Frances to Thomas...

Thanks for the added quotes on the term "intermediate" and its idea.
They will go into my Peircean pool of passages for future phishing.
To be cagey, it would seem that the term "intermediate" for Peirce
leans slightly right of center away from strict secondness and
somewhat toward slight thirdness, which alas is not at all what might
have been expected by me.

In the postscript to your message, you stated in effect that "directly
monstrative" is certainly a carefully crafted allusion to
"demonstrative" while at the same time more forceful and less
insistent than "demonstrative" in that the proof simply manages to
show what cannot possibly be described in the same way as "directly
monstrative" expresses what cannot possibly be said in a
"demonstrative" way. You then mused on what to do with "to see the
force" of something.

If the "crafted allusion" of Peirce is understood correctly by me, for
a thinker to see the rhetorical force of a conclusive proof as culled
from its grammatical form and critical fact is to prescribe or predict
its probable evocative outcome merely from attending to what is
directly and monstratively given in the connective ground that
formally relates premiss to conclusion, where the monstration is
identified as being iconically similar to the presupposed existential
experience the thinker already has of phenomena.

In other words, the initial direct proof would seem to be based on
common sense, in that the directness of monstrated proof is derived
from its iconic similarity to the ordinary experience of represented
objects. Human logic according to Peirce is thus seemingly an
obstinate and degenerate form of pure logic that thinkers discover.
What is likely found however is not a rigid mechanical world
predetermined to exist by some agent of design, but rather is a
dispositional tendency for the natural world to simply evolve
logically. The human aquisition and utilization of pure logic is
perhaps one of intermediate phenomena, acting as a bridge laying
related between say immediate nomena and mediate epiphenomena, if it
can be put in those terms within a Peircean framework.



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