Helmut, List: HR: Nevertheless, wouldn´t you say, that an individual can construct reality in the following sense:
According to Peirce, *real *possibilities are those that are *capable *of being actualized. CSP: That a possibility which *should* never be actualized, (in the sense of having a bearing upon conduct that might conceivably be contemplated,) would be a nullity is a form of stating the principle of pragmaticism. One obvious consequence is that the potential, or really possible, must always *refer* to the actual. The possible is what *can become actual*. A possibility which could not be actualized would be absurd, of course. (R 288:69[134-135], 1905) Hence, actualizing a possibility is *not *constructing reality--the possibility was *already *real, *regardless *of whether it would ever get actualized. HR: Theologically, is the divine creation an act of setting logical (and maybe value related, like cosmologic constants, in case these don´t derive from pure logic) limits for the natural "Tohu Va Bohu"? Yes, in the sense that the actualization of any one possibility always precludes the actualization of others--at a minimum, the negation of that same possibility. Peirce says that in the beginning, "there must then have been a tohu-bohu of which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true universally. There must have been a little of everything conceivable" (CP 6.490, 1908), and "[i]t must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that the world of forms comes about" (CP 6.196, 1898). However, I would quibble with calling the initial state "natural," since I believe that every Platonic world is *also *a divine creation in accordance with Peirce's blackboard diagram (see CP 6.203-208, 1898). HR: Reality consists of 1. uninstantiated possibilities or uninstantiated necessary failures (depending on how you look at it), and 2. existing elements, being, For Peirce, reality also includes 3. conditional necessities, i.e., habits/laws. HR: According to this quote, reality would be a subset of being, i.e. the other way. Yes, Peirce describes existence as a subset of reality and reality as a subset of being. CSP: Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of any assertion about them. (CP 6.349, 1902) The other mode of being is fiction, "For the fictive is that whose characters depend upon what characters somebody attributes to it" (CP 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903). HR: The nonexisting reality, we are talking about, does not exist for any individual in the universe, but for the universe itself, as a whole, it exists. Unactualized possibilities do not "*exist *in its strict philosophical sense of 'react with the other like things in the environment'" (CP 6.495, c. 1906), but they do "exist" in the *logical *sense of belonging to a universe of discourse, namely, what Peirce calls the First Universe of Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 9, 2022 at 9:42 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > Supplement: > > So far it seems to me, that existence or being is a subset of reality: > Reality consists of 1. uninstantiated possibilities or uninstantiated > necessary failures (depending on how you look at it), and 2. existing > elements, being, On the other hand, Peirce writes (from Commens Dictionary): > > 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349 > Reality […] is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is > that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of > any assertion about them. > > According to this quote, reality would be a subset of being, i.e. the > other way. I guess, the solution of this contradiction is, that when one > talks about existence/being, he*she has to say, for whom something exists: > The nonexisting reality, we are talking about, does not exist for any > individual in the universe, but for the universe itself, as a whole, it > exists. Or? > > > Jon, Jack, List, > > > > Thank you! I see, that reality is "that which is as it is regardless of > what anyone thinks about it". I am not a postmodernist or radical > constructivist. Nevertheless, wouldn´t you say, that an individual can > construct reality in the following sense: On one hand, possibilities are > parts of reality: A not yet fulfilled possibility is real but not existing, > and with a fulfilled possibility, this fulfilment is something that exists, > and this existence is a part of reality too, which it hasn´t been before? > > > > So, possibilities cannot be constructed (do radical constructivists or > postmodernists claim they can?), but their fulfillment or instantiation > can? > > > > About this question the background question arises, what possibility is > anyway: Are possibilities positive characters, or is everything possible by > nature, except what is (e.g. logically) excluded? Theologically, is the > divine creation an act of setting logical (and maybe value related, like > cosmologic constants, in case these don´t derive from pure logic) limits > for the natural "Tohu Va Bohu"? In this case, nonexistent reality would not > be uninstantiated possibility, but uninstantiated limitation of its, > uninstantiated necessary failure. > > > > Best Regards, Helmut >
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