> While this is indeed correct, the unfortunate state of affairs is that > providers are placing the entire onus upon service operators to prevent > abuses > and once the "fix" is in place, the status quo returns where BCP38 is deemed > "not needed after all" because responsive security (updating software, > blocking ports) has been put in place. Many providers are uninterested in > spending money and resources in implementing proactive security.
I recently asked the local firewall and router admins if it was actually "HARD" to implement. They all went "WTF, are you joking?". So I fail to see how ISPs and the like cannot simply "do the same" -- Ralf Hildebrandt Charite Universitätsmedizin Berlin [email protected] Campus Benjamin Franklin http://www.charite.de Hindenburgdamm 30, 12203 Berlin Geschäftsbereich IT, Abt. Netzwerk fon: +49-30-450.570.155 _______________________________________________ pool mailing list [email protected] http://lists.ntp.org/listinfo/pool
