Dear Jim, Yeah, I think that the idea is that Peirce was _already_ working on the questions of classifying the elements when Mendeleev published his.Periodic Table. Peirce might have already worked out some of the picture, so it could have been contemporaneous with his work on philosophical threefolds. Anyway, he'd have understood a triangle-like structure in Mendeleev's table without Mendeleev's having draw him a picture, and at that point, if not earlier, it would have HAD to give him pause. I mean, if one is of a mind to look across diverse fields for a recurrent pattern of logical categories, then one is going to _look_ at that sort of thing.
Off-list, Gary Richmond, who's quite busy, sent me this: 66~~~~~~~~~~ Chemistry expresses itself in Peirce's valency theory (the term is not his but Ken Ketner's who hasn't been given enough credit yet for his work in this area, something you hinted hadn't been developed in Pierce, etc.). In any event, see the reduction thesis at work in organic chemistry here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organic_nomenclature Trichotomy, the reduction thesis, the development of EGs, etc. all come from Peirce's knowledge of and work in chemistry. In some writings he makes this explicit. ~~~~~~~~~~99 As for mass, Peirce did not really consider physical quantities of that kind in his philosophy, especially since energy in its relationships required extensive special experiences to understand and quantify. I've talked about how -- because of the consideration of a finite constant signal-speed limit and its ramifications for measurement acts and for the unification of the conceptions of space and time -- special relativity may be able to be better based on the general and philosophical level than Newtonian physics was. Anyway, Peirce did explicitly consider (physical) matter a "second" -- effete mind, spent, exhausted, all birthed-out. Why would you consider, as a Second, an index relative to you, but consider as a First and a quality, some indices mutually relative to one another? If the indices' mutual relationality to one another is a form and quality, why isn't _an_ index's relation a form and quality, indeed its representational relations, to its object and to you -- why isn't that a form and quality and firstness? Why do you consider form a quality? Form is a kind of medium displaying all kinds of things -- rhythms, temporal things, and energy and vibrance as well. But basically, a shape in space looks like a balance of motion(s) and/or force(s). And when one looks not at loose forms -- patterns of bubbles on water, etc. -- but integral, cohesive forms, one sees structures, with structural integrities amidst their very flexibilities. To point to a thing with a certain quality is one thing, but to point at a thing which is a complex of things pointing at one another -- that seems another thing. The line of one's pointing can get caught up into the cross-woven "richochets" of indexicality in such a complex. Best, Ben ----- Original Message ----- From: Jim Piat To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Wednesday, May 10, 2006 9:32 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? Dear Ben, Just a side note on Mendaleev's talbe which I googled. Mendaleev's periodic table was published 1869 -- Peirce New list in 1867. So I don't think it could have been the pyramidism of Mendaleev's table that inspired Peirce. Plus Mendeleev's original table didn't look like much the pyramid we remember from chemistry class -- and he called it a matrix. But you got me thinking about this notion of pyamidism being an inspiration to Peirce. The triangle is a fascinating structure or form for sure but I think it was more the semantic form of the triad than its physical form that inspired Peirce. Just as location can be in semantic as well as physical space. Although as you know I think that physical space (even if it is itself a crude representation of some other reality) does underlie our notions of semantic space and that location and mass are not just semanticly related in common speech but are in fact related in the abstract theories of Enstein in which mass actually bends or creates the shape of space. So when we denote or point to an object its hard to say whether it is its mass or location we referencing. No doubt in our minds we probably think of ourselves as pointing to the object's form as well. But, I still maintain that in theory all object have a set of qualities (constituting their forms or firstness) which are distinct from their mass/location (otherness or secondness), In fact I don't think Peirce equated secondness with either mass or location. He seems to have seen the continuity of space and time as being part of what constituted the mediation of thirdness. But I think a specific place is a matter of secondness. And I don't think he included mass as a quality. I think he equated mass (as a force) with secondness though he does not say this explicitely. I think mass is more or less the at the philosophers pole of substance with form at the other pole and continutity (representation or thought) being what mediates between them. Didn't mean to go off in this direction but I suppose this is my lst attempt at responding to some of your recent critiques of my discussions of connotation and denotation. Which, as usual I find very interesting, helpful -- and valid. Cheers, Jim Piat I would _not_ bet that his first inspiration was the periodic table or something like it, or the chemical symbolisms that were developing before it. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
