Perhaps Claiborne Hardware is the better analogy. Most of Clarence Evers' speech to the crowd consisted of protected speech on a matter of public concern -- a politically motivated boycott of white merchants to remedy racial discrimination. Taken in isolation, a couple of his statements could be construed as unprotected threats against anyone who broke the boycott. But rather than analyze those statements in isolation, Claiborne Hardware saw them in the larger context of Evers' speech, and because the theme of the speech was protected political speech, liability could not rest on those isolated statements.

Michael R. Masinter                      3305 College Avenue
Professor of Law                         Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
Nova Southeastern University             954.262.6151 (voice)
masin...@nova.edu                        954.262.3835 (fax)



Quoting Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com>:

Perhaps.  Or perhaps those signs might refer, like most of the other
messages, to the government and its agents more generally.  And perhaps that
would be good enough reason to immunize such statements -- because there is
a likelihood they were on matters of public concern, and would be understood
as such by a (forgive me) "reasonable observer."  At least that would be a
rationale -- one that would limit the holding so that it did not apply to
speech unambiguously about a private figure (an issue that could be
reserved).

But what Roberts writes is this:  "*Even if a few of the signs*?such as
?You?re Going to Hell? and ?God Hates You??*were viewed as containing
messages related to Matthew Snyder or the Snyders specifically*, that would
not change the fact that the overall thrust and dominant theme of Westboro?s
demonstration spoke to broader public issues."

This *appears* to suggest that speech can't be the source of IIED liability
if its "overall thrust" is with respect to broader public issues, even if
certain of its constituative statements are only about "non-public-figure"
targets.
On Wed, Mar 2, 2011 at 7:13 PM, Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu> wrote:

It's not at all obvious that "You're Going to Hell" and "God Hates You"
refers to  Mr. Snyder (the father), or to his deceased son, or to anyone in
particular.  Perhaps the "You" in these messages refers to anyone who
supports gay rights, or the Roman Catholic Church.  So Isn't there an echo
here of NYT v. Sullivan, where (as I recall, perhaps erroneously) the Court
did not remand because a jury could not reasonably find that the NYT ad was
"of and concerning" Sullivan?

  On Wed, Mar 2, 2011 at 6:45 PM, Marty Lederman <lederman.ma...@gmail.com
> wrote:

  The most troubling (or at least undefended) part of the majority
opinion is why the particular signs specifically about Snyder and arguably
not on a matter of public concern ? namely, ?You?re Going to Hell? and ?God
Hates You? ? should be immunized merely because the ?overall thrust? of the
collective messages was on matters of public concern.  (Get ready to teach
your students the ?overall thrust? doctrine. Akin to the "taken as a whole"
component of obscenity doctrine?)

That is to say ? why wasn?t the proper resolution to remand with
instructions that the jury is to be charged only with respect to the
non-public-concern speech?  I can imagine reasons why the Court might be
reluctant to do that and might prefer an ?overall thrust? test ? e.g., to
provide breathing space; or because the jury would invariably be tainted by,
and inclined to assign liability for, the surrounding public concern
speech; or because the record didn't demonstrate that the Snyder family was
aware of those particular messages (if that's the case); or perhaps even on
the theory that speech *about Snyder* but directed to a public audience
is more constitutionally protected than Dun&Bradstreet-like speech to a
purely private audience -- but the Court doesn't bother to invoke any such
explanations, or even try to distinguish, e.g., the old ?Voltaire/flyleaf?
reasoning.

On the other hand, most of the Internet speech here was, in fact, directed
to a public audience but concerning a private figure, and the Court goes out
of its way to emphasize that it's not deciding that question.  So perhaps
some such speech might still not be entitled to full constitutional
protection . . . at a minimum, where it constitutes the "overall thrust" of
the expression viewed as a whole.

On Wed, Mar 2, 2011 at 6:05 PM, Steven Jamar <stevenja...@gmail.com>wrote:

Snyder v. Phelps, 8-1.

C.J. Roberts:

 Whether the First Amendment prohibits holding Westboro liable for its
speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech is of public or
private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.


http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf
 <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/09-751.pdf>
   --
Prof. Steven D. Jamar                     vox:  202-806-8017
Associate Director, Institute for Intellectual Property and Social
Justice http://iipsj.org
Howard University School of Law           fax:  202-806-8567
http://iipsj.com/SDJ/

Peace can only last where human rights are respected, where the people
are fed, and where individuals and nations are free.

Dalai Lama






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--
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
My SSRN papers are here:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=181272#reg





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