Jeff, List Is the question around Platonic universals [Forms] one that refers to whether they function within an eternal a priori timeless nature? My understanding of Peircean universals is that they, as habits of Formation, are generated within and by matter as it evolves and interacts with other existents. [objective-idealism].
His whole outline of the emergence the universe [ 1.412] and 6.214—is as an evolutionary cosmology [6.102] “where all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of. Growth and to a Schelling-fashiooned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind” 6.102…. And “ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectibility. In this spreading they lose intensity and especially the power of affecting others, but gain generality and become welded with other ideas’. 6.104. In this reference, it seems to me that generals actually evolve within the universe - they are not stable or eternal. And since the three categories are basic modes within the universe - then, the universe has its own capacity to self-organize and generate these universals - as outlined in 1.412, where habits emerge and develop. That is - Peirce sets up a semiosic infrastructure, which, in my view, enables such an evolutionary universe. 1] He defines the three categorical modes of being as basic to the universe. 2] And Peirce’s outline of the Complete Sign as an irreducible triad as the basic method of such adaptive evolution sets up a method for the informational transformation of data from one Sign to another Sign, and, with the categories, the transformation of their input data into generals. ]See outline in 6.142]…”the affection of one idea by another”… “It is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the affecting idea as a subject”. 1908 MS[R]277 By a Sign is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its turn is capable of determining in a MInd something called its Interpretant, and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is particularly intended to define [very imperfectly as yet] a Complete Sign”. [my emphasis] 3] The concept of the Dicisign - which as just outlined, ]See outline in 6.142]…”the affection of one idea by another”… “It is that the affected idea is attached as a logical predicate to the affecting idea as a subject”. .. That is - Dicisgns, are not merely descriptive [ mental] of an object but are indexically connected to that object. As such, by induction, “a habit becomes established [ 6.145]. ….”Thus, by induction, a number of sensations followed by one reason become united under one general idea followed by he same reaction”…6.146. This sets up a habit or general.. Edwina > On Nov 2, 2024, at 4:55 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <[email protected]> > wrote: > > Jon S, all, > > My initial point was simply that we can trace the roots of objective idealism > to the writings of Plato. As such, it would be odd to insist that Peirce is > not a "Platonist" insofar as he is arguing for objective idealism in > metaphysics. > > Peirce traces the central theses that he groups under the heading of > objective Idealism to the kind of neo-Platonic metaphysics that is developed > by Schelling, and explored, on this side of the pond, by Emerson and Thoreau. > In the passage you cite, he points out that the "grotesque weldings" of > doctrines that are , on the one hand, nominalist in spirit, and, on the other > Platonist, are not, by any means, a natural fit. As such, it would be fair to > say that he is resisting such a grotesque welding of doctrines. > > Consider the point Peirce is making in pointing to the example of Westminster > Abbey. This is how I try to interpret that passage: metaphysical principles > do not live merely in the writings of philosophers. Rather, the principles > live and breathe in the heart and soul of entire cultures, and they are > expressed in its great works of architecture and literature. Philosophers who > write essays and books in metaphysics are trying to give expression of those > principles, but it is fair to assume the theories of the philosophers will, > by necessity, be mere summary accounts of something that is, in reality, much > larger and more significant that can be expressed in dry scientific prose. > > When I think of the example of Westminster Abbey, what comes to mind is that > the Abbey was built on the site where Catholicism was brought to the British > Isles--which was a little island in a river near where London became a > thriving metropolis. The Abbey was the site where Augustinian ideas and > principles were planted, took root and started to grow--well before the > fights between the Catholics and the Protestants shaped the religious and > political landscape of the greater Isles. The Augustinian ideas that took > root, were, in both body and spirit, largely developments of ideas explored > by Plato and, later, by Plontinus. > > Peirce points out that the philosophical principles and methods articulated > by Aristotle had such vitality that they shaped the commonsense of every > schoolboy--on both sides of the pond--for two millennia. A similar point can > be made, I believe, for the conception of the forms explored in the dialogues > of Plato. To appreciate the point, one need only look at the depth of the > moral and religious Ideals expressed in the architecture of the Abbey. The > Nineteenth century individuals of Peirce's day may have spoken a language > informed by the common sense of the peripatetic when they walked the streets > of London, but their eyes were lifted to the heavens by the representation of > the form of the Good in the spires of the Abbey. > > Similar points can be made about the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, but > I'll stop here. > > Hope that helps, > > Jeff > > > > > > > From: [email protected] <[email protected]> on > behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > Sent: Saturday, November 2, 2024 7:44 PM > To: Peirce-L <[email protected]> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] More on Peirce and Anselm > > Jeff, List: > > Peirce indeed explicitly and repeatedly endorses scholastic realism (some > possibilities and some generals are real) and objective idealism (matter is a > derived and special kind of mind), but Platonism (i.e., Platonic idealism) is > incompatible with both--there is a sense in which it is actually a form of > nominalism, because it maintains that abstract objects exist as individuals > in a different realm from concrete objects. > > CSP: Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible > misunderstanding that all other men are individualists, too--even the > scholastic realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." It > is true that there are indications of there having been some who thought so > in that greater darkness before the dawn of Aristotle's Analytics and Topics, > when such grotesque weldings of doctrine as that of nominalistic Platonism > are heard of, and when Roscellin may possibly have said that universals were > flatus vocis [breath of voice]. But I ask, can anybody who has seen > Westminster Abbey, who had read the Prologue to the Canterbury Tales, and who > stops to consider that the metaphysics of the Plantagenet age must have more > adequately represented the general intellectual standing of that age, when > metaphysics absorbed its greatest heuristic minds, than the metaphysics of > our day can represent our general intellectual condition, can any such person > believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals exist? > They certainly did not so opine, but regarded generals as modes of > determination of individuals; and such modes were recognized as being of the > nature of thought. (CP 5.503, c. 1905) > > CSP: I am myself a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe. Every > realist must, as such, admit that a general is a term and therefore a sign. > If, in addition, he holds that it is an absolute exemplar, this Platonism > passes quite beyond the question of nominalism and realism; and indeed the > doctrine of Platonic ideas has been held by the extremest nominalists. There > is some reason to suspect that it was shared by Roscellinus himself. (CP > 5.470, 1907) > > As Robert Lane summarizes in Peirce's Realism and Idealism, "the real > generals that correspond to hypostatically abstracted concepts are not > abstract individuals, and so Peirce’s realism about such generals does not > amount to nominalistic Platonism" (p. 134). Peirce also describes himself as > "an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much > further in the direction of scholastic realism" (CP 5.77n, EP 2:180, 1903). > By contrast, as far as I know, he never refers to himself as a Platonist or > neo-Platonist. > > Returning to the thread topic, I was hoping all along that you (Jeff) might > have something to say in response to my initial post > (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-10/msg00046.html). Any > thoughts on my four questions there? > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> > > On Sat, Nov 2, 2024 at 12:02 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Jon S, Jerry, List, > > Did Peirce reject Platonism in favor of scholastic realism regarding the > status of abstract objects? > > That is not how I interpret Peirce's inquiries in metaphysics and cosmology. > Rather, I agree with several scholars who take Peirce at his word when he > says that the position he is developing is an extreme form of scholastic > realism and, at the same time, a form of objective idealism. Platonic > idealism is label used to characterize a wide range of metaphysical positions > that reject various forms of materialism in favor or objective idealism. > > We've inherited two important distinctions from the classical metaphysics of > Plato and Aristotle: the division between realism and nominalism, and the > division between idealism and materialism. As an interpretative strategy, I > agree with Richard Smyth, Kelly Parker and others who suggest that Peirce is > developing ideas in logic, epistemology and metaphysics that stem from the > Neo-Platonic tradition of Plotinus and Porphyry. See, for instance, Kelly > Parker's short essayhttps://kellyaparker.net/kap/Neoplatonism/, or Smyth's > Reading Peirce Reading. > > The general thrust of Neo-Platonic thought is to seek a synthesis between > Platonic Idealism and Aristotelian Realism. Peirce, I think, is exploring the > various ways an evolutionary cosmology might open the door to a richer and > deeper synthesis of these two traditions in philosophical metaphysics. > > So, no, I don't think Peirce rejects Platonism in favor of scholastic > realism. As an interpretative strategy, I tend to think such bold claims miss > the mark. > > Yours, > > Jeff > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
