Jerry, Jon, List,
There is no single theory by Peirce that can explain everything. For any
particular quotation, it's important to study the context to determine which
theory (or theories) Peirce was using when he wrote that paragraph.
JLRC> We seem to be on different wavelengths... It seems to me that there is a
profound distinction between a categorical decision to express a feeling /
emotion and experiencing a relation with the exterior world... Further the
design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two nouns into
a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine to create
Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. Perhaps the modern usage of
symbols differs at a foundational level of logical meanings than during the CSP
era.
Peirce's background in philosophy, science, formal logic, and semeiotic is very
much at the same level as modern developments in the cognitive sciences
(Philosopy, Psychology, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, Neuroscience, and
Anthropology). At Peirce conferences (Sesquicentennial in 1989 and Centennial
in 2019), there were many specialists from all those fields who showed how
modern and up-to-date his contributions have been.
In the quotations cited by Jon (copy below), the context shows that Peirce was
addressing different issues from different areas of his vast range of thought.
In some cases, the issues are about logic, in other cases phaneroscopy or some
other field may be more relevant.
I agree with Jon that "We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other
common noun for "camel" in this passage."
But it's essential to ask in what context Peirce might happen to mention those
three words. If it's merely to use those words as signs, he might talk about
them in the same way. But if he is talking about feelings, such as a headache,
he is more likely to be talking about phaneroscopy. If he is talking about an
orange, he might be talking about the chemistry and methods for analyzing the
constituents of orange juice. And he might mention a camel for many other
reasons.
Issues about signs are relevant to chemical experiments in many ways. But when
Peirce talks about any science, he does so with a focus on applications of
logic to propositions stated in the terminology of that science. Issues about
interpretants of signs are, of course, relevant at the lowest levels of
interpretinf anything. But those issues are so detailed that a discussion at
that level might obscure, rather than clarify the more relevant issues.
Summary: when citing any quotation by Peirce, we need to consider the context
of the quotation and how it is related to the context we are discussing --
and consider how Peirce himself would relate those two different contexts.
'when we consider multiple contexts that happen to mention the same words, we
may have to interpret those words in different senses.
With his deep experience in lexicography for the Century Dictionary, Peirce
knew very well how words senses shift from one context to another. We must
always consider how and whether words from different contexts might be used in
different senses.
John
----------------------------------------
From: "Jerry LR Chandler" <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>
Sent: 1/11/24 4:09 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Cc: Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re:
Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Thanks for your answer.
We seem to be on different wavelengths.
On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" in
this passage.
It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical
decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the
exterior world.
One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external
experience is sexual copulation.
Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two
nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine
to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example.
Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical
meanings than during the CSP era.
I appreciate your responses.
Cheers
Jerry
____________________________________
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
To: Peirce-L
Every word is a token of a type--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a replica of a
rhematic symbol or symbolic rheme, and therefore a peculiar kind of rhematic
indexical sinsign.
CSP: Eighth, a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with its
Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls
up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of
that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and the Replica is interpreted
as a sign of an Object that is an instance of that concept. Thus, the Rhematic
Symbol either is, or is very like, what the logicians call a general term. The
Rhematic Symbol, like any Symbol, is necessarily itself of the nature of a
general type, and is thus a Legisign. Its Replica, however, is a Rhematic
Indexical Sinsign of a peculiar kind, in that the image it suggests to the mind
acts upon a Symbol already in that mind to give rise to a general concept. ...
A Replica of the word "camel" is likewise a Rhematic Indexical Sinsign, being
really affected, through the knowledge of camels, common to the speaker and
auditor, by the real camel it denotes, even if this one is not individually
known to the auditor; and it is through such real connection that the word
"camel" calls up the idea of a camel. The same thing is true of the word
"phoenix." For although no phoenix really exists, real descriptions of the
phoenix are well known to the speaker and his auditor; and thus the word is
really affected by the Object denoted. (CP 2.261, EP 2:295, 1903)
We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" in
this passage. The word by itself is a name, its dynamical object is the general
concept that it denotes, its immediate object is the idea that can be
associated with it by virtue of previous collateral experience, its immediate
interpretant is its verbal definition describing the range of meanings that it
possibly could have, its dynamical interpretant is any effect that it actually
does have, and its final interpretant is the effect that it necessarily would
have under ideal circumstances, after infinite inquiry by an infinite
community. However, "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906)--each
dynamical interpretant is affected by the context of the word's utterance and
the interpreter's established habits of interpretation. Moreover ...
CSP: The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with
other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant
which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we
may use this language) would be the very Universe. (EP 2:304, c. 1901)
CSP: A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a
nature that a proposition is needed to represent it. There is but one
individual, or completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of
reality. A. fact is so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it
can be wholly represented in a simple proposition, and the term "simple," here,
has no absolute meaning, but is merely a comparative expression. (CP 5.549, EP
2:378, 1906)
CSP: {A]n Argument is no more built up of Propositions than a motion is built
up of positions. So to regard it is to neglect the very essence of it. ...
[P]ropositions are either roughly described states of Thought-motion, or are
artificial creations intended to render the description of Thought-motion
possible; and Names are creations of a second order serving to render the
representation of propositions possible. (R 295, 1906)
CSP: [N]o sign of a thing or kind of thing--the ideas of signs to which
concepts belong--can arise except in a proposition; and no logical operation
upon a proposition can result in anything but a proposition; so that
non-propositional signs can only exist as constituents of propositions. But it
is not true, as ordinarily represented, that a proposition can be built up of
non-propositional signs. The truth is that concepts are nothing but indefinite
problematic judgments. The concept of man [or headache or orange] necessarily
involves the thought of the possible being of a man [or headache or orange];
and thus it is precisely the judgment, "There may be a man."(CP 4.583, 1906)
In short, words as names of concepts are artifacts used to formulate
propositions describing facts prescinded from the real and continuous
inferential process of semiosis. That is why Existential Graphs, as individual
frames in "a moving-picture of Thought" (CP 4.11, 1906), always represent
propositions. In the Beta part, a name typically cannot be scribed by itself,
it must be attached to at least one line of identity. As I said before, this
attribution of a general (indeterminate) concept to an indefinite individual
makes the former more determinate and the latter more definite. The logical
meaning of a concept (second grade of clearness) is the continuum of all
possible propositions that would truthfully affirm or deny it of something,
while its pragmatistic meaning (third grade of clearness) is a general mental
habit described by a subjunctive conditional proposition.
CSP: Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you
conceive the object of your conception to have: then the general mental habit
that consists in the production of these effects is the whole meaning of your
concept. (R 318, 1907)
CSP: I do not deny that a concept, proposition, or argument may be a logical
interpretant. I only insist that it cannot be the final logical interpretant,
for the reason that it is itself a sign of that very kind that has itself a
logical interpretant. The habit alone, though it may be a sign in some other
way, is not a sign in that way in which the sign of which it is the logical
interpretant is a sign. The habit conjoined with the motive and the conditions
has the action for its energetic interpretant; but action cannot be a logical
interpretant, because it lacks generality. The concept which is a logical
interpretant is only imperfectly so. It somewhat partakes of the nature of a
verbal definition, and is as inferior to the habit, and much in the same way,
as a verbal definition is inferior to the real definition. The deliberately
formed, self-analyzing habit,--self-analyzing because formed by the aid of
analysis of the exercises that nourished it,--is the living definition, the
veritable and final logical interpretant. Consequently, the most perfect
account of a concept that words can convey will consist in a description of the
habit which that concept is calculated to produce. But how otherwise can a
habit be described than by a description of the kind of action to which it
gives rise, with the specification of the conditions and of the motive? (EP
2:418, 1907)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt
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