiotic grammar. This tendency to conflate the application of the phenomenological categories -- and, perhaps, the application especially to semeiotic -- with the categories themselves is, in my view, one of the principal reasons why the slow read of De Tienne's slideshow presentation of phaneroscopy/ phenomenology, seems timely and important. Best, Gary R “Let everything happen to you Beauty and terror Just keep going No feeling is final” ― Rainer Maria Rilke *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> Virus-free. www.avg.com <http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail> <#DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2> On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 8:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > John, List: > > I have corrected the subject line since the cited writings by Jappy and > quoted statements by Peirce are not about phaneroscopy at all, but about > speculative grammar as the first branch of the normative science of logic > as semeiotic. Jappy himself recognizes this in the very first chapter of > his book. > > TJ: In his earlier writings, Peirce had made the categories, of which > there were five in the mid-1860s, dependent upon logic. By 1903, he had > created a new science to deal with this part of the system, which he called > ‘phenomenology’* and which was now independent of logic, presupposing only > concepts provided by mathematics. (p. 15) > *Later to be titled ‘phaneroscopy’, which studies the ‘phaneron’. (p. 190 > n. 9) > > TJ: For the moment, we note simply that the normative, as opposed to the > formal, mathematical aspect of logic – in other words, the philosophy of > representation – subdivides by the architectonic principle into three > branches, the first of which as we saw above, being speculative grammar. > This Peirce defines as the general theory of the nature and meaning of > signs and, since logic is a classificatory science, speculative grammar > determines, among other things, whether a sign is an icon, an index or a > symbol (CP 1.191, 1903). (p. 17) > > > Jappy's paper further clarifies that phenomenology/phaneroscopy provides > the *framework *for classifying signs in the 1903 taxonomy, but that task > itself clearly falls within speculative grammar. It is important not to > conflate the two by treating the latter as if it were a branch of the > former, since it also depends on esthetics and ethics as Peirce clearly > maintained. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Jun 13, 2021 at 11:21 PM John F. Sowa <s...@bestweb.net> wrote: > >> (For some mysterious reason, the content of my previous note disappeared.} >> >> As background reading material about phaneroscopy, I recommend some >> important papers by Tony Jappy. Unlike many publications that talk only >> about abstract issues, Tony J illustrates the abstract analysis with >> specific examples of paintings and other images. >> >> "Two Peircean approaches to the image: hypoiconicity and semiosis" by >> Tony Jappy: https://www.academia.edu/40389448 >> >> For a book by Jappy with many more examples, see *Peirce's 28 classes of >> signs and the philosophy of representation*, >> https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/45654/625766.pdf >> >> Jappy has published more articles on phaneroscopy and related issues, but >> these two references are a good place to start. >> >> John >> _________________________________ >> >> Some quotations by Peirce, which Jappy discusses: >> >> Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to the categories; but >> the mere completeness of the notion of the icon does not imperatively call >> for any such division”(EP2 163, April 1903). >> >> But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly by its >> similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be wanted, >> an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as a >> painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in >> itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon. (1903, CP >> 2.276) >> >> Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the mode of Firstness >> which they partake. Those which partake the simple qualities, or First >> Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly >> dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in >> their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative >> character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something >> else, are metaphors. (R478 62; EP2274, 1903) >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. 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