I'm not sure why, absent some judgment about the impropriety of the ministerial 
exemption, one would think that employees and potential employees are somehow 
entitled to disclosure about the way in which constitutional doctrine might 
frustrate what they  (perhaps erroneously) to be their statutory rights. Why, 
indeed, not require reporters to tell persons who may qualify as public 
officials or figures about the way in which constitutional doctrine may impair 
what they might otherwise regard to be their legal protection from defamation? 
Even if we are especially concerned about employees, why not require that they 
be told, for example, that the presumed right of white employees to be free of 
race based decision-making could be compromised should circumstances justify 
race conscious remedies under current doctrine?

One argument might be that, if we recognize a ministerial exception, religious 
organizations are being granted some unique exemption from generally applicable 
laws. Putting apart whether that could ever be an accurate description of the 
current constitutional landscape, it is not clearly so. Associational rights, 
such as those of the Boy Scouts, might also warrant an exemption from otherwise 
applicable discrimination laws.

Going beyond that, why does the potential frustration of the expectations of 
employees stemming from a failure to appreciate the law of free exercise or of 
legislative solicitude for religious organizations deserve special attention?  
Most of us who don't hail from social circles riddled with lawyers know, for 
example,  that the concept of at-will employment comes as a shock to the 
average man or woman on the street. Most have no idea that the right of free 
speech that they understand to exist does not  protect them from private 
employers.

In fact, it is not at all clear that persons who accept positions that might 
qualify as "ministerial" are  likely to be ignorant of the ways in which free 
exercise might be thought to justify exemption from certain legal requirements 
in some unique way that justifies qualifying statutory or constitutional rights 
on disclosure. They may very well be more, rather than less,  likely to know 
the legal landscape.

To place a unique burden on religious organizations raises questions of 
government neutrality as a matter of policy, free exercise and establishment in 
the sense of avoiding both endorsement and disapproval of religion.

Rick Esenberg
Marquette University Law School
Eckstein Hall 253B
1215 W. Michigan Avenue
Milwaukee, WI 53201
(o) 414-288-6908
(m)414-213-3957
(f)  414-288-6975
Homepage: http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?10905&userID=3715
Blogs: www.sharkandshepherd.blogspot.com
             http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/
You can access my papers at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=1171612

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Rick Garnett
Sent: Monday, July 19, 2010 8:49 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: 10th Circuit Finds Church Immune From Workplace Discrimination Suit

Friends -- with respect to Marci's suggestion that religious entities be 
required to inform people in ministerial positions about the fact that such 
entities have a constitutional right to hire-and-fire that is not subject to 
many employment-law constraints . . .   it seems to me that people often suffer 
what I think Marci and I would agree are "harms" as a result of others' 
exercise of constitutional rights (in particular, the freedom of speech).  That 
is, the Constitution does have the effect (and, it seems to me, *was* intended 
to have the effect) of insulating *some* harms (e.g., the pain caused by 
offensive speech) caused from correction or prevention by the government.

Do we think, though, that, as a general matter, rights holders should have to 
inform those with whom they are in relationships and who might be harmed by the 
exercise of the rights holders' rights that the rights might, in fact, be 
exercised?  Should a reporter, for example, have to warn anyone whom she 
interviews about the harm-causing-potential of the rule in New York Times v. 
Sullivan?

I agree, for what it's worth, that it makes good sense for attorneys 
representing churches and religious institutions to advise their clients to 
inform those in ministerial positions (that is, in any position that the church 
regards as ministerial) about their (the institutions') religious liberty.  But 
I'm wondering if Marci's proposed warning requirement applies only to religious 
employers (and if so, why?  Because they are employers?  Because they are 
religious?) or to all whose rights-exercise might cause "harm"?

 Best,

r


Richard W. Garnett
Professor of Law and Associate Dean
Notre Dame Law School
P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556-0780

574-631-6981 (w)
574-276-2252 (cell)

SSRN page<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=342235>

Blogs:

Prawfsblawg<http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/>
Mirror of Justice<http://www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/>
Law, Religion, and Ethics<http://lawreligionethics.net/>

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of hamilto...@aol.com
Sent: Friday, July 16, 2010 3:44 PM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: 10th Circuit Finds Church Immune From Workplace Discrimination Suit

Bob makes very good points but I'm not persuaded.  Religious employers can be 
required to report child abuse by their employees, so why can't they be 
required to provide legal boilerplate to incoming employees?

If Bob is right, we have serious problems in my view. The public policy problem 
is that no religious organization is going to make such a warning without being 
prodded by the law (or insurance cos., but they do not prod without legal --aka 
financial -- consequences).  So we are stuck with obvious harm to employees of 
religious organizations but no solution.  I am a firm believer that the 
Constitution was not intended and should not make it impossible for government 
to prevent or remedy substantial harm.

So that leaves the government -- charged with protecting citizens from harm -- 
on Bob's theory hamstrung from requiring religious employers to issue a warning 
regarding the state of the law.  So how does the government protect its 
citizens?  I guess there are several public education options:

(1) public service announcement: if you are considering or are working for a 
religious institution in a religious capacity, you need to understand that it 
is immune under judicial doctrine from anti-discrimination laws, including 
sexual harassment and gender discrimination

(2) on every W-2, which the religious employer must provide to every full-time 
employee, right?, there is boilerplate saying the same as above.

Here is another option-- how about no religious organization can be eligible 
for faith-based funding unless it provides to its employees a statement that it 
is immune from the anti-discrimination laws?

Marci




In a message dated 7/16/2010 3:13:44 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
rtut...@law.gwu.edu writes:
Marci's idea of a warning for ministerial employees would certainly be a 
prudent step for religious employers to take on their own initiative, but I 
don't think the state could impose such a requirement as a condition of the 
religious employer invoking the exception in litigation -- the exception seems 
to me jurisdictional, not something derived from a religious organization's 
claim of autonomy (about which there is good reason to be dubious) but rather 
from courts' constitutional inability to determine what is adequate 
qualification for or performance of the ministerial role.

Bob Tuttle

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