What makes it outrageous is not the content per se, but the content in the context. And doesn't the old workhorse, our erstwhile objective standard of "outrageous to a reasonable person", save it from unconstitutional vagueness?
Steve On 11/1/07, Volokh, Eugene <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Isn't a restriction on "speech that is outrageous, and inflicts > severe emotional distress, where the speaker knows there's a high > probability that severe emotional distress will be inflicted" > unconstitutionally vague, suffering from all three of the Grayned > problems (risk of viewpoint discrimination in enforcement, difficulty of > telling when one is complying with the law, and resulting deterrent > effect)? "'Outrageousness' in the area of political and social > discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a > jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or views, or > perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression." (I > also think it's unconstitutionally even setting aside the vagueness, but > as in many instances the vagueness is such an important problem that it > makes it hard to do the rest of the constitutional analysis, since it's > so hard to tell just what speech the law will restrict, even if limited > to cases where plaintiffs are private figures.) > > Eugene -- Prof. Steven Jamar Howard University School of Law _______________________________________________ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
