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Unfortunately, Ed Darrell
distorts my post. I never said or implied that Kuhn's theory of
science favors intelligent design in any way at all. " What I said was
"I do not see any likelihood of intelligent design providing the thrust for
a paradigm shift concerning what is or what is not science." Further, I never
said Judge Jones imposed "his views over the experts in science
who were called to testify." My point is directed at capacity, and the
indefensible contention, in my view, that somehow a legal education
provides the necessary ingredients for assessing expert testimony in a wide
range of domains of human inquiry.
When it comes to science
(if not everything else) the distinction between not deciding what is or is
not science and "following accepted legal procedures in use of expert testimony"
is, in my view unhelpful. It is entirely circular to suppose that because
there are "accepted legal procedures of expert testimony," that these procedures
are anything more than "accepted." There is little more than hubris in the
view that the fact that courts use these procedures means that these
procedures count as legitimate evaluations of expert testimony.
What gives judges the
requisite background to decide whether experts are correct about defining
science as naturalistic, testable, and so forth? In other words, what
prepares judges to assess such abstract debates?
I agree with the experts
(and the court) about what science is. But my agreement is irrelevant to
the question of whether judges have the ability to sift through conceptually
difficult testimony about the nature of science, religion, and a host of other
issues. What in a legal education (or in practicing law) provides
the required background?
As for the gratuitous
remark about philosophy, well I'll leave it at that.
Bobby
Robert Justin Lipkin Professor of Law Widener University School of Law Delaware |
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