All,
There is also this, with the alternate spelling “reflexion” at CP 3.489-490.
> C.S. Peirce • Relatives of Second Intention
> Selections from C.S. Peirce, “The Logic of Relatives”, CP 3.456–552
>
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/04/07/c-s-peirce-relatives-of-second-intention/
488. The general method of graphical representation of propositions has now
been given in all its essential
elements, except, of course, that we have not, as yet, studied any truths
concerning special relatives; for to do so
would seem, at first, to be “extralogical”.
Logic in this stage of its development may be called paradisaical logic,
because it represents the state of Man’s
cognition before the Fall. For although, with this apparatus, it is easy to
write propositions necessarily true, it
is absolutely impossible to write any which is necessarily false, or, in any
way which that stage of logic affords,
to find out that anything is false. The mind has not as yet eaten of the fruit
of the Tree of Knowledge of Truth and
Falsity.
Probably it will not be doubted that every child in its mental development
necessarily passes through a stage in
which he has some ideas, but yet has never recognised that an idea may be
erroneous; and a stage that every child
necessarily passes through must have been formerly passed through by the race
in its adult development. It may be
doubted whether many of the lower animals have any clear and steady conception
of falsehood; for their instincts
work so unerringly that there is little to force it upon their attention. Yet
plainly without a knowledge of
falsehood no development of discursive reason can take place.
489. This paradisaical logic appears in the study of non-relative formal
logic. But there no possible avenue
appears by which the knowledge of falsehood could be brought into this Garden
of Eden except by the arbitrary and
inexplicable introduction of the Serpent in the guise of a proposition
necessarily false. The logic of relatives
affords such an avenue, and that, the very avenue by which in actual
development, this stage of logic supervenes. It
is the avenue of experience and logical reflexion.
490. By logical reflexion, I mean the observation of thoughts in their
expressions. Aquinas remarked that this
sort of reflexion is requisite to furnish us with those ideas which, from lack
of contrast, ordinary external
experience fails to bring into prominence. He called such ideas second
intentions. Is is by means of relatives of
second intention that the general method of logical representation is to find
completion.
Reference
Charles S. Peirce, “The Logic of Relatives”, The Monist, vol. 7, 161–217,
(1897). Reprinted, CP 3.456–552.
On 4/1/2021 12:17 AM, John F. Sowa wrote:
Jon A and Gary F,
Thanks for suggesting quotations by CSP. The one I was thinking of was not in
CP, but in R619:
"I do not think I ever reflect in words: I employ visual diagrams, firstly because this way of thinking is my
natural language of self-communion, and secondly, because I am convinced that it is the best system for the
purpose." (R 619, 1909)
The emphasis on the word reflect was by Peirce. Like most people, he would think in words in a casual conversation,
but he would *reflect* in diagrams for greater precision on critical issues.
I discuss that quotation (and others) in more detail in my article "Phaneroscopy and Hypoicons". I added more to it
and posted it at http://jfsowa.com/peirce/hypoicon.pdf
John
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