Jon, you wrote: "Yes, Peirce describes existence as a subset of reality and reality as a subset of being.".
At first, this looks logically false: Two non-identical things. each one being a subset of the other. So far, your resp. Peirce´s solution in the case of reality and existence is, that there are two kinds of existence. I have another, maybe not contradictional, solution: The subset relation can reverse, if applied to different system hierarchies. Example: Mouse is a subset of mammal, and mammal is a subset of mouse. In the system hierarchy "composition from traits", mammal is a subset of mouse, because being a mammal is only one trait of a mouse. In the system hierarchy "taxonomic classification", mouse is a subset of mammal. This reverse subset relation in composition versus subsumption (classification) goes back to Stanley N. Salthe. Best Regards, Helmut > Gesendet: Freitag, den 09.09.2022 um 19:20 Uhr > Von: "Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > An: Peirce-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] two kinds of vibration > > Helmut, List: > > HR: Nevertheless, wouldn´t you say, that an individual can construct > reality in the following sense: > > > According to Peirce, *real *possibilities are those that are *capable *of > being actualized. > > CSP: That a possibility which *should* never be actualized, (in the sense > of having a bearing upon conduct that might conceivably be contemplated,) > would be a nullity is a form of stating the principle of pragmaticism. One > obvious consequence is that the potential, or really possible, must always > *refer* to the actual. The possible is what *can become actual*. A > possibility which could not be actualized would be absurd, of course. (R > 288:69[134-135], 1905) > > > Hence, actualizing a possibility is *not *constructing reality--the > possibility was *already *real, *regardless *of whether it would ever get > actualized. > > HR: Theologically, is the divine creation an act of setting logical (and > maybe value related, like cosmologic constants, in case these don´t derive > from pure logic) limits for the natural "Tohu Va Bohu"? > > > Yes, in the sense that the actualization of any one possibility always > precludes the actualization of others--at a minimum, the negation of that > same possibility. Peirce says that in the beginning, "there must then have > been a tohu-bohu of which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true > universally. There must have been a little of everything conceivable" (CP > 6.490, 1908), and "[i]t must be by a contraction of the vagueness of that > potentiality of everything in general, but of nothing in particular, that > the world of forms comes about" (CP 6.196, 1898). However, I would quibble > with calling the initial state "natural," since I believe that every > Platonic world is *also *a divine creation in accordance with Peirce's > blackboard diagram (see CP 6.203-208, 1898). > > HR: Reality consists of 1. uninstantiated possibilities or uninstantiated > necessary failures (depending on how you look at it), and 2. existing > elements, being, > > > For Peirce, reality also includes 3. conditional necessities, i.e., > habits/laws. > > HR: According to this quote, reality would be a subset of being, i.e. the > other way. > > > Yes, Peirce describes existence as a subset of reality and reality as a > subset of being. > > CSP: Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other > characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. > Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of > which is that things that are real are whatever they really are, > independently of any assertion about them. (CP 6.349, 1902) > > > The other mode of being is fiction, "For the fictive is that whose > characters depend upon what characters somebody attributes to it" (CP > 5.152, EP 2:209, 1903). > > HR: The nonexisting reality, we are talking about, does not exist for any > individual in the universe, but for the universe itself, as a whole, it > exists. > > > Unactualized possibilities do not "*exist *in its strict philosophical > sense of 'react with the other like things in the environment'" (CP 6.495, > c. 1906), but they do "exist" in the *logical *sense of belonging to a > universe of discourse, namely, what Peirce calls the First Universe of > Experience (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Sep 9, 2022 at 9:42 AM Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> wrote: > > > Supplement: > > > > So far it seems to me, that existence or being is a subset of reality: > > Reality consists of 1. uninstantiated possibilities or uninstantiated > > necessary failures (depending on how you look at it), and 2. existing > > elements, being, On the other hand, Peirce writes (from Commens Dictionary): > > > > 1902 | Minute Logic: Chapter IV. Ethics (Logic IV) | CP 6.349 > > Reality […] is a special mode of being, the characteristic of which is > > that things that are real are whatever they really are, independently of > > any assertion about them. > > > > According to this quote, reality would be a subset of being, i.e. the > > other way. I guess, the solution of this contradiction is, that when one > > talks about existence/being, he*she has to say, for whom something exists: > > The nonexisting reality, we are talking about, does not exist for any > > individual in the universe, but for the universe itself, as a whole, it > > exists. Or? > > > > > Jon, Jack, List, > > > > > > Thank you! I see, that reality is "that which is as it is regardless of > > what anyone thinks about it". I am not a postmodernist or radical > > constructivist. Nevertheless, wouldn´t you say, that an individual can > > construct reality in the following sense: On one hand, possibilities are > > parts of reality: A not yet fulfilled possibility is real but not existing, > > and with a fulfilled possibility, this fulfilment is something that exists, > > and this existence is a part of reality too, which it hasn´t been before? > > > > > > So, possibilities cannot be constructed (do radical constructivists or > > postmodernists claim they can?), but their fulfillment or instantiation > > can? > > > > > > About this question the background question arises, what possibility is > > anyway: Are possibilities positive characters, or is everything possible by > > nature, except what is (e.g. logically) excluded? Theologically, is the > > divine creation an act of setting logical (and maybe value related, like > > cosmologic constants, in case these don´t derive from pure logic) limits > > for the natural "Tohu Va Bohu"? In this case, nonexistent reality would not > > be uninstantiated possibility, but uninstantiated limitation of its, > > uninstantiated necessary failure. > > > > > > Best Regards, Helmut > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
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