Cathy, List: CT: If I come upon a painting in a museum, and I know it is hanging in the museum because it is a portrait of 'someone', I just don't know who, and there is no label identifying who it is a portrait of, it would be a hypoicon. It reaches fullness as an icon to me once I find out who it is a portrait of. Correct?
I am not sure what you mean by "fulness as an icon," since a physical painting is never a *pure *icon--an unembodied quality merely *presenting *itself, not *representing *something else. It is *primarily *iconic in terms of its relation of resemblance to its object, but it also includes indexical and symbolic aspects. In particular, as Peirce himself says, it "is largely conventional [symbolic] in its mode of representation." Again, if the physical painting includes a "legend or label" that *informs *you of its object, then it is no longer *merely *a hypoicon--it is instead a dicisign/proposition, with an iconic part (the painting itself) and an indexical part (the legend/label), although the latter usually consists of words (symbolic). CT: I am trying to line this scenario up with First Firstness/Second Firstness/Third Firstness. These are distinctions between different classes of hypoicons--images, diagrams, and metaphors, respectively--rather than having anything to do with distinguishing a hypoicon from an icon. Again, my understanding of the latter is that a hypoicon is simply an *embodied *iconic sign. Regards, Jon S. On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 12:15 PM Synechism Center <synechismcen...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, List, > > Ahh... Thank you! That makes perfect sense when you describe it that way. > So... If I come upon a painting in a museum, and I know it is hanging in > the museum because it is a portrait of 'someone', I just don't know who, > and there is no label identifying who it is a portrait of, it would be a > hypoicon. It reaches fullness as an icon to me once I find out who it is a > portrait of. Correct? > > " CSP: But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object mainly > by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a substantive be > wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. Any material image, as > a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of representation; but in > itself, without legend or label it may be called a hypoicon. (1903, CP > 2.276) > > I am trying to line this scenario up with First Firstness/Second > Firstness/Third Firstness. > > Much appreciated, > > Cathy T. > > On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 12:51 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Cathy, Auke, List: >> >> CT: Imagine I am standing in front of the Mona Lisa. The 'painting' >> (canvas and frame),* if absent of the image of the Mona Lisa*, is a >> *hypoicon*. >> >> >> I respectfully disagree that the absence of the *image *is what would >> cause a physical painting to be classified as a hypoicon. Rather, as Auke >> points out, it is the absence of a "legend or label" telling us who or what >> is being depicted. >> >> In accordance with CP 2.276 (quoted below), I understand "hypoicon" to be >> Peirce's term for any embodied sign that is *primarily *iconic, a >> sinsign/token that represents its object by qualitatively resembling it and >> does not otherwise indicate what that object is. A hypoicon is also not in >> any kind of existential relation to its object, as a photograph would be, >> which is why Peirce classifies the latter as primarily indexical rather >> than iconic. When a "legend or label" *is *provided with a physical >> painting, that serves as an indexical part of the overall sign, turning it >> into a dicisign/proposition by separately identifying its object. >> >> CSP: A man's portrait with a man's name written under it is strictly a >> proposition, although its syntax is not that of speech, and although the >> portrait itself not only represents, but is, a Hypoicon. (CP 2.320, EP >> 2:282, 1903) >> >> >> CSP: It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon nor a pure index can >> assert anything, an index which forces something to be an *icon*, as a >> weathercock does, or which forces us to regard it as an *icon*, as the >> legend under a portrait does, does make an assertion, and forms a >> *proposition*. (EP 2:307, 1904) >> >> CSP: But a pure picture without a legend only says "*something *is like >> this." True he attaches what amounts to a legend. But that only makes his >> sentence analogous to a portrait we will say of Leopardi with Leopardi >> written below it. It conveys its information to a person who knows who >> Leopardi was, and to anybody else it only says "something called Leopardi >> looked like this." (CP 8.183, EP 2:496, 1909) >> >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 10:35 AM Auke van Breemen < >> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> wrote: >> >>> Cathy, >>> >>> Gary must speak for himself, but I like the way in which you exemplfy >>> the 'without legend or label' part of Peirce's determination of a >>> painting as a hypericon. >>> >>> best, >>> >>> Auke van Breemen >>> >>> Op 15 juni 2021 om 17:26 schreef Synechism Center < >>> synechismcen...@gmail.com>: >>> >>> Gary R, List, >>> >>> From your last post.... >>> >>> " CSP: But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its object >>> mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a >>> substantive be wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. Any >>> material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of >>> representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be called a >>> hypoicon. (1903, CP 2.276) >>> >>> The third and last quotation John offered suggests that according to the >>> trichotomic divisions of iconic signs, those 'hypoicons' partaking of >>> "simple qualities" (images, such as paintings) are signs of "First >>> Firstness;" while those representing (mainly) dyadic relations can >>> similarly be considered signs of what we may now justifiably refer to as >>> signs of 2nd firstness (diagrams); and finally that those hypoicons "which >>> represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a >>> parallelism in something else" (metaphors) may be considered signs of 3rd >>> firstness. >>> >>> CSP: Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the mode of >>> Firstness which they partake. Those which partake the simple qualities, or >>> First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly >>> dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in >>> their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative >>> character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something >>> else, are metaphors. (R478 62; EP2274, 1903)" >>> >>> Please correct me if I am not understanding... I always try to relate >>> these topics to real life, as that is my intention with trying to help a >>> more *general *audience understand. ..... Imagine I am standing in >>> front of the Mona Lisa. The 'painting' (canvas and frame),* if absent >>> of the image of the Mona Lisa*, is a *hypoicon*. It is a 'container', >>> so to speak, a Firstness, and a potential *placement* for 2nd firstness >>> (that which the artist applies to the canvas), the Mona Lisa becomes a >>> metaphor when I gaze at it and in my mind it represents a 16th century >>> woman with knowing eyes. This *activity *that my mind is now engaged in >>> is 3rd firstness. It is the *manifestation of the original potentiality >>> of First Firstness.* >>> >>> Semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin would expand on this idea of continued >>> interaction with the painting as *dialogic*. >>> >>> Am I making sense? >>> >>> Cathy T. >>> >>>
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