Jurriaan Bendien writes: >... Role theory was certainly challenged by feminists concerned with gender roles, but the concept of role itself and its theoretical status were rarely interrogated. <
So what is this "role theory" anyway? > Most of the Marxist Left ... implicitly or explicitly accepted a structural-functionalist concept of role in their social ontology. ...< Really? You've done an opinion poll to check the empirical validity of that statement? More importantly, there are a lot of Marxist propositions that that are illogical, unempirical, functionalist, etc. (just as many liberal, fascist, "Communist," etc., propositions have similar problems). But the point is not to sweep some abstraction called "Marxism" off the face of the earth because of such errors, as Jurriaan seems to want to do. IMHO, Marx and Marxists have had a lot of important insights into the workings of the real world of capitalism and other modes of production. (Alas, intellectual property rights laws don't prevent people from using the word "Marxism" in a large number of different ways, some of them disgusting.) Thus, I see the point as being to get rid of illogic, anti-empirical assertions, functionalism and the like. (Obscure jargon is another.) In my experience those flaws are totally unnecessary to a Marxist approach to understanding the social reality so that a cleaned-up theory can be produced. I had written: >> Contrary to Jurriaan's assertion, I do not define words to suit myself. Rather, the point is to have a clear definition that's generally accepted by the others one is communicating with, because that promotes rational discourse. And the other point (that I repeat too often) is that there are no _correct_ definitions, since we don't live in Plato's world. << Jurriaan responded: > It is patently absurd to say that “there are no correct definitions” .... There are correct and incorrect definitions, appropriate definitions and inappropriate ones… < "patently absurd"? Interestingly (and sadly), Jurriaan rejects my assertion out of hand without even _asking_ me what I meant by "correct," i.e., without wondering what definition I was using. Perhaps he thinks he can read my mind. (That can't be, since it's usually too hard for _me_ to read my mind!) The fact is that definitions are _conventional_, because they made by people as part of the process of communication with other people (or with themselves as part of thinking). Definitions differ between languages and social groups. They often vary with context. Thus, for some (and in some contexts) "correct" means "morally correct." For others, it means "empirically correct" (fitting the known reality outside one's head). For yet others, it means "logically (or mathematically) correct." And then there are those for whom it means "politically correct." More importantly, when I say that there are no “correct” definitions, it’s a response to the futility of arguing about the meaning of words (as I’ve said too many times on pen-l). So I state a clear definition (or use some else’s clear definition) and then go from there. As I said, “the point is to have a clear definition that's generally accepted by the others one is communicating with, because that promotes rational discourse.” Of course, my making that statement doesn’t prevent Jurriaan from interpreting my following statement out of context, ignoring the sentence before it. Especially when taken out of context, my statement above (“there are no _correct_ definitions”) was extremely cryptic (and hurried), because I felt insulted by Jurriaan’s outrageous and unsubstantiated assertion that I define words to suit myself. But the reference to Plato should have tipped him off that I was referring to empirically correct. On the issue of empirical correctness, definitions are _abstract_, which means that they cannot correspond exactly to the concrete (empirical) reality outside of our heads. The latter is complicated and messy (unlike the nice simplicity of definitions). Even with defining an object as simple as a “horse,” the question still remains “where do you draw the line? Isn’t a donkey really a horse?” Well, horses and donkeys are different species because if a horse and a donkey have offspring, they will be sterile. Except that mules aren’t always sterile. There are always shades of gray. (I’m no philosopher, but as far as I can tell Plato thought the “correct” definition would correspond to the divine “form,” which he assumed exists. The form is assumed to be simple (having no complicated concrete details, no shades of gray). Both the definition and the form are abstract, so it’s possible for a human-made definition to be correct in defining the form. Of course, Plato assumed that he’s the type who can find the correct definition. Not everyone is so smart.) "Correct" is very different from "appropriate." I don’t see why Jurriaan equates these two. If we do equate them, then my point is obvious, since appropriateness depends on context (and one's purpose). If appropriateness depends on context and purpose, so does correctness. There is no (uniquely) "correct" or appropriate definition. Jurriaan goes on to say that > while a definition may be correct, it may not be adequate for a given purpose. A definition may be relevant or irrelevant, applicable or inapplicable, useful or useless.< I agree with this, except that “correct” definitions would be those that people use as part of a communication and thinking processes (rather than being empirically correct). Jurriaan continues: > For example, a textbook definition of the “real interest rate” is simply any given nominal rate adjusted for inflation. That definition is correct, as far as it goes.< In other words, the “correctness” (or appropriateness) of the definition depends on the context, as I’ve said. -- JD
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