List 

My own view of Peirce and objective idealism [ 6.24] is that Peirce, by this 
term, means the reality of ‘matter as effete mind'; that is the Aristotelian 
view that the two are integrated.  Therefore, I’m not convinced of any 
references to platonism. 

As for Jerrys’ post - my reading of it [and I could be wrong!] was that he was 
referring to Peirce’s focus on Dicisigns as propositions, ie, those triads 
which incorporate Secondness in their Interpretants,and  thus ’say something 
about something' [ Stjernfelt p.51] ie,, they provide sourced, connected 
[indexical] information about the Dynamic Object. “A proposition is a 
representamen which is not an argument but which separately indicates what 
object it is intended to represent” 1903: EP 2;204. Without such indexical 
connections with the object. [MS[R]491.5 - you easily move into what Marty 
calls ‘magical thinking’ 

The lack of this indexical reference to the object - enables unscientific 
conclusions. 

See F.Stjernfelt Natural Propositions 
Docent Press 2014.

See also Robert Marty’s The Lattice of Five Paths [ in academia.edu 
<http://academia.edu/>]. 

Edwina



> On Nov 2, 2024, at 1:02 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> 
> wrote:
> 
> Jon S, Jerry, List,
> 
> Did Peirce reject Platonism in favor of scholastic realism regarding the 
> status of abstract objects?
> 
> That is not how I interpret Peirce's inquiries in metaphysics and cosmology. 
> Rather, I agree with several scholars who take Peirce at his word when he 
> says that the position he is developing is an extreme form of scholastic 
> realism and, at the same time, a form of objective idealism. Platonic 
> idealism is label used to characterize a wide range of metaphysical positions 
> that reject various forms of materialism in favor or objective idealism.
> 
> We've inherited two important distinctions from the classical metaphysics of 
> Plato and Aristotle:  the division between realism and nominalism, and the 
> division between idealism and materialism. As an interpretative strategy, I 
> agree with Richard Smyth, Kelly Parker and others who suggest that Peirce is 
> developing ideas in logic, epistemology and metaphysics that stem from the 
> Neo-Platonic tradition of Plotinus and Porphyry. See, for instance, Kelly 
> Parker's short essayhttps://kellyaparker.net/kap/Neoplatonism/, or Smyth's 
> Reading Peirce Reading.
> 
> The general thrust of Neo-Platonic thought is to seek a synthesis between 
> Platonic Idealism and Aristotelian Realism. Peirce, I think, is exploring the 
> various ways an evolutionary cosmology might open the door to a richer and 
> deeper synthesis of these two traditions in philosophical metaphysics.
> 
> So, no, I don't think Peirce rejects Platonism in favor of scholastic 
> realism. As an interpretative strategy, I tend to think such bold claims miss 
> the mark.
> 
> Yours,
> 
> Jeff
> 
> From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on 
> behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]>
> Sent: Saturday, November 2, 2024 4:22 PM
> To: Peirce-L <[email protected]>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Peirce and Anselm
>  
> Jerry, List:
> 
> As has generally been the case with your other recent posts, I frankly do not 
> see the relevance of this one to what the rest of us have been discussing. It 
> does not appear to have anything at all to do with the thread topic.
> 
> It is not a "conjecture" that Peirce rejected fictionalism, conceptualism, 
> and Platonism regarding the ontological status of abstract objects (including 
> propositions) in favor of scholastic realism. It is also not a "conjecture" 
> that he classified propositions as dicent symbols and therefore 
> legisigns/types, which do not (metaphysically) exist except when and where 
> they are embodied in sinsigns/tokens as replicas/instances.
> 
> I am not in any way seeking to downplay Peirce's originality as a thinker. 
> After all, he went well beyond the term logic of Aristotelian syllogisms by 
> inventing modern first-order predicate logic independently of Frege. In fact, 
> it is Peirce's notation for the latter (not Frege's), employing the 
> existential and universal quantifiers, that evolved (via Russell) into what 
> we use today.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> 
> On Fri, Nov 1, 2024 at 11:35 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> List, Jon, Gary, Helmut:
> On Nov 1, 2024, at 5:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] 
> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
> 
> Of course, Peirce rejected all three of these in favor of scholastic 
> realism--propositions do not (metaphysically) exist, but they are real as 
> representations of purported facts prescinded from reality as a whole.
> From the perspective of the histories of the sciences and the goals of 
> meaningful communication, I find this conjecture to nothing less than absurd.
> 
> CSP developed his notions of logic from chemical demonstrations and gives 
> many many examples of this throughout his texts. (Personal and scientific 
> integrity require every CSP scholar to acknowledge the scientific role of 
> these concepts in evaluating CSP texts.) These demonstrations of material 
> facts are remote from the assertions that CSP's originality is merely a minor 
> extension of "scholastic realism”  
> 
> I would suggest that the first four Aristotelian categories (substance, 
> quality, quantity, and relatives) are the principle basis of the developments 
> of the structuralism presented in:
> 
> Quality-signs, sin-signs, legi-signs,
> Images(icons), indicies, symbols
> Rhema, decisions, arguments
> 
> such that chemical demonstrations are grounded on the chemical indices as 
> constituents of chemical symbols and the “legi-signs" (identities) of the 
> sin-signs.
> 
> I would further suggest that for CSP, the role of the indices is placed in 
> the center of the eight other terms because it is a direct logical 
> quantitative connective to the qualities and term assignments of all 
> chemicaldemonstrations.  The corresponding grammar of the chemical 
> connectives (essential to semiosis) are expressions of the meanings of 
> connectivity of the semiotic with the semes (cognitive signs), the semiology 
> (legisigns) with the semantics. 
> 
> My reasoning for this logical perspectives is that it is consistent with 
> chemical practice, then and now. 
> The modern chemical practice is grounded in the TERM logic of Aristotelian 
> syllogisms, (chemical elements as names of objects) not the sentential logic 
> of modern first predicate logic grounded in various connectives that are 
> totally unrelated to CSP expressions of chemical connectives as the source of 
> lattice points.
> 
> In modern terminology, the Quali-signs (semiotic terms) determine the indices 
> of the sin-sign  (identity of the object) which in turn determine the 
> argument that generates the legi-sign (the name of the chemical object).  In 
> set theoretic terms, the set of indices (determined / demonstrated from) the 
> quali-sign are arranged to assign the organization of the legisign.   This 
> line of reasoning follows the structuralism of modern mathematics in the 
> sense of  [ “sets” —> "permutation groups” —> “categories”] for any chemical 
> object, including higher order perplex structures. 
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
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