In a message dated 12/16/2004 9:55:49 PM Eastern Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If you think that experience requires a different conclusion, then you simply have not read the opposing briefs of a variety of groups on the opposite side from me in numerous constitutional cases.
        I think briefs are one of the worst examples of testing the importance of the distinction between teaching and proselytizing. Briefs are advocacy pieces, usually (in my experience a long time ago as a federal appellate clerk) poorly done.  Impartiality, if it exists at all, is not likely to be found in briefs. Indeed, it might be oxymoronic to contend that impartiality is or should be a goal of brief writing.
 
        The distinction between impartiality and advocacy, of course, itself is one of those troubling distinctions (or perhaps dichotomies) whose use might be counterproductive generally.  Still shouldn't we exhibit patience when hearing someone using this distinction to see if that particular person is sensitive to its importance and is also sensitive to the ease of abusing it. Only a few people, Stanley Fish comes to mind if his work is not completely based in irony, sincerely believe that these distinctions are meaningless, incoherent or necessarily subject to abuse. Finally, distinctions such as "teaching and "proselytizing" and "impartiality" and "advocacy" as well as a host of others are currently defining characteristics of our conceptual discourse.  Abandoning these distinctions, while not impossible I suppose, requires a revolution in conceptual discourse similar to the types of revolutions in science Kuhn wrote about. Rejecting our current conceptual discourse is not impossible, but the cost is enormous and should not be borne without an extraordinary justification.
 
Bobby
 
Robert Justin Lipkin
Professor of Law
Widener University School of Law
Delaware
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