Jeff, List: Peirce indeed explicitly and repeatedly endorses *scholastic *realism (some possibilities and some generals are real) and *objective *idealism (matter is a derived and special kind of mind), but Platonism (i.e., Platonic idealism) is incompatible with both--there is a sense in which it is actually a form of nominalism, because it maintains that abstract objects *exist* as individuals in a different realm from concrete objects.
CSP: Individualists are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that all other men are individualists, too--even the scholastic realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." It is true that there are indications of there having been some who thought so in that greater darkness before the dawn of Aristotle's *Analytics *and *Topics*, when such grotesque weldings of doctrine as that of nominalistic Platonism are heard of, and when Roscellin may possibly have said that universals were *flatus vocis* [breath of voice]. But I ask, can anybody who has seen Westminster Abbey, who had read the Prologue to the *Canterbury Tales*, and who stops to consider that the metaphysics of the Plantagenet age must have more adequately represented the general intellectual standing of that age, when metaphysics absorbed its greatest heuristic minds, than the metaphysics of our day can represent our general intellectual condition, can any such person believe that the great doctors of that time believed that generals *exist*? They certainly did not so opine, but regarded generals as modes of determination of individuals; and such modes were recognized as being of the nature of thought. (CP 5.503, c. 1905) CSP: I am myself a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe. Every realist must, as such, admit that a general is a term and therefore a sign. If, in addition, he holds that it is an absolute exemplar, this Platonism passes quite beyond the question of nominalism and realism; and indeed the doctrine of Platonic ideas has been held by the extremest nominalists. There is some reason to suspect that it was shared by Roscellinus himself. (CP 5.470, 1907) As Robert Lane summarizes in *Peirce's Realism and Idealism*, "the real generals that correspond to hypostatically abstracted concepts are not abstract individuals, and so Peirce’s realism about such generals does not amount to nominalistic Platonism" (p. 134). Peirce also describes himself as "an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but going much further in the direction of scholastic realism" (CP 5.77n, EP 2:180, 1903). By contrast, as far as I know, he *never *refers to himself as a Platonist or neo-Platonist. Returning to the thread topic, I was hoping all along that you (Jeff) might have something to say in response to my initial post ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-10/msg00046.html). Any thoughts on my four questions there? Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Nov 2, 2024 at 12:02 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, Jerry, List, > > Did Peirce reject Platonism in favor of scholastic realism regarding the > status of abstract objects? > > That is not how I interpret Peirce's inquiries in metaphysics and > cosmology. Rather, I agree with several scholars who take Peirce at his > word when he says that the position he is developing is an extreme form of > scholastic realism and, at the same time, a form of objective idealism. > Platonic idealism is label used to characterize a wide range of > metaphysical positions that reject various forms of materialism in favor or > objective idealism. > > We've inherited two important distinctions from the classical metaphysics > of Plato and Aristotle: the division between realism and nominalism, and > the division between idealism and materialism. As an interpretative > strategy, I agree with Richard Smyth, Kelly Parker and others who suggest > that Peirce is developing ideas in logic, epistemology and metaphysics that > stem from the Neo-Platonic tradition of Plotinus and Porphyry. See, for > instance, Kelly Parker's short essay > https://kellyaparker.net/kap/Neoplatonism/, or Smyth's *Reading Peirce > Reading*. > > The general thrust of Neo-Platonic thought is to seek a synthesis between > Platonic Idealism and Aristotelian Realism. Peirce, I think, is exploring > the various ways an evolutionary cosmology might open the door to a richer > and deeper synthesis of these two traditions in philosophical metaphysics. > > So, no, I don't think Peirce rejects Platonism in favor of scholastic > realism. As an interpretative strategy, I tend to think such bold claims > miss the mark. > > Yours, > > Jeff >
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