Frances to Gary... It does seem that Peirce did not, in his available writings to us, use the term "intermediate" in any formal or categorical manner. To use the term "intermediate" informally or casually as a thirdness as he often did, in regard to say continuity and synechism as you noted, would however perhaps defeat the term "mediate" as an alternate for thirdness; but so be it.
In regard to the term "direct" it does seem to be say an iconic firstness, at least when used in seeking the initial proof of connectivity among premisses and conclusions in logical arguments, but not as a thirdness in the way "intermediate" might be, because the term "indirect" is used by Peirce as say a symbolic thirdness. The "direct" and the "indirect" are seemingly formal terms for him, while "intermediate" is not. The formal contrast at least in proof therefore is perhaps not so much between "direct and intermediate" as you suggested, but rather might be between "direct and indirect" as he often stated. It would be tidy for me in my statements about Peirce to align these terms as "immediate and intermediate and mediate" and as "direct and redirect and direct" but only if they properly expressed and conveyed his ideas, even as synonyms; yet he seemingly did not so align them, and there you have it. As you further mused in offering us an additional Peircean passage, the "proof" Peirce refers to in arguments may qualify him eventually as an "authority on authority" but only if he initially arrived at his conclusions through empirical means. If the "authorship and ownership" or "messenger" of a stated conclusion are important at all, given its necessary empirical foundation of course, they would then be perhaps "extra logical" rather than being merely illogical. In regard to the inner state of "desire" among semioticians or logicians, in their wishing or willing or wanting to seek truth in the first place, it might be held as an innate inclined trait; and thus aligned as habitual tendency, along with obstinate stubborn tenacity, and ruling authority. These methods of arriving at proof and truth, aside from any "desire" to attain them, are however not empirical; yet some senseless and illogical "desire" for them seems ever present. This "desire" for humans to be rational and reasonable is certainly a drive in the intellectual and scientific process, probably the outcome of evolution, but it seemingly cannot be accounted for by logic on its own solely alone. It would seem that objective logic must hence allow and admit some degree of psychologistic subjectivism after all. This may go to explaining why abduction is best located as an immediate or initial kind of inferred judgement, before empirical induction and eventual deduction. The "desire" might of course also be neatly aligned with "direct" monstration in finding logical proof. Gary wrote... Frances writes "My access to digital versions of Peircean writings is limited, but it would be interesting to seek and find out how many occasions the term "intermediate" appears in his texts, if indeed it has not already been done and posted to the list archive." A search for "intermediate" in the Collected Papers gives 46 hits. He seems to use the word mostly in connection with continuity (as per his doctrine of "synechism") and thus with Thirdness. For instance: "A fork in a road is a third, it supposes three ways; a straight road, considered merely as a connection between two places is second, but so far as it implies passing through intermediate places it is third.... Continuity represents Thirdness almost to perfection" (CP 3.337). In CP 4.75 (Thomas's selection) i don't see a "clear distinction between the immediate and the direct", but i do see an implied contrast between intermediate and direct. By the way, i came across another paragraph in Peirce that strikes me as very similar in tone and content to CP.475, though it is differently framed: [[[ Some persons fancy that bias and counter-bias are favorable to the extraction of truth--that hot and partisan debate is the way to investigate. This is the theory of our atrocious legal procedure. But Logic puts its heel upon this suggestion. It irrefragably demonstrates that knowledge can only be furthered by the real desire for it, and that the methods of obstinacy, of authority, and every mode of trying to reach a foregone conclusion, are absolutely of no value. These things are proved. The reader is at liberty to think so or not as long as the proof is not set forth, or as long as he refrains from examining it. Just so, he can preserve, if he likes, his freedom of opinion in regard to the propositions of geometry; only, in that case, if he takes a fancy to read Euclid, he will do well to skip whatever he finds with A, B, C, etc., for, if he reads attentively that disagreeable matter, the freedom of his opinion about geometry may unhappily be lost forever. ]]] -- CP 2.635, EP1 193 I wonder, would the "proof" Peirce refers to here qualify him as an authority on authority? --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
