It appears that the science teachers tried to bring some science before
the board but were unsuccessful and frustrated. It isn't clear whether
the board members who resigned had tried to bring science before the
board, because the facts focus on their objections to the process (and
to the way they were treated, claiming that they were marginalized and
questioned about their religious beliefs and their patriotism). So it's
possible that some science was brought before the board but ignored. The
facts state that the board did not contact organizations such as the
NAS, nor visit their web sites. 

Of course, this presupposes that intelligent design isn't science, but
the defendant board members would argue that it is, and therefore
science WAS brought before the board. The semantics and logic can be
circular. The judge, on the other hand, had all sorts of scientific
evidence in front of him, and reached conclusions concerning it. 

Jim Maule

>>> [EMAIL PROTECTED] 12/20/2005 1:31:19 PM >>>
This would seem to further support the idea that the judge may be the 
most competent person in this case to make a decision on the merits (as

well as the constitutoinality of the program). Bobby seemed to be 
concerned that a judge was ruling on scientifc evidence, but what James

Maule is suggesting is that there was no science brought before school

board at all.  

James Maule wrote:

>One problem in this case, Paul, is that the school board in effect
>didn't listen to anyone except representatives of two organizations
>seeking a test case. The record, as explicated in the opinion, is one
of
>process severely lacking in full and open discussion. Several board
>members testified they didn't even understand what they were voting
to
>approve but felt pressured (to use a kind word) into voting as they
>did.
>
>Jim Maule
>
>  
>
>>>>[EMAIL PROTECTED] 12/20/2005 12:51:31 PM >>>
>>>>        
>>>>
>Is it better to have a judge decide what is science, after lots of 
>expert testimony, than an elected school board after listening to 
>constituents without any scientific background? Now what would really
>be 
>nice is to have the science department decide what is science but
that
>
>is likely to  happen in some places only after hell (if there is a
>hell) 
>freezes over.
>
>paul finkelman
>
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>  
>
>>        Although I do not disagree with the result in this case, I
am
>>    
>>
>
>  
>
>>troubled by the idea of judges deciding what is or what is not 
>>science.  As far as I can tell, a Kuhnian conception of scientific 
>>change in principle supports the possibility of intelligent design 
>>being understood as expanding the current notion of science. ( I say
>>    
>>
>
>  
>
>>"in principle" for the reason that just because a particular 
>>conception theoretically can be advanced in a Kuhnian fashion does
>>    
>>
>not 
>  
>
>>mean that the change in paradigm will be successful). Hence, to say 
>>that intelligent design cannot be considered a science according to 
>>our current paradigm of science can be answered by intelligent 
>>designers with a strident "So what?"
>> 
>>        Don't get me wrong.  According to my own understanding of
the
>>    
>>
>
>  
>
>>philosophy of science, I do not see any likelihood of intelligent 
>>design providing the thrust for a paradigm shift concerning what is
>>    
>>
>or 
>  
>
>>what is not science. That aside, what justifies judicial 
>>determinations of this matter?  I suppose one reply is that the 
>>court is merely reflecting what its best understanding of the
current
>>    
>>
>
>  
>
>>scientific paradigm is.  Moreover, courts are forever involving in 
>>making judgments about complex factual and conceptual matters. 
>>Still, an opinion based solely on the EC might be more in line 
>>with the basis of a court's authority and expertise. 
>> 
>>Bobby
>>
>>Robert Justin Lipkin
>>Professor of Law
>>Widener University School of Law
>>Delaware
>>
>>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>_______________________________________________
>>To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu 
>>To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
>>    
>>
>http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw 
>  
>
>>Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed
as
>>    
>>
>private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are
>posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can
(rightly
>or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>  
>
>
>  
>

-- 
Paul Finkelman
Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law
University of Tulsa College of Law
3120 East 4th Place
Tulsa, OK   74104-3189

918-631-3706 (office)
918-631-2194 (fax)

[EMAIL PROTECTED] 


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