Exactly. The Marxists who think this way tend to be Hegelians or
Althusserian structuralists. That is, they're well "educated," but not
so smart.


IMHO, Marx and Marxists have had a lot of important insights into the
workings of the real world of capitalism and other modes of
production.


==================

Do you have a poll.............................


Fuck.



On Sun, Aug 18, 2013 at 8:02 PM, Jim Devine <[email protected]> wrote:
> Jurriaan Bendien writes:
>
>>... Role theory was certainly challenged by feminists concerned with gender
>> roles, but the concept of role itself and its theoretical status were rarely
>> interrogated. <
>
>
>
> So what is this "role theory" anyway?
>
>
>
>> Most of the Marxist Left ...  implicitly or explicitly accepted a
>> structural-functionalist concept of role in their social ontology. ...<
>
>
>
> Really?  You've done an opinion poll to check the empirical validity of that
> statement?
>
> More importantly, there are a lot of Marxist propositions that that are
> illogical, unempirical, functionalist, etc.  (just as many liberal, fascist,
> "Communist," etc., propositions have similar problems).
>
> But the point is not to sweep some abstraction called "Marxism" off the face
> of the earth because of such errors, as Jurriaan seems to want to do.
>
> IMHO, Marx and Marxists have had a lot of important insights into the
> workings of the real world of capitalism and other modes of production.
> (Alas, intellectual property rights laws don't prevent people from using the
> word "Marxism" in a large number of different ways, some of them
> disgusting.)  Thus, I see the point as being to get rid of illogic,
> anti-empirical assertions, functionalism and the like. (Obscure jargon is
> another.)  In my experience those flaws are totally unnecessary to a Marxist
> approach to understanding the social reality so that a cleaned-up theory can
> be produced.
>
>
>
> I had written:
>
>>> Contrary to Jurriaan's assertion, I do not define words to suit myself.
>>> Rather, the point is to have a clear definition that's generally accepted by
>>> the others one is communicating with, because that promotes rational
>>> discourse. And the other point (that I repeat too often) is that there are
>>> no _correct_ definitions, since we don't live in Plato's world. <<
>
>
> Jurriaan responded:
>
>> It is patently absurd to say that “there are no correct definitions” ....
>> There are correct and incorrect definitions, appropriate definitions and
>> inappropriate ones… <
>
>
>
> "patently absurd"? Interestingly (and sadly), Jurriaan rejects my assertion
> out of hand without even _asking_ me what I meant by "correct," i.e.,
> without wondering what definition I was using. Perhaps he thinks he can read
> my mind. (That can't be, since it's usually too hard for _me_ to read my
> mind!)
>
>
>
> The fact is that definitions are _conventional_, because they made by people
> as part of the process of communication with other people (or with
> themselves as part of thinking). Definitions differ between languages and
> social groups. They often vary with context.  Thus, for some (and in some
> contexts) "correct"  means "morally correct." For others, it means
> "empirically correct" (fitting the known reality outside one's head). For
> yet others, it means "logically (or mathematically) correct." And then there
> are those for whom it means "politically correct."
>
>
>
> More importantly, when I say that there are no “correct” definitions, it’s a
> response to the futility of arguing about the meaning of words (as I’ve said
> too many times on pen-l). So I state a clear definition (or use some else’s
> clear definition) and then go from there. As I said, “the point is to have a
> clear definition that's generally accepted by the others one is
> communicating with, because that promotes rational discourse.” Of course, my
> making that statement doesn’t prevent Jurriaan from interpreting my
> following statement out of context, ignoring the sentence before it.
>
>
>
> Especially when taken out of context, my statement above (“there are no
> _correct_ definitions”) was extremely cryptic (and hurried), because I felt
> insulted by Jurriaan’s outrageous and unsubstantiated assertion that I
> define words to suit myself.  But  the reference to Plato should have tipped
> him off that I was referring to empirically correct.
>
> On the issue of empirical correctness, definitions are _abstract_, which
> means that they cannot correspond exactly to the concrete (empirical)
> reality outside of our heads. The latter is complicated and messy (unlike
> the nice simplicity of definitions). Even with defining an object as simple
> as a “horse,” the question still remains “where do you draw the line? Isn’t
> a donkey really a horse?” Well, horses and donkeys are different species
> because if a horse and a donkey have offspring, they will be sterile. Except
> that mules aren’t always sterile. There are always shades of gray.
>
>
>
>  (I’m no philosopher, but as far as I can tell Plato thought the “correct”
> definition would correspond to the divine “form,” which he assumed exists.
> The form is assumed to be simple (having no complicated concrete details, no
> shades of gray). Both the definition and the form are abstract, so it’s
> possible for a human-made definition to be correct in defining the form. Of
> course, Plato assumed that he’s the type who can find the correct
> definition. Not everyone is so smart.)
>
>
>
> "Correct" is very different from "appropriate." I don’t see why Jurriaan
> equates these two. If we do equate them, then my point is obvious, since
> appropriateness depends on context (and one's purpose). If appropriateness
> depends on context and purpose, so does correctness. There is no (uniquely)
> "correct" or appropriate definition.
>
>
>
> Jurriaan goes on to say that > while a definition may be correct, it may not
> be adequate for a given purpose. A definition may be relevant or irrelevant,
> applicable or inapplicable, useful or useless.<
>
>
>
> I agree with this, except that “correct” definitions would be those that
> people use as part of a communication and thinking processes (rather than
> being empirically correct).
>
>
>
> Jurriaan continues:
>
>> For example, a textbook definition of the “real interest rate” is simply
>> any given nominal rate adjusted for inflation. That definition is correct,
>> as far as it goes.<
>
>
>
> In other words, the “correctness” (or appropriateness) of the definition
> depends on the context, as I’ve said.
>
>  --
> JD
>
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