Cathy, Gary must speak for himself, but I like the way in which you exemplfy the 'without legend or label' part of Peirce's determination of a painting as a hypericon.
best, Auke van Breemen > Op 15 juni 2021 om 17:26 schreef Synechism Center <synechismcen...@gmail.com>: > > Gary R, List, > > From your last post.... > > > > > " CSP: But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent > its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If a > substantive be wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. Any > material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode of > representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be called a > hypoicon. (1903, CP 2.276) > > > > > > The third and last quotation John offered suggests that according to the > trichotomic divisions of iconic signs, those 'hypoicons' partaking of > "simple qualities" (images, such as paintings) are signs of "First > Firstness;" while those representing (mainly) dyadic relations can similarly > be considered signs of what we may now justifiably refer to as signs of 2nd > firstness (diagrams); and finally that those hypoicons "which represent the > representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in > something else" (metaphors) may be considered signs of 3rd firstness. > > > > > CSP: Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the > mode of Firstness which they partake. Those which partake the simple > qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the > relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by > analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent > the representative character of a representamen by representing a parallelism > in something else, are metaphors. (R478 62; EP2274, 1903)" > > > > > > > > > Please correct me if I am not understanding... I always try to relate > > these topics to real life, as that is my intention with trying to help a > > more general audience understand. ..... Imagine I am standing in front of > > the Mona Lisa. The 'painting' (canvas and frame), if absent of the image of > > the Mona Lisa, is a hypoicon. It is a 'container', so to speak, a > > Firstness, and a potential placement for 2nd firstness (that which the > > artist applies to the canvas), the Mona Lisa becomes a metaphor when I gaze > > at it and in my mind it represents a 16th century woman with knowing eyes. > > This activity that my mind is now engaged in is 3rd firstness. It is the > > manifestation of the original potentiality of First Firstness. > > Semiotician Mikhail Bakhtin would expand on this idea of continued > interaction with the painting as dialogic. > > Am I making sense? > > Cathy T. > > > > On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 10:44 AM Gary Richmond < gary.richm...@gmail.com > mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > Jon, John, List > > > > Jon, thank you for pointing out that Jappy's work, which John > > referenced, is not about phaneroscopy but, rather, about semeiotic; and, > > similarly, that the Peirce snippets John quoted also -- as I see it, rather > > obviously -- concern semeiotic (specifically, semeiotic grammar) and not > > phaneroscopy/ phenomenology. I'll comment only on those three quotations > > here. > > > > > > > > > CSP: Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided > > according to the categories; but the mere completeness of the notion of the > > icon does not imperatively call for any such division”(EP2 163, April 1903). > > > > > > > > > > Now this quotation is of considerable interest for several reasons. > > The entire short paragraph as it appears in EP2 reads: > > > > > > > > > CSP: Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided > > according to the categories but the mere completeness of the notion of the > > icon does not imperatively call for any such division. For a pure icon does > > not draw any distinction between itself and its object. It represents > > whatever it may represent, and, whatever it is like, it in so far is. It is > > an affair of suchness only. > > > > > > > > > > The icon/index/symbol trichotomy is introduced in Peirce's > > semeiotic grammar (along with two other trichotomies added somewhat later, > > namely, the qualisign/sinsign/legisign and the rheme/dicisign/argument). > > > > What is of interest to me here is that an icon "represent[ing] > > whatever it may represent, and, whatever it is like [and so being] an > > affair of suchness only," that this simplest of semeiotic structures in > > relation to the sign's object may, nonetheless, "undoubtedly be divided > > according to the [3] categories" is, on the face of it, a somewhat > > startling notion. So at some point in the slow read I'd like to take this > > up. The crucial distinction may be -- and as Joe Ransdell and I (and some > > others) discussed it on the List many years ago -- that between 'a pure > > icon' (does Peirce even regard a pure icon as really possible?) and > > 'iconicity' as, perhaps, the second passage John quoted suggests. > > > > > > > > > CSP: But a sign may be iconic, that is, may > > represent its object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of > > being. If a substantive be wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a > > hypoicon. Any material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in > > its mode of representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may > > be called a hypoicon. (1903, CP 2.276) > > > > > > > > > > The third and last quotation John offered suggests that according > > to the trichotomic divisions of iconic signs, those 'hypoicons' partaking > > of "simple qualities" (images, such as paintings) are signs of "First > > Firstness;" while those representing (mainly) dyadic relations can > > similarly be considered signs of what we may now justifiably refer to as > > signs of 2nd firstness (diagrams); and finally that those hypoicons "which > > represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a > > parallelism in something else" (metaphors) may be considered signs of 3rd > > firstness. > > > > > > > > > CSP: Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided > > according to the mode of Firstness which they partake. Those which partake > > the simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which > > represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one > > thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which > > represent the representative character of a representamen by representing a > > parallelism in something else, are metaphors. (R478 62; EP2274, 1903) > > > > > > > > > > Whether or not one agrees with the details or the terminology or > > even the whole of the above trichotomic analysis (which, again, I'd rather > > postpone to much later in the slow read while, in fact, John didn't place > > his post in a slow read thread), yet, these quotations all refer to > > applications of the categories discovered in phenomenology to another > > science, viz., semeiotic, specifically, to the first branch of that > > science, semeiotic grammar. > > > > This tendency to conflate the application of the phenomenological > > categories -- and, perhaps, the application especially to semeiotic -- with > > the categories themselves is, in my view, one of the principal reasons why > > the slow read of De Tienne's slideshow presentation of phaneroscopy/ > > phenomenology, seems timely and important. > > > > Best, > > > > Gary R > > > > > > > > “Let everything happen to you > > Beauty and terror > > Just keep going > > No feeling is final” > > ― Rainer Maria Rilke > > > > > > > > Gary Richmond > > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > > Communication Studies > > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail > > Virus-free. www.avg.com > > http://www.avg.com/email-signature?utm_medium=email&utm_source=link&utm_campaign=sig-email&utm_content=webmail > > > > On Mon, Jun 14, 2021 at 8:26 PM Jon Alan Schmidt < > > jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com > wrote: > > > > > > > John, List: > > > > > > I have corrected the subject line since the cited writings by > > > Jappy and quoted statements by Peirce are not about phaneroscopy at all, > > > but about speculative grammar as the first branch of the normative > > > science of logic as semeiotic. Jappy himself recognizes this in the very > > > first chapter of his book. > > > > > > > > > > > > > TJ: In his earlier writings, > > > Peirce had made the categories, of which there were five in the > > > mid-1860s, dependent upon logic. By 1903, he had created a new science to > > > deal with this part of the system, which he called ‘phenomenology’* and > > > which was now independent of logic, presupposing only concepts provided > > > by mathematics. (p. 15) > > > > *Later to be titled ‘phaneroscopy’, which studies the > > > > ‘phaneron’. (p. 190 n. 9) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > TJ: For the moment, we note > > > simply that the normative, as opposed to the formal, mathematical aspect > > > of logic – in other words, the philosophy of representation – subdivides > > > by the architectonic principle into three branches, the first of which as > > > we saw above, being speculative grammar. This Peirce defines as the > > > general theory of the nature and meaning of signs and, since logic is a > > > classificatory science, speculative grammar determines, among other > > > things, whether a sign is an icon, an index or a symbol (CP 1.191, 1903). > > > (p. 17) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Jappy's paper further clarifies that > > > phenomenology/phaneroscopy provides the framework for classifying signs > > > in the 1903 taxonomy, but that task itself clearly falls within > > > speculative grammar. It is important not to conflate the two by treating > > > the latter as if it were a branch of the former, since it also depends on > > > esthetics and ethics as Peirce clearly maintained. > > > > > > Regards, > > > > > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > > > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran > > > Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > > > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > > > > > On Sun, Jun 13, 2021 at 11:21 PM John F. Sowa < > > > s...@bestweb.net mailto:s...@bestweb.net > wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > (For some mysterious reason, the content of my previous > > > > note disappeared.} > > > > > > > > As background reading material about phaneroscopy, I > > > > recommend some important papers by Tony Jappy. Unlike many > > > > publications that talk only about abstract issues, Tony J illustrates > > > > the abstract analysis with specific examples of paintings and other > > > > images. > > > > > > > > "Two Peircean approaches to the image: hypoiconicity > > > > and semiosis" by Tony Jappy: https://www.academia.edu/40389448 > > > > > > > > For a book by Jappy with many more examples, see > > > > Peirce's 28 classes of signs and the philosophy of representation, > > > > https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/45654/625766.pdf > > > > > > > > Jappy has published more articles on phaneroscopy and > > > > related issues, but these two references are a good place to start. > > > > > > > > John > > > > _________________________________ > > > > > > > > Some quotations by Peirce, which Jappy discusses: > > > > > > > > Now the Icon may undoubtedly be divided according to > > > > the categories; but the mere completeness of the notion of the icon > > > > does not imperatively call for any such division”(EP2 163, April 1903). > > > > > > > > But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its > > > > object mainly by its similarity, no matter what its mode of being. If > > > > a substantive be wanted, an iconic [sign] may be termed a hypoicon. > > > > Any material image, as a painting, is largely conventional in its mode > > > > of representation; but in itself, without legend or label it may be > > > > called a hypoicon. (1903, CP 2.276) > > > > > > > > Hypoicons may roughly [be] divided according to the > > > > mode of Firstness which they partake. Those which partake the simple > > > > qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the > > > > relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by > > > > analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams; those which > > > > represent the representative character of a representamen by > > > > representing a parallelism in something else, are metaphors. (R478 62; > > > > EP2274, 1903) > > > > > > > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > > > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" > > > to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. 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