It has certainly made a difference in RLUIPA cases.   I have to say I find it a 
little hard to believe these cases can be generalized across states given how 
few there are and how different each state operates procedurally, but I look 
forward to reading your article and will keep an open mind.

Marci A. Hamilton
Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School
Yeshiva University
@Marci_Hamilton 



On Dec 2, 2013, at 1:18 PM, Christopher Lund <ed9...@wayne.edu> wrote:

> 
>> Again I have not seen any evidence that differences in phrasing--"burden," 
>> "substantial burden," "restriction on religious liberty,"--have caused any 
>> differences in result (or even reasoning).  If you have examples, I'd love 
>> to know about them.  If not, it suggests the differences in phrasing don't 
>> matter.  That's my intuition from the cases I've read.  But it may be wrong, 
>> and I'd like to know if it is.
>> 
>> On Dec 2, 2013, at 12:44 PM, Marci Hamilton <hamilto...@aol.com> wrote:
>> 
>>> Chris--  As I mentioned, CT's has been amended through interpretation  You 
>>> are right about Alabama.   
>>> 
>>> I actually think these terms matter and removal of substantial  violates 
>>> the Establishment Clause but it also shows the endless push by religious 
>>> entities to overcome all laws.   I assume the next wave will be a push to 
>>> interpret compelling to mean absolutely necessary.   That is not intended 
>>> to be snide.  Just an observation.   The Framers expected all those w power 
>>> to
>>> push it as far as they could.  They were right.
>>> 
>>> I look forward to reading your article.
>>> 
>>> Marci A. Hamilton
>>> Verkuil Chair in Public Law
>>> Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School
>>> Yeshiva University
>>> @Marci_Hamilton 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Dec 2, 2013, at 12:01 PM, Christopher Lund <l...@wayne.edu> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> Connecticut and Alabama use "burden" instead of "substantial burden."  New 
>>>> Mexico, Missouri, and Rhode Island don't use the burden terminology--they 
>>>> speak of "restrictions on religious liberty."  To me, that would seem like 
>>>> it jettisons the requirement of burden altogether, but others may 
>>>> disagree.  Two of the substantial burden states—Arizona and Idaho—say 
>>>> explicitly in their statutes that the requirement is only meant to weed 
>>>> out "trivial, technical, or de minimis burdens."  I talk about the 
>>>> differences, and have a handy though dated chart, in this piece, 
>>>> http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1666268.
>>>> 
>>>>  
>>>> 
>>>> It's a mess, in other words.  And I have to say, I don't know how much any 
>>>> of these differences matter.  When I looked at state RFRA cases a few 
>>>> years back, I found these differences in wording didn't matter much.  They 
>>>> are rarely even talked about.  This may be an issue where academics care 
>>>> quite a bit, but judges do not.  Judges are heavily influenced by the 
>>>> facts of these cases; the wording of the RFRAs, I think, is secondary.
>>>> 
>>>> From: hamilto...@aol.com
>>>> To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
>>>> Sent: Monday, December 2, 2013 10:43:51 AM
>>>> Subject: Re: Letter of 16 law professors in support of removing        
>>>> "substantial"        as modifier of "burden" in state RFRAs
>>>> 
>>>> The WIs bill was never passed to my knowledge, but if it went through 
>>>> under the radar, I would be interested.  
>>>> Conn did not include the term in one of the earliest bills, but the Conn 
>>>> Supreme Court read it in.  To my knowledge, only
>>>> KY passed such a bill, and only over the Governor's veto.
>>>> 
>>>> Marci A. Hamilton
>>>> Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
>>>> Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
>>>> Yeshiva University
>>>> 55 Fifth Avenue
>>>> New York, NY 10003 
>>>> (212) 790-0215
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