I don't think "harassment" is a sufficiently well-defined legal 
term to be helpful here.  To be sure, it is defined - though vaguely and very 
broadly - in hostile environment harassment law, but that definition isn't 
applicable here.  There's also telephone harassment law, but that is (rightly) 
limited to speech that is said to a particular unwilling person, and not to 
other, potentially willing, listeners.  And occasionally one has 
anti-"harassment" orders, which tend to be pretty vaguely defined.  One way or 
the other, I don't think that the term "harassment," given its many 
definitions, each of which is not terribly clear (except possibly telephone 
harassment), is that helpful to the discussion.

               Persistent following is a different story.  I'm inclined to say 
that persistently following someone, whether to speak to him or not, could 
indeed be banned, though I haven't thought enough about the subject to 
determine where the line between punishable following and unpunishable 
following should be drawn.

               Likewise, perhaps there are other bases on which certain kinds 
of speech, even on matters of public concern, could be restricted; I'd just 
like to see a more specific proposed definition.

               Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Brownstein, Alan
Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2011 1:46 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Snyder v. Phelps

I have no particular problem with Eugene's conclusion that the speech at issue 
is a matter of public concern or his statement that the fact that the speech 
uses a particular person as an example does not make the speech less 
constitutionally protected. Indeed, I think most speech in a traditional public 
forum to a general audience (other than false statements of fact or categories 
of unprotected speech) is fully protected even if it is on a matter of private 
concern.

I think that the fact that the speech refers to a particular individual is 
relevant (but certainly not dispositive) to whether it can be understood as 
targeting that individual and harassment. If sufficient facts support the 
characterization of the speech as targeting and harassing the individual 
referred to, I think that such speech can be sanctioned even if it is a matter 
of public concern. The facts did not support such a characterization of the 
Phelps' speech in this case. If they did, I think the speech could be 
sanctioned as harassment even if it was speech on a matter of public concern. 
See my example of telephone harassment.

Eugene, do you think that the fact that speech is on a matter of public concern 
immunizes it from sanction as harassment? If the Phelps clan picketed Mr. 
Snyder's  home and followed him around whenever he stepped foot on a public 
sidewalk for the week before and the week after his son's funeral, brandishing 
the same signs they held up in this case, could we punish such conduct as 
harassment? How much of a role does the fact that speech is on a matter of 
public concern play in deciding whether the expressive activity can be punished 
as harassment without violating the First Amendment?

Alan



From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, March 03, 2011 1:03 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Snyder v. Phelps

               It seems to me that the speech in Snyder was speech that was 
both on a broad topic, and used a particular person as an example (and the 
occasion for the speech).  That of course is utterly routine - many news 
stories, for instance, talk about crime, risks to health, government 
misconduct, and so on, using specific incidents as examples and occasions for 
the speech.  And those incidents often involve tragic things happening to 
private persons.  My sense is that such concrete "news hooks" are considered 
necessary in journalisms.

               I don't think that this can be enough to make the speech less 
constitutionally protected.  See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., where the Court 
concluded that the general story was on a matter of public concern (crime, even 
though it was just a small item on one crime, with no express connection to 
broader discussions), and that this was so even though it used the name of the 
crime victim.  Likewise here, it seems to me.

               The Phelpses believe that God is retaliating against America for 
its sin of tolerating homosexuality, and that this retaliation - including the 
violent death of American soldiers - will continue until we change our 
policies.  That strikes me as a ridiculous position; but it is surely speech on 
a matter of public concern.  And including a specific example of someone who 
died allegedly because of our sins can't, I think, make this speech on a matter 
of private concern any more than focusing on someone who died from lung cancer 
(whether as a result of smoking or second-hand smoke) or from HIV strips a 
broad discussion of the dangers of smoking or sexual promiscuity or anal 
intercourse of its public-concern status.

               Eugene
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