[EM] SODA arguments
For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval. For those who feel that Condorcet compliance is the be-all-and-end-all, a majority Condorcet winner, or any Condorcet winner with 3 candidates and full candidate preferences, is not just the winner with honest votes, but in all cases the strategically-forced winner; this contrasts with Condorcet systems, in which strategy can cause even majority- or 3-candidate- CWs to lose. For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, SODA is unmatched. It meets FBC, solves the chicken dilemma, has no burial incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), and even meets later-no-harm for the two most-approved candidates (where it matters most). It's monotonic, and I believe (haven't proven) that it meets consistency. It meets participation, cloneproofness, and IIA for up to 4 candidates. For those middlebrows who most value a system's acceptability to current incumbents, SODA is top-of-the-line. It allows voters to vote plurality-style and, if two parties are clearly favored by voters, allows those two parties to prevent a weak centrist from winning, even if polarization is so high that the centrist is an apparent Condorcet winner. For those who want simplicity: while it's true that the SODA counting process is more complicated than approval, the process of voting is actually simpler than any other system, because you can just vote for your favorite candidate. For the majority who agrees with their favorite candidate's preferences, there is no strategic need to watch the polls and figure out who the frontrunners are, and no nail-biting dilemma of whether to rank others as equal to your favorite. And for those who balk at delegation, SODA allows any voter to cast a direct, undelegated ballot; and allows those voters who do delegate to know how their vote will be used. Refusing to consider SODA because you don't want to delegate, is like refusing to walk into a candy store because you don't like chocolate; SODA allows, not requires, delegation. I think pretty much everybody on this list falls into one or more of the above categories. So, what's not to like about SODA? Jameson ps. I clarified the SODA procedurehttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/SODA_voting_(Simple_Optionally-Delegated_Approval)#Full.2C_step-by-step_rules on the wiki, though there were no substantive changes. I improved the formatting, marked the steps which are optional, and better explained that winning candidates use their delegated votes first because precisely because they will probably choose not to approve others. Comments are welcome. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would be better than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA. Thus my favored system is PAL representationhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation. It's true that PAL still has some (very attenuated) party-list-like aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts at the end; but if you were willing to give up this (overlapping) geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar delegated PR system in which parties played no explicit role. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
But why would you want all these differences and complications? If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use STV-PR for all of these elections to the various representative assemblies (councils, state legislatures, US House of Representatives, US Senate). STV-PR works OK in both partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper representation of the VOTERS in all these different elections. Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested interests, then so be it. STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member districts and to plurality at large. We had to accept local government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR package - that's practical politics. But that reform has transformed our local government - no more one-party states. James Gilmour -Original Message- From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of David L Wetzell Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 2:49 PM To: EM Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and that both can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand. So what do you think? I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having their representative and they could keep that if there are relatively few seats per election. dlw Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SODA arguments
For those who feel that strategic resistance is the most important, SODA is unmatched. It ... has no burial incentive (ie, meets later-no-help), Oops. I got carried away. No burial incentive is arguably true, but it doesn't universally meet later-no-help, only up to 4 candidates. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method
On 2/17/12 1:27 PM, Markus Schulze wrote: it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link, say CD. how can that be? since a path is a *defeat* path. you only traverse a beatpath from a candidate who beats the next candidate in the path. is it that candidates C and D are exactly tied? other than that, i cannot understand how the weakest link from A to B can be the same as *any* link from B to A. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 9:26 AM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. I don't. I think that party-list removes voter freedom, and ranked choices is too much of a burden on the voter. While either would be better than what we have, I prefer to use delegation a la SODA. Obviously, you are not most folks 1. Your igoring my key-arg of context. Less freedom is not always less for rationally ignorant voters. 2. Up to 5 rankings is not a burden, since voters can choose to do as many as they wish and rely on intermediaries for discernment. Thus my favored system is PAL representationhttp://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/PAL_representation. It's true that PAL still has some (very attenuated) party-list-like aspects, because party affiliation is used to match candidates to districts at the end; but if you were willing to give up this (overlapping) geographical representation aspect of PAL, you could make a similar delegated PR system in which parties played no explicit role. 3. I haven't looked at PAL for a while. I'm sticking with 3-5 seat forms of PR that don't challenge the existence of a 2-party system. This keeps the complexity down. I figure we can challenge the constitutionality of denying state's rights to decide whether they want to use a multi-seat election rule for congressional candidates, on the basis of its discriminatory effect against minorities. Clarence Thomas is known to be favorable to this. James Gilmore: But why would you want all these differences and complications? dlw: Because context matters. 3-seat LR Hare is not complicated. It works almost just like 1-seat LR Hare, better known as FPTP. And I'm keeping STV-PR to keep down the diffs and complications, since it works similarly to IRV, the best known alternative to FPTP among progressives in the US. JG: If you are going to use STV-PR for some of these elections, why not use STV-PR for all of these elections to the various representative assemblies (councils, state legislatures, US House of Representatives, US Senate). STV-PR works OK in both partisan and non-partisan elections, so it should give fair and proper representation of the VOTERS in all these different elections. dlw: 1. There are benefits to party-list PR, relative to STV. 2. STV-PR has been bundled with the droop quota. The hare quota is far more 3rd party friendly. 3. Some elections get less voter attn and the benefit of giving voters more options is less than cost of having too many candidates clamoring for your ranked votes. JG: Of course, with districts returning only 3 to 5 members, the proportionality and direct representation MAY be a little limited, but if small numbers are needed to make the system acceptable to the vested interests, then so be it. STV-PR with 3, 4 or 5 member districts is greatly to be preferred to plurality in single-member districts and to plurality at large. dlw: Hare quota w. 3 seats is somewhat preferable to Droop quota w. 3 seats. 3-seat LR-Hare is biased in favor of bigger 3rd parties, which offsets the continued use of single-member elections for state senate and what-not. Now, you could pair the Hare quota w. STV, but why not keep the bundling of STV w. the Droop quota to keep things simpler? JG:We had to accept local government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR package - that's practical politics. But that reform has transformed our local government - no more one-party states. dlw: Undoubtedly, and this is what made the AV referendum possible, no doubt. This is why I argue that the strategic use of low-seat PR for more local elections is a key way to change the dynamics of US politics. Which is in turn why I keep insisting that |Xirv-Xoth| Pirv-Poth for single-member seats. dlw Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to election-methods@lists.electorama.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com You can reach the person managing the list at election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest... Today's Topics: 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) -- Forwarded message -- From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com To: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two vote splitting factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the most self-consistent counts of Florida. Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property would remain in a singlewinner context. -- Forwarded message -- From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and that both can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand. So what do you think? I'm keeping the seat numbers down because I accept that those in power aren't going to want an EU multi-party system and I'm not sure they're wrong about that, plus the US is used to voting the candidate and having their
Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: ... It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. ... So what do you think? I don't see this as an either/or choice, nor do I see a viable both option being suggested. So I'll again suggest VoteFair ranking: VoteFair ranking uses ranked choices (1-2-3 ballots and pairwise counting...) for identifying the most popular candidate -- for filling the first seat in a legislative district. VoteFair ranking fills the second district-based seat with the second-most representative candidate. In the U.S., even without asking voters to indicate a party preference, that would usually be the most popular candidate from the opposite party (i.e. the opposite party compared to the first-seat winner). To further increase proportionality, VoteFair ranking fills some proportional seats based on the favorite party of the voters. (Whichever party has the biggest gap between voter proportion and filled-seat proportion wins the next seat.) We don't have to choose between proportionality (PR) and ranked methods. We can get both. And in a U.S.-compatible way. If election-method reform is to happen in the U.S., it has to merge with the reality of the two-party system. And I believe it should accommodate third parties only to the extent that voters are unable to regain control of the two main parties. As for STV, going beyond two seats easily produces unfair results. And in the U.S. the results also would be quite unstable (i.e. not mesh well with the current two-party system). Richard Fobes Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. Jameson 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to election-methods@lists.electorama.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com You can reach the person managing the list at election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest... Today's Topics: 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) -- Forwarded message -- From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com To: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two vote splitting factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the most self-consistent counts of Florida. Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property would remain in a singlewinner context. -- Forwarded message -- From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. I think it is a matter of context and that both can be useful, especially when no explicit party-list is required for a 3-seat LR Hare election. The vice-candidates who would hold the extra seats a party wins could either be selected after the victory or specified before hand. So what do you think? I'm keeping the seat numbers down
Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
It is because first-mover counts a lot that we've been stuck with FPTP in the US for such a long time in contrast with countries with younger democracies... I never said it was all that counts, but it counts a good deal, as I metaphorically allude to by emphing the diffs in Ps over the diffs in Xs for single-winner election rules. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:35 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.comwrote: If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. Jameson 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to election-methods@lists.electorama.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com You can reach the person managing the list at election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest... Today's Topics: 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) -- Forwarded message -- From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com To: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100 Subject: Re: [EM] Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? On 02/15/2012 08:46 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote: As I've said before, I'm writing a paper on SODA and the chicken dilemma. I'd appreciate any real-world examples of the dilemma. Obviously, since a true chicken dilemma is not possible with either plurality, runoffs, or IRV, I'm looking for cases that arguably would have been a chicken dilemma under approval. That means that the two vote splitting factions would almost certainly have clearly preferred each other to the opposing faction, but there was still enough bad blood and a close enough balance that they could easily have failed to cooperate. I'd say HI-01-2010 qualifies as a good example; US-Pres-2000 doesn't, because many of the Nader voters affirmed that they would not have voted for Gore, and anyway, Gore won both the popular vote and the most self-consistent counts of Florida. Wouldn't the Burr dilemma count? That *was* Approval. Granted, it was used to elect more than one candidate, but you could argue the property would remain in a singlewinner context. -- Forwarded message -- From: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com To: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 08:49:08 -0600 Subject: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? It seems to me that a common sense solution would be to base which gets used on the propensity for voters to be informed about the elections. Also, the two types seem to be bundled with different types of quotas. STV gets marketed with the droop quota here in the US. I'm not complaining because it's good to simplify things. But if STV were bundled with Droop then 3-seat LR Hare might prove handy to make sure that 3rd parties get a constructive role to play in US politics. So I propose that 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota, perhaps using AV in a first step to simplify and shorten the vote-counting and transferring process, for US congressional elections or city council elections and 3-seat LR Hare for state representative and aldermen elections. The latter two elections are less important and get less media coverage and voter attention. Is it reasonable to expect voters to rank multiple candidates in an election where they often simply vote their party line? Why not keep it simple and use the mix of Droop and Hare quotas to both keep the system's duopolistic tendencies and to make the duopoly contested? It seems to
Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org To: election-meth...@electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 12:01:16 -0800 Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: ... It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. ... So what do you think? I don't see this as an either/or choice, dlw: U2 apparently are not among most folks... nor do I see a viable both option being suggested. dlw: viability is a low-blow at this stage, but I guess it's a blow I use quite often. So I'll again suggest VoteFair ranking: VoteFair ranking uses ranked choices (1-2-3 ballots and pairwise counting...) for identifying the most popular candidate -- for filling the first seat in a legislative district. VoteFair ranking fills the second district-based seat with the second-most representative candidate. In the U.S., even without asking voters to indicate a party preference, that would usually be the most popular candidate from the opposite party (i.e. the opposite party compared to the first-seat winner). To further increase proportionality, VoteFair ranking fills some proportional seats based on the favorite party of the voters. (Whichever party has the biggest gap between voter proportion and filled-seat proportion wins the next seat.) We don't have to choose between proportionality (PR) and ranked methods. We can get both. And in a U.S.-compatible way. If election-method reform is to happen in the U.S., it has to merge with the reality of the two-party system. And I believe it should accommodate third parties only to the extent that voters are unable to regain control of the two main parties. dlw: I agree with the reality of the 2-party system. I also believe that we need to make the case that our 2-party system will work much, much better if we give 3rd parties a constructive role to play in it. Giving them access to one-third of the seats in the state assembly so they get to determine which major party is in power in that body every two years is such a constructive role. It will give folks more exit threat from the two major parties, thereby making both of them more responsive to the moving center. As for STV, going beyond two seats easily produces unfair results. And in the U.S. the results also would be quite unstable (i.e. not mesh well with the current two-party system). Can you elaborate? I don't see why 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota wouldn't have results like what you described that would maintain yet transform the US's 2-party system. dlw Richard Fobes -- Forwarded message -- From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 14:35:58 -0600 Subject: Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. Jameson 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to election-methods@lists.electorama.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com You can reach the person managing the list at election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest... Today's Topics: 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (James Gilmour) 6. Re: Question about Schulze beatpath method (Markus Schulze) -- Forwarded message -- From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm km_el...@lavabit.com To: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com Cc: EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 07:51:10 +0100
Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
I give a rebuttal to the Electoral Reform Society's assessment of party-list PR for the case of 3-seat LR Hare. http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:54 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com wrote: From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org To: election-meth...@electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 12:01:16 -0800 Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: ... It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. ... So what do you think? I don't see this as an either/or choice, dlw: U2 apparently are not among most folks... nor do I see a viable both option being suggested. dlw: viability is a low-blow at this stage, but I guess it's a blow I use quite often. So I'll again suggest VoteFair ranking: VoteFair ranking uses ranked choices (1-2-3 ballots and pairwise counting...) for identifying the most popular candidate -- for filling the first seat in a legislative district. VoteFair ranking fills the second district-based seat with the second-most representative candidate. In the U.S., even without asking voters to indicate a party preference, that would usually be the most popular candidate from the opposite party (i.e. the opposite party compared to the first-seat winner). To further increase proportionality, VoteFair ranking fills some proportional seats based on the favorite party of the voters. (Whichever party has the biggest gap between voter proportion and filled-seat proportion wins the next seat.) We don't have to choose between proportionality (PR) and ranked methods. We can get both. And in a U.S.-compatible way. If election-method reform is to happen in the U.S., it has to merge with the reality of the two-party system. And I believe it should accommodate third parties only to the extent that voters are unable to regain control of the two main parties. dlw: I agree with the reality of the 2-party system. I also believe that we need to make the case that our 2-party system will work much, much better if we give 3rd parties a constructive role to play in it. Giving them access to one-third of the seats in the state assembly so they get to determine which major party is in power in that body every two years is such a constructive role. It will give folks more exit threat from the two major parties, thereby making both of them more responsive to the moving center. As for STV, going beyond two seats easily produces unfair results. And in the U.S. the results also would be quite unstable (i.e. not mesh well with the current two-party system). Can you elaborate? I don't see why 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota wouldn't have results like what you described that would maintain yet transform the US's 2-party system. dlw Richard Fobes -- Forwarded message -- From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 14:35:58 -0600 Subject: Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. Jameson 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to election-methods@lists.electorama.com To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com You can reach the person managing the list at election-methods-ow...@lists.electorama.com When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest... Today's Topics: 1. Re: Real-world examples of chicken dilemma? (Kristofer Munsterhjelm) 2. STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (David L Wetzell) 3. SODA arguments (Jameson Quinn) 4. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? (Jameson Quinn) 5. Re: STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method
Hi Robert, Suppose there are four candidates ABCD. B beats A with strength of 10. C beats D with strength of 20. With strength of 30, A beats C, B beats C, D beats A, and D beats B. Then every candidate has a path to every other candidate, and the best path from A to B or from B to A involves traversing the CD win (which is the weakest link in those paths). Kevin De : robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 12h56 Objet : Re: [EM] Question about Schulze beatpath method On 2/17/12 1:27 PM, Markus Schulze wrote: it can happen that the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate A to candidate B and the weakest link in the strongest path from candidate B to candidate A is the same link, say CD. how can that be? since a path is a *defeat* path. you only traverse a beatpath from a candidate who beats the next candidate in the path. is it that candidates C and D are exactly tied? other than that, i cannot understand how the weakest link from A to B can be the same as *any* link from B to A. -- r b-j r...@audioimagination.com Imagination is more important than knowledge. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA
Hi David, De : David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 13h37 Objet : Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. You are supposed to get the EM list to agree first, before writing Soros directly. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates That doesn't make much sense to me. The election method is a part of the system and it has an obvious effect on how many candidates could run. and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw If I remember correctly your idea is to use approval to pick finalists. I don't think this is a good idea because it breaks clone independence, which is an IRV selling point. If your goal is to e.g. not elect Condorcet winners who place third, I think you should use the Approval-IRV hybrid that eliminates the least approved candidate until there is a majority favorite. I call it AER... I think Woodall called it Approval AV. Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
I don't see why anyone would want to use a party-list voting system when there are more voter-centred alternatives that fit much better with the political cultures of countries like USA, Canada, UK. Why anyone would want to use the Hare quota when, with preferential voting, it can distort the proportionality - in a way that Droop does not. Why anyone would want to restrict the voting system to 3-seat districts instead of adopting a flexible approach to district magnitude to fit local geography and recognised communities.. James Gilmour -Original Message- From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com [mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of David L Wetzell Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 9:21 PM To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? I give a rebuttal to the Electoral Reform Society's assessment of party-list PR for the case of 3-seat LR Hare. http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/05/electoral-reform-society-united-kingdom.html dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 2:54 PM, David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com wrote: From: Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org To: election-meth...@electorama.com Cc: Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 12:01:16 -0800 Subject: Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter? On 2/17/2012 6:49 AM, David L Wetzell wrote: ... It seems to me that most folks think the choice is between ranked choices or party-list PR. ... So what do you think? I don't see this as an either/or choice, dlw: U2 apparently are not among most folks... nor do I see a viable both option being suggested. dlw: viability is a low-blow at this stage, but I guess it's a blow I use quite often. So I'll again suggest VoteFair ranking: VoteFair ranking uses ranked choices (1-2-3 ballots and pairwise counting...) for identifying the most popular candidate -- for filling the first seat in a legislative district. VoteFair ranking fills the second district-based seat with the second-most representative candidate. In the U.S., even without asking voters to indicate a party preference, that would usually be the most popular candidate from the opposite party (i.e. the opposite party compared to the first-seat winner). To further increase proportionality, VoteFair ranking fills some proportional seats based on the favorite party of the voters. (Whichever party has the biggest gap between voter proportion and filled-seat proportion wins the next seat.) We don't have to choose between proportionality (PR) and ranked methods. We can get both. And in a U.S.-compatible way. If election-method reform is to happen in the U.S., it has to merge with the reality of the two-party system. And I believe it should accommodate third parties only to the extent that voters are unable to regain control of the two main parties. dlw: I agree with the reality of the 2-party system. I also believe that we need to make the case that our 2-party system will work much, much better if we give 3rd parties a constructive role to play in it. Giving them access to one-third of the seats in the state assembly so they get to determine which major party is in power in that body every two years is such a constructive role. It will give folks more exit threat from the two major parties, thereby making both of them more responsive to the moving center. As for STV, going beyond two seats easily produces unfair results. And in the U.S. the results also would be quite unstable (i.e. not mesh well with the current two-party system). Can you elaborate? I don't see why 3-5 seat STV with a droop quota wouldn't have results like what you described that would maintain yet transform the US's 2-party system. dlw Richard Fobes -- Forwarded message -- From: Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com To: David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com Date: Fri, 17 Feb 2012 14:35:58 -0600 Subject: Re: [EM] JQ wrt SODA If first-mover is all that counts, then I'm afraid we're stuck with plurality. Obviously, I hope and believe that's not true. Jameson 2012/2/17 David L Wetzell wetze...@gmail.com IRV's got a first mover advantage over SODA and to catch up you need to convince someone like Soros to help you market it. It wouldn't matter if you got the whole EM list to agree with you that it was hunky-dory. But in the context of a 2-party dominated system, there aren't as many serious candidates and so what relative advantages there are of SODA over IRV will be less, which then makes the first-mover marketing problem more significant, especially if IRV can be souped up with the seemingly slight modification of the use of a limited form of approval voting in the first stage. dlw On Fri, Feb 17, 2012 at 12:27 PM, election-methods-requ...@lists.electorama.com wrote: Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
Re: [EM] SODA arguments
Hi Jameson, Just a few thoughts. De : Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com À : EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com; electionsciencefoundation electionscie...@googlegroups.com Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 9h20 Objet : [EM] SODA arguments For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval. I guess you will have a hard time arguing this, especially if you have multiple audiences. For instance, whether Range/Approval are even all that great is controversial. But if you're an anti-majoritarian type or think it's unfair/unrealistic to propose that voters are strategic, I guess that SODA looks like a step down. Didn't you post an example where SODA declined to elect a weak CW that you said was actually a good thing? If that's true, I guess some people won't agree with that. It seems to me that there would be a lot more candidates under SODA. It's pretty hard to spoil the race and there is benefit to be had in receiving some votes. It seems parliamentary that way. How many supporters is too few to consider running? (I have a simple rule for cutting down the number of candidates. I don't think I've ever mentioned it because I know how idealistic you all are. Just say that the first-preference winner auto-wins if he has more first preferences than second and third place combined. This can make it risky even to compete for third place. The idea is that voters should definitely then realize which candidates are the top three in their race, which could amount to a viability/visibility boost for #3. My rule assumes there's no equal-ranking, but I bet something could be devised for other ballots.) Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] STV vs Party-list PR, could context matter?
David L Wetzell Sent: Friday, February 17, 2012 7:31 PM James Gilmour: But why would you want all these differences and complications? dlw: Because context matters. I have great difficulty in believing that there are such context specific differences. I could believe that there are differences in the hostility of the political parties to proposals for reform of the voting system at different levels of government and that reforms that the parties might accept at one level would not be acceptable at another - especially their own election! dlw: 1. There are benefits to party-list PR, relative to STV. I do not agree that there are any benefits of any party-PR voting system that outweigh the benefits to the voters of STV-PR. Elections are for electors - or at least, they should be - and to change that balance in favour of the voters should be one of the key objectives of any reform of a voting system. JG: We had to accept local government wards electing only 3 or 4 councillors as part of our STV-PR package - that's practical politics. But that reform has transformed our local government - no more one-party states. dlw: Undoubtedly, and this is what made the AV referendum possible, no doubt. The reform of the voting system for local government in Scotland in 2007 had absolutely nothing to do with the 2011 UK referendum on AV (= IRV, not approval voting). THE problem with the AV referendum was that no serious reformer wanted AV. Some party politicians wanted AV, but far more party politicians (especially Conservatives) were opposed to any reform at all. The Liberal Democrats (whose party policy is for STV-PR) decided that a referendum on AV was the best they could extract from the Conservatives in the negotiations to form the coalition government. The negotiating teams were under a great deal of pressure and wanted to achieve an agreement before the UK financial markets opened on the Monday morning after the Thursday election. James Gilmour Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SODA arguments
2012/2/17 Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr Hi Jameson, Just a few thoughts. *De :* Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com *À :* EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com; electionsciencefoundation electionscie...@googlegroups.com *Envoyé le :* Vendredi 17 février 2012 9h20 *Objet :* [EM] SODA arguments For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval. I guess you will have a hard time arguing this, especially if you have multiple audiences. For instance, whether Range/Approval are even all that great is controversial. But if you're an anti-majoritarian type or think it's unfair/unrealistic to propose that voters are strategic, I guess that SODA looks like a step down. I'm not sure that's true. Clay and Warren are the most hard-core BR advocates, and probably I should let them speak for themselves, but... I think their attitude is not that strategy is evil or Range voters will be 100% honest, but rather, Some fraction of voters will be honest under range, and that's good, so why not use range and let them? In that case, the fact that range voting is strictly better (by BR, and for a pre-chosen arbitrary strategic percentage) than [IRV, Condorcet, MJ, etc], is an important foundation of their argument. Finding a system which, while it is worse than range for 100% honest, is actually better than it in some cases (100% strategy, and presumably 99%, who knows where it stops), is an important qualitative difference in the situation. Didn't you post an example where SODA declined to elect a weak CW that you said was actually a good thing? If that's true, I guess some people won't agree with that. Yes. The basic setup is two major candidates and a weak centrist. The weaker of the two majors gets to decide which of the other two wins. So if the weak CW is truly a CW, they will be preferred by the weaker major, and thus win; but if they are more weak than CW, then the weaker major would rather allow the stronger major to win than stake their reputation on electing the weak CW. So in the end, it's more a question of giving a last chance to realize that someone isn't really the CW, rather than not electing someone who is the CW. It seems to me that there would be a lot more candidates under SODA. It's pretty hard to spoil the race and there is benefit to be had in receiving some votes. It seems parliamentary that way. How many supporters is too few to consider running? Well, there is the 5% cutoff, below which your votes are automatically assigned for you. (I have a simple rule for cutting down the number of candidates. I don't think I've ever mentioned it because I know how idealistic you all are. Just say that the first-preference winner auto-wins if he has more first preferences than second and third place combined. This can make it risky even to compete for third place. The idea is that voters should definitely then realize which candidates are the top three in their race, which could amount to a viability/visibility boost for #3. My rule assumes there's no equal-ranking, but I bet something could be devised for other ballots.) That rule doesn't sound too bad to me. Most of the time, there'd be no risk of it applying; but I think it would still be a gentle pressure in the intended direction. Still, I think it should be considered separately from SODA per se. Jameson Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SODA arguments
Hi Jameson, De : Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com À : Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr Cc : election-methods election-meth...@electorama.com Envoyé le : Vendredi 17 février 2012 19h53 Objet : Re: [EM] SODA arguments For those who feel that Bayesian Regret is the be-all-and-end-all measure of voting system quality, that SODA's BR for 100% strategic voters will beat all other systems, including Range/Approval. I guess you will have a hard time arguing this, especially if you have multiple audiences. For instance, whether Range/Approval are even all that great is controversial. But if you're an anti-majoritarian type or think it's unfair/unrealistic to propose that voters are strategic, I guess that SODA looks like a step down. I'm not sure that's true. Clay and Warren are the most hard-core BR advocates, and probably I should let them speak for themselves, but... I think their attitude is not that strategy is evil or Range voters will be 100% honest, but rather, Some fraction of voters will be honest under range, and that's good, so why not use range and let them? In that case, the fact that range voting is strictly better (by BR, and for a pre-chosen arbitrary strategic percentage) than [IRV, Condorcet, MJ, etc], is an important foundation of their argument. Finding a system which, while it is worse than range for 100% honest, is actually better than it in some cases (100% strategy, and presumably 99%, who knows where it stops), is an important qualitative difference in the situation. Alright. I guess I'll let them make their own arguments if they are so inclined. Didn't you post an example where SODA declined to elect a weak CW that you said was actually a good thing? If that's true, I guess some people won't agree with that. Yes. The basic setup is two major candidates and a weak centrist. The weaker of the two majors gets to decide which of the other two wins. So if the weak CW is truly a CW, they will be preferred by the weaker major, and thus win; but if they are more weak than CW, then the weaker major would rather allow the stronger major to win than stake their reputation on electing the weak CW. So in the end, it's more a question of giving a last chance to realize that someone isn't really the CW, rather than not electing someone who is the CW. Concerns me a little. I'm not sure candidates would do the thing their supporters would want (or even that they themselves feel is best) due to pressures like staking their reputation. For instance, I can see a moderate liberal giving his votes to a more extreme liberal even when he himself prefers a moderate conservative. A voter whose personal ranking crosses the line like that might want to avoid delegating. It seems to me that there would be a lot more candidates under SODA. It's pretty hard to spoil the race and there is benefit to be had in receiving some votes. It seems parliamentary that way. How many supporters is too few to consider running? Well, there is the 5% cutoff, below which your votes are automatically assigned for you. That's not really a punishment though. The candidate will probably get what they would've done anyway. I really think this is an issue that might need a rule of some kind. Why nominate one when you can nominate five? Anybody who appeals to some segment of the electorate could help bring in votes. Can you imagine if, for example, the Republicans were able to nominate every single one of their hopefuls for the presidency, with the knowledge that in the end all their votes would probably pool together? You don't have to like Gingrich, you can vote for Cain. And maybe your vote will end up with Gingrich, but without Cain you might not have cast it at all. (I have a simple rule for cutting down the number of candidates. I don't think I've ever mentioned it because I know how idealistic you all are. Just say that the first-preference winner auto-wins if he has more first preferences than second and third place combined. This can make it risky even to compete for third place. The idea is that voters should definitely then realize which candidates are the top three in their race, which could amount to a viability/visibility boost for #3. My rule assumes there's no equal-ranking, but I bet something could be devised for other ballots.) That rule doesn't sound too bad to me. Most of the time, there'd be no risk of it applying; but I think it would still be a gentle pressure in the intended direction. Still, I think it should be considered separately from SODA per se. Maybe it would be gentle if you expect a lot of candidates but in general I don't think it is very gentle. For example, this election: 49 A 44 B 4 CB 3 DB Would qualify, and auto-elect A. Kevin Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] SODA arguments
So in the end, it's more a question of giving a last chance to realize that someone isn't really the CW, rather than not electing someone who is the CW. Concerns me a little. I'm not sure candidates would do the thing their supporters would want (or even that they themselves feel is best) due to pressures like staking their reputation. For instance, I can see a moderate liberal giving his votes to a more extreme liberal even when he himself prefers a moderate conservative. A voter whose personal ranking crosses the line like that might want to avoid delegating. This scenario is about whether to elect the squeezed centrist or the opposite side. The extremist on your own side is already out of the running. Moreover, as a voter, you can already see if your candidate predeclared for a same-side exremist. It seems to me that there would be a lot more candidates under SODA. It's pretty hard to spoil the race and there is benefit to be had in receiving some votes. It seems parliamentary that way. How many supporters is too few to consider running? Well, there is the 5% cutoff, below which your votes are automatically assigned for you. That's not really a punishment though. The candidate will probably get what they would've done anyway. I really think this is an issue that might need a rule of some kind. Why nominate one when you can nominate five? Anybody who appeals to some segment of the electorate could help bring in votes. Can you imagine if, for example, the Republicans were able to nominate every single one of their hopefuls for the presidency, with the knowledge that in the end all their votes would probably pool together? You don't have to like Gingrich, you can vote for Cain. And maybe your vote will end up with Gingrich, but without Cain you might not have cast it at all. That's a fair point. But look at the other side. Imagine Obama, with a single votecatcher on his left, let's say Grayson. To me it's clear that the two-person tag team (in this case, on the left) would be much better off than the 6-person one (in this case, on the right). Too many people would be tempted to approve just some subset of the Republicans. And similarly, if it were just Romney and (pre-meltdown) Perry against (non-incumbent) Obama, Clinton, (pre-scandal) Edwards, and Kucinich... I think that Romney and Perry would have the advantage. That is to say, more is not always better, even in SODA. Jameson Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
