Thanks. Seems like we are arguing BIG principles that, actually everyone agrees with, when the work that needs to be done is in the details.
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Friday, June 15, 2012 1:33 PM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Religious exemptions in ND Excellent points, both in the first paragraph and in the third. From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Graber, Mark Sent: Friday, June 15, 2012 6:46 AM To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Religious exemptions in ND May I suggest this is too strong. A great many constitutional rights increase to some degree the possibility that child abuse will occur, not be detected and not be adequately punished. Consider in this respect the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, at least as presently interpreted (and I suspect most of us would not agree with an interpretive rule that said government does not violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendment whenever doing so might increase to any degree the possibility that a crime will not be committed, not be detected, and not be punished. So we might assume that a) protections for religious freedom will have some negative consequences, including some severe negative consequences but b) that this is true for pretty much all constitutional rights. So the issue is how much do we risk because we value religious freedom (remembering that a strategy of risk nothing will have other severe bad consequences. In this vein, may I suggest that the present alternatives are not helpful. SMITH seems to suggest a rational basis test that would allow government to severely burden religious practice whenever doing so has any appreciable tendency to prevent, detect, or punish crime. Many RFRAs suggest a compelling interest test that probably puts too high a burden on government to do a variety of acts (not just in the area of criminal justice-so even if you think, as I do, that preventing child abuse is obviously a compelling government interest, you might still think the compelling interest standard too strong in other cases). Strikes me that one thing we might discuss is what that in-between standard looks like. Mark A. Graber
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