One point of clarification, which goes to Bob Tuttle’s point more than Marci’s: 
Are we sure that the ministerial exception is jurisdictional?  I would have 
thought it wasn’t.  I agree it’s constitutional.  So like Bob, I would think 
that Congress can’t diminish its scope—Congress can’t say to a religious 
organization, “You’ll lose this constitutional right [ministerial exception] 
unless you do this [inform an employee prospectively about the ministerial 
exception].”  But why should we consider this constitutional limitation 
jurisdictional?



Best,

Chris

___________________________

Christopher C. Lund

Assistant Professor of Law

Wayne State University Law School

471 West Palmer St.

Detroit, MI  48202

l...@wayne.edu

(313) 577-4046 (phone)

(313) 577-9016 (fax)

Papers: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=363402



From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of hamilto...@aol.com
Sent: Monday, July 19, 2010 10:45 AM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: 10th Circuit Finds Church Immune From Workplace Discrimination 
Suit



Rick is casting a larger net than my post suggested.  The relevant universe 
here is the universe of employees.  As in the speech cases (and in 
particular the defamation cases since we're dealing with employment), there 
should be some weighing of interests here.  Right now, in my view, the 
balance is out of whack in this universe.  (If there are other harms arising 
from other First Amendment rights that require redressing, I'm all in favor 
of exploring those as well.)



 Employees assume that they cannot be discriminated against on the basis of 
gender (including a right not to be a victim of sexual harassment).  It 
turns out in most states that they are UNLESS the employer is religious. 
(Don't forget the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the ministerial 
exception so whether it is a robust or less robust or not a constitutional 
right still remains in limbo.) So a bishop who creates a hostile working 
environment or who persistently engages in sexual innuendo typically is 
immune or who arbitrarily decides a man is a better choice than a better 
qualified woman is immune.



Employees are doubly disabled in these scenarios.  First, as Americans the 
culture encourages them to trust religious leaders (though surely that is 
declining in light of the steady investigative reporting suggesting folks do 
that at their peril).  More importantly, because of the ministerial 
exception, few cases are ever filed, let alone litigated, and, therefore, 
the incidence of gender discrimination is not publicized.  So women are 
going into these jobs with expectations of fairness that are not borne out, 
because of a First Amendment doctrine.



One option is to carve back on the right so that no employer who fails to 
advise an employee of this issue can claim it.  Bob objected to that, 
because the ministerial exception is jurisdictional.  But if this is the 
result, why should it be?  Why isn't it a right, like the freedom of speech 
in defamation cases, which carries with it some obligations and weighing, 
depending on the scenario?



One option is to have the government inform applicants through public 
education, as in add language to the tax forms.....  Another is to have 
anyone who is taking government funds for mission have to agree as a 
condition of receiving the funds to inform employees about the risks they 
are taking by taking the employment.



Is Rick saying none of these options are constitutional and/or desirable?



Marci



Marci A. Hamilton

Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law

Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law

Yeshiva University





In a message dated 7/19/2010 9:50:33 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, 
rgarn...@nd.edu writes:

I agree, for what it’s worth, that it makes good sense for attorneys 
representing churches and religious institutions to advise their clients to 
inform those in ministerial positions (that is, in any position that the 
church regards as ministerial) about their (the institutions’) religious 
liberty.  But I’m wondering if Marci’s proposed warning requirement applies 
only to religious employers (and if so, why?  Because they are employers? 
Because they are religious?) or to all whose rights-exercise might cause 
“harm”?



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