Ben, List: I share your concern about describing the *genuine *triadic relation of mediating (or representing) with its three correlates (sign, object, interpretant) as if it were reducible to dyadic relations of determining, which could only be true if it were a *degenerate *triadic relation. It is not *false *to say, "the object determines the sign, which determines the interpretant," but it could be misleading because it omits the *mediation *of the sign by which the object *also *determines the interpretant. Indeed, it is more accurate to say, "the object determines the sign to determine the interpretant." Peirce expresses this even more precisely as follows, in what I consider to be one of his very best definitions of a sign.
CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907) That is why I call the relation "mediating" in my Existential Graph (EG) that I posted on Friday, rather than "representing," although the latter could be substituted with some loss of generality. Here is that EG again. [image: image.png] Peirce himself apparently never scribed this EG, but he did scribe the one for the genuine triadic relation of *giving *with its three correlates (giver, gift, recipient). As one would expect for *any *genuine triadic relation, it is isomorphic with the EG above, except that instead of three heavy lines of identity with the correlate names attached, the relation name has three dots (also called "hooks" or "pegs" in other writings) to which Peirce assigned those names in the subsequent text. Here is an image of that handwritten sentence in R 670 (1911). [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jan 7, 2024 at 11:54 AM Ben Udell <baud...@gmail.com> wrote: > Hi, Robert, all, > > I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that > you quote in your message, > > *The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a > Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or > Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and > Second. A First is something to which (or, more accurately, to some > substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) attention may be > directed. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; while a Second > is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness. > An object in the proper sense is a Second.* (EP 2: 271) > > We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce > meant by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to > the categories. Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others, > argued that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories. > > I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to viewing > the sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being determined > by the object. At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that I could > find (I happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came up with a > quote that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I could > remember (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message about > it), but I don't want send anybody on a wild goose chase. > > Folks, here, by the way, is a link to Robert's "76 DEFINITIONS OF THE SIGN > BY C.S. PEIRCE" > http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm > > It includes added quotes absent from the Arisbe version. > > Robert, you wrote below that "*O → S → I*" reads: > > "*O determines S, which determines I*." > > I haven't tried to learn any category theory, since I got intimidated by > its being reputedly based in very high or abstract algebra. > > Generally I recall people saying that — > > an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant > > — rather than that — > > an object determines a sign, which determines an interpretant > > — a phrasing which makes the sign's determination of an interpretant seem > possibly coincidental to the sign's being determined by an object, like > dominoes toppling, each one the next, though the earlier dominoes are not > finally-caused to topple the later ones (except if they are literal > dominoes that some person set up to fall that way). I remember (though not > in detail) a whole lot of discussion of this at peirce-l. Does the > category-theoretical understanding of "O determines S, which determines I" > avoid that seeming problem? To put it another way, how does "*O → S → I*" > keep from breaking down into dyads "*O → S*" and "*S → I*"? I'm not > trying to be argumentative, I'm actually wondering. > > Best, Ben >
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