Dear Folks--
 
The most difficult challenge Ben's discussion of collateral knowledge raises for me how to distinguish a sign from an object.  This would be no problem for me if I accepted that from of realism that asserts we have unmediated knowledge of objects that  exist in the world and we make up signs to refer to them so we can talk and think about them.  But I don't hold with this sort of realism.  I hold that we only know objects through signs. I believe that without representation I have no knowledge of tree or any of the other so called objects we suppose populate our world.   So I am left with explaining why ultimately someone needs to point to an actual tree in order to explain what the word "tree" or its synonyms mean. 
 
 
Here's my explanation.  All signs have objects  which are the multitude of sensuous impression which the sign unifies.  The collateral tree that Ben is so fond of holding up as the real McCoy and final arbiter of treeness is the same object that is refered to by the word tree.  And when Ben hold up that real tree or points to it or identifies it by whatever means he is simply identifing the object of a symbol  -- the symbol in this case being his pointing, holding up, directing our attention to or whatever means he is employing to interpret to us what he is talking about.  The word tree is no different in essence than whatever symbol Ben is using to identify that tree in the forest.  That is,  no different as long as they both call to our mind or represent the same object.  No word means anything to us beyond the object they repesent.  All objects are collateral to the sign.  They are one part of a inextricably three sided  phenomenon  -- objects are that in which qualities are represented to inhere.  Signs, qualities and objects are all collateral to one another. 
 
Maybe not $%^&*
 
Best wishes,
Jim Piat
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