RE: Conventional QTI = False
I think we're talking at different levels. You claim SWE is emergent from a computational layer BENEATH it - I think that's fine. I was objecting to the primacy of a computational layer which runs on top of the SWE (i.e. physical computers like the one I'm typing on). But I guess I misunderstood. Charles > -Original Message- > From: Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Sunday, 16 September 2001 4:33 a.m. > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: RE: Conventional QTI = False > > > Charles Goodwin wrote: > > >I think the only constraint is that the extensions should be > physically > >possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave > >equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but > the SWE is the > >constraining factor. > > Why? > > You postulate physicalism. Show me your theory of mind, please. > By UDA it cannot be computationalist. > With comp it can be argued that the constraining factors are > only logico-arithmetical. The SWE should be emerging. > We must explain why quantum computation described by "e^iH" > seems, from the point of view of the observer, to supersede > classical computation described by "H". > > Bruno
RE: Conventional QTI = False
Charles wrote: >(BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who >"finds himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll >live to be 80 is 1/80?) This argument (against Leslie Bayesian Doomsday argument) has been developped by Jean Paul Delahaye in the journal "Pour la Science" (french version of the "Scientific American"). I have not the precise reference under the hand. I think it is a good point against too quick use of Bayes in infinite or continuous context. Bruno
RE: Conventional QTI = False
Charles Goodwin wrote: >I think the only constraint is that the extensions should be physically >possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave >equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but the SWE is the >constraining factor. Why? You postulate physicalism. Show me your theory of mind, please. By UDA it cannot be computationalist. With comp it can be argued that the constraining factors are only logico-arithmetical. The SWE should be emerging. We must explain why quantum computation described by "e^iH" seems, from the point of view of the observer, to supersede classical computation described by "H". Bruno
RE: Conventional QTI = False
> -Original Message- > From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > I wasn't referring to that snippet, but another one discussing the > evolution of "superclusters" of galaxies. The theory predicts that the > universe will ultimately come to be dominated by said clusters. The > snippet I mentioned seems to be referring to our measured velocity of > ca 600km/s in the direction of the Virgo supercluster, although that > wasn't explicitly mentioned in the article. Yes, I know the one you mean (the snippet and the supercluster). An article on the future evolution of the universe. That suffers from the same objection to the prediction that we'll fall into our galaxy's black hole, namely that the dynamics of the situation might be such that our galaxy is 'evaporated off' from the supercluster's potential well rather than 'relaxed into' it. (However I realise you were just making a casual remark in passing so maybe all this analysis is getting a bit over the top) > Re our own supermassive black hole at the heart of the Milky Way - I > assume we're in a stable orbit about that one, with the usual caveat > that its impossible to prove stability of any arbitrary n-body orbit > of course. The sun does seem to be in a very stable orbit about the galaxy - almost circular, in fact. See "Rare Earth" for an explanation of why this is one of the many factors that had to come out just right for us to exist at all... Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
I wasn't referring to that snippet, but another one discussing the
evolution of "superclusters" of galaxies. The theory predicts that the
universe will ultimately come to be dominated by said clusters. The
snippet I mentioned seems to be referring to our measured velocity of
ca 600km/s in the direction of the Virgo supercluster, although that
wasn't explicitly mentioned in the article.
Re our own supermassive black hole at the heart of the Milky Way - I
assume we're in a stable orbit about that one, with the usual caveat
that its impossible to prove stability of any arbitrary n-body orbit
of course.
Cheers
George Levy wrote:
>
>
> > >
> > > Russell Standish wrote:
> > >
> > > > Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole
> > > > right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years
> > > before we hit
> > > > the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of
> > > issue ago).
> >
> George wrote:
> > >
> > > To avoid any scheduling conflict, I'll make sure to enter this in my
> > > scheduler. I wouldn't want to miss this for the world.
> > >
> > > George
>
> Charles Goodwin wrote:
> >
> > According to NS for 8th Sept the supermassive hole at the centre of our galaxy has
>been observed with much greater precision due to
> > a flare which occured when matter fell into the accretion disc. But it doesn't say
>anything about us falling in Or is this just
> > a general statement based on the momentum exchange which will take place inside
>the galaxy over the next few 100 billion years?
> > Because momentum exchange can go either way - either the Earth (or what's left of
>it) is flung out of the galaxy or it falls into
> > the central black hole. Similarly if the galaxy itself is orbiting a supermassive
>hole at the centre of the local group (say) that
> > might also lead to 'evaporation' of the galaxy from the group or collapse into the
>central hole
> >
> > I just thought you needed to be aware of that. Set your scheduler for either ice
>or fire, a bang or a whimper
> >
> > Charles
> >
>
>
>
> Thanks for the weather report Charles. I'll get dressed in layers, take
> my sunscreen lotion, and pack a good lunch.
>
> George
>
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Conventional QTI = False
> > > > Russell Standish wrote: > > > > > Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole > > > right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years > > before we hit > > > the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of > > issue ago). > George wrote: > > > > To avoid any scheduling conflict, I'll make sure to enter this in my > > scheduler. I wouldn't want to miss this for the world. > > > > George Charles Goodwin wrote: > > According to NS for 8th Sept the supermassive hole at the centre of our galaxy has >been observed with much greater precision due to > a flare which occured when matter fell into the accretion disc. But it doesn't say >anything about us falling in Or is this just > a general statement based on the momentum exchange which will take place inside the >galaxy over the next few 100 billion years? > Because momentum exchange can go either way - either the Earth (or what's left of >it) is flung out of the galaxy or it falls into > the central black hole. Similarly if the galaxy itself is orbiting a supermassive >hole at the centre of the local group (say) that > might also lead to 'evaporation' of the galaxy from the group or collapse into the >central hole > > I just thought you needed to be aware of that. Set your scheduler for either ice or >fire, a bang or a whimper > > Charles > Thanks for the weather report Charles. I'll get dressed in layers, take my sunscreen lotion, and pack a good lunch. George
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Russell Standish wrote: > Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole > right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years before we hit > the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of issue ago). To avoid any scheduling conflict, I'll make sure to enter this in my scheduler. I wouldn't want to miss this for the world. George
Re: Conventional QTI = False
The lines are too large for my screen to handle but I have fixed that by setting my Netscape to wrap automatically (it does so at around 70 characters). The output is irregular but it's OK. Charles Goodwin wrote: > > Re wrapping around - I've set MS Outlook to wrap at 132 characters (the largest >value it will accept). It insists that I wrap > somewhere (unfortunately). If you know any way to improve the situation let me know >(I often go through and manually stick together > the short lines). I could miss out the >'s on quoted bits, but that might be >confusing > > > However I must admit I don't see how using the SWE limits the size of the >multiverse. The SWE predicts a continuum of resultant > states from a given initial states, which leads me to assume that (if the MWI is >correct) the multiverse must contain a continuum / > uncountable infinity of states. If that's a limit it's a fairly large one by most >standards! > The limits may just be different orders of infinity. > Re logically possible vs physically possible universes. The "set" (or whatever one >shoud call it) of all logically possible > universes is called Platonia by Julian Barbour. The "set" of all physically possible >universes with the same laws of physics as ours > (plus some extra information, as David Deutsch has pointed out) is called the >Multiverse. Platonia is either as big as the MV (both > being continua) or bigger (a higher order of infinity than the Multiverse). Immortality does not have to be based on Quantum Theory. It can be derived from basic philosophical considerations borrowed from the Anthropic principle, Descartes and Leibniz (all possible worlds). What Barbour calls Platonia some philosophers call the Plenitude. > All the above assumes the MWI is correct (evidence: quantum interference), and that Platonia exists (evidence (?) : the weak > anthropic principle). The evidence for the Plenitude (Platonia) is the Principle of sufficient reason or more simply, causality (or the lack of). In the absence of any cause, for any given instance, all other possible instances must also exist. For any instance of universe (ours), all other possible universes must also exist. Hence, the Plenitude. Note, that by invoking the "absence of any cause", this derivation specifically steers clear of the "Creation by Design" argument. In addition, this reliance on rationality, combined with the anthropic principle, leads to a theory of consciousness: "I am rational because I am conscious." Bruno may have found a way to express this using a modern mathematical formulation. George
RE: Conventional QTI = False
> -Original Message- > From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > Except that it is possible to perform an infinite amount of > computation in the big crunch due to Tipler's argument, and only a > finite amount of computation with the open universe (Dyson's > argument). Sort of the opposite of what you might expect... I trust Dyson's argument more than Tipler's - the latter relies on a raft of unproven assumptions about what might be possible during the collapse. I was assuming a conventional big crunch in my argument. > Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole > right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years before we hit > the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of issue ago). Enough time to move elsewhere I guess. Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Except that it is possible to perform an infinite amount of computation in the big crunch due to Tipler's argument, and only a finite amount of computation with the open universe (Dyson's argument). Sort of the opposite of what you might expect... Anyway, it looks like we're falling into a supermassive black hole right now, but we've got about 100 billion (10^11) years before we hit the event horizon. (Reported in New Scientist a couple of issue ago). Cheers Charles Goodwin wrote: > > Another thought on the Bayesian / SSA argument. Suppose (recent cosmological >discoveries aside) that we discovered that the universe > was going to fall back on itself into a big crunch in, say, 1 googol years' time. In >such a universe QTI could still operate, but > would only operate until the big crunch, which would act as a cul-de-sac. Now the >SSA would say that typically you'd "expect to find > yourself" (whatever that means) with an age around 0.5 googol, but that nevertheless >there was a finite chance that you'd "find > yourself" at age, say, 20. So assuming the SSA is valid for a moment, it wouldn't >rule out QTI (although it would make it seem > rather unlikely) if we discussed it when aged 20 in a closed universe. But it would >be *impossible* if had the same discussion in an > open universe! Odd that the average density of our branch of the multiverse should >make all the difference to a theory based on the > MWI . . . odd too (though not impossible) that the distant future history of the >universe should determine the probability of events > in the present . . . > > (BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who "finds >himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll > live to be 80 is 1/80?) > > Charles > > > -Original Message- > > From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 12:35 p.m. > > To: Charles Goodwin > > Cc: "Everything-List (E-mail)" > > Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False > > > > > > The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's > > list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I > > originally posted this at > > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May > > 1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument > > was posted - perhaps this was via some other papers. > > > > The discussion that followed over the following year was quite > > interesting at times, and boringly technical at other times. It > > clarified a number of technical concepts, in particular what became > > known as the ASSA - which seems exactly like point 3) of Charles's > > post below: random hoppings of some "soul" between observer > > moments. Despite your protestations to the contrary Jacques, which I > > never found convincing. > > > > By contrast, "soul hopping" does not happen in the usual formulation > > of QTI, although I grant it is a feature of some computational > > theories of immortality based on infinite sized universes. > > > > I find it very droll that Jacques attempted to tar his opposition's > > theories with the very same brush that tars his own ASSA theory. > > > > The point of this is not to say that QTI is true (for which I > > retain my > > usual degree of scepticism), but simply that the Jacques Mallah SSA > > argument simply does not work as a counter argument. > > > > Cheers > > > > Charles Goodwin wrote: > > > > > > > -Original Message- > > > > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > > > > > > > >From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > >I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI > > compatible with > > > > >Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails > > > > >completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the > > reasons for > > > > >the failure are also interesting. > > > > > > > > What the hell are you babbling about? > > > > > > I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to > > the SSA argument, but mine certainly *appear* to undermine it > > (at least I > > > haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly, > > (1) the SSA argument neglects the fact that even with an > > infinitely long
RE: Conventional QTI = False
Another thought on the Bayesian / SSA argument. Suppose (recent cosmological
discoveries aside) that we discovered that the universe
was going to fall back on itself into a big crunch in, say, 1 googol years' time. In
such a universe QTI could still operate, but
would only operate until the big crunch, which would act as a cul-de-sac. Now the SSA
would say that typically you'd "expect to find
yourself" (whatever that means) with an age around 0.5 googol, but that nevertheless
there was a finite chance that you'd "find
yourself" at age, say, 20. So assuming the SSA is valid for a moment, it wouldn't rule
out QTI (although it would make it seem
rather unlikely) if we discussed it when aged 20 in a closed universe. But it would be
*impossible* if had the same discussion in an
open universe! Odd that the average density of our branch of the multiverse should
make all the difference to a theory based on the
MWI . . . odd too (though not impossible) that the distant future history of the
universe should determine the probability of events
in the present . . .
(BTW, would I be right in thinking that, applying the SSA to a person who "finds
himself" to be 1 year old, the chances that he'll
live to be 80 is 1/80?)
Charles
> -Original Message-
> From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 12:35 p.m.
> To: Charles Goodwin
> Cc: "Everything-List (E-mail)"
> Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False
>
>
> The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's
> list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I
> originally posted this at
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May
> 1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument
> was posted - perhaps this was via some other papers.
>
> The discussion that followed over the following year was quite
> interesting at times, and boringly technical at other times. It
> clarified a number of technical concepts, in particular what became
> known as the ASSA - which seems exactly like point 3) of Charles's
> post below: random hoppings of some "soul" between observer
> moments. Despite your protestations to the contrary Jacques, which I
> never found convincing.
>
> By contrast, "soul hopping" does not happen in the usual formulation
> of QTI, although I grant it is a feature of some computational
> theories of immortality based on infinite sized universes.
>
> I find it very droll that Jacques attempted to tar his opposition's
> theories with the very same brush that tars his own ASSA theory.
>
> The point of this is not to say that QTI is true (for which I
> retain my
> usual degree of scepticism), but simply that the Jacques Mallah SSA
> argument simply does not work as a counter argument.
>
> Cheers
>
> Charles Goodwin wrote:
> >
> > > -Original Message-
> > > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > >
> > > >From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > > >I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI
> compatible with
> > > >Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails
> > > >completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the
> reasons for
> > > >the failure are also interesting.
> > >
> > > What the hell are you babbling about?
> >
> > I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to
> the SSA argument, but mine certainly *appear* to undermine it
> (at least I
> > haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly,
> (1) the SSA argument neglects the fact that even with an
> infinitely long
> > worldline, everyone must pass through every age from 0
> upwards, which is precisely what we observe. It also (2)
> ignores a selection
> > effect, namely that only in a thermodynamically low number
> of universes can a person who is not "QTI-old" expect to
> communicate with
> > someone who *is* (and hence 99....% of
> discussion groups will necessarily be composed of "QTI-young"
> people). The SSA
> > argument also (3) gives the strong impression (though this
> could *perhaps* be argued away) that it relies on us treating our
> > worldlines as though we've just been "dropped" into them at
> some random point, like Billy Pilgrim; which is, of course, not what
> > happens in reality.
> >
> > Maybe there are some more technical objections to the SSA
> argument, but these are the simplest and most obvious.
> >
> > Charles
> >
>
>
>
> --
> --
> Dr. Russell Standish Director
> High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967,
> 8308 3119 (mobile)
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425
> 253119 (")
> Australia [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
Re: Conventional QTI = False
The reason for failure of Jacques' argument is no. 1) from Charles's
list below, which he obviously thought of independently of me. I
originally posted this at
http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m583.html, on 10th May
1999. Unfortunately, I couldn't find where the orginal SSA argument
was posted - perhaps this was via some other papers.
The discussion that followed over the following year was quite
interesting at times, and boringly technical at other times. It
clarified a number of technical concepts, in particular what became
known as the ASSA - which seems exactly like point 3) of Charles's
post below: random hoppings of some "soul" between observer
moments. Despite your protestations to the contrary Jacques, which I
never found convincing.
By contrast, "soul hopping" does not happen in the usual formulation
of QTI, although I grant it is a feature of some computational
theories of immortality based on infinite sized universes.
I find it very droll that Jacques attempted to tar his opposition's
theories with the very same brush that tars his own ASSA theory.
The point of this is not to say that QTI is true (for which I retain my
usual degree of scepticism), but simply that the Jacques Mallah SSA
argument simply does not work as a counter argument.
Cheers
Charles Goodwin wrote:
>
> > -Original Message-
> > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> >
> > >From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > >I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with
> > >Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails
> > >completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for
> > >the failure are also interesting.
> >
> > What the hell are you babbling about?
>
> I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to the SSA argument, but mine
>certainly *appear* to undermine it (at least I
> haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly, (1) the SSA argument
>neglects the fact that even with an infinitely long
> worldline, everyone must pass through every age from 0 upwards, which is precisely
>what we observe. It also (2) ignores a selection
> effect, namely that only in a thermodynamically low number of universes can a person
>who is not "QTI-old" expect to communicate with
> someone who *is* (and hence 99....% of discussion groups will
>necessarily be composed of "QTI-young" people). The SSA
> argument also (3) gives the strong impression (though this could *perhaps* be argued
>away) that it relies on us treating our
> worldlines as though we've just been "dropped" into them at some random point, like
>Billy Pilgrim; which is, of course, not what
> happens in reality.
>
> Maybe there are some more technical objections to the SSA argument, but these are
>the simplest and most obvious.
>
> Charles
>
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
RE: Conventional QTI = False
Re wrapping around - I've set MS Outlook to wrap at 132 characters (the largest value it will accept). It insists that I wrap somewhere (unfortunately). If you know any way to improve the situation let me know (I often go through and manually stick together the short lines). I could miss out the >'s on quoted bits, but that might be confusing Re the SWE versus logical consistency. I suspect that at some deep level the two might become the same thing. If you are thinking of logical consistency from the pov of a conscious observer, I'm not sure what that entails. Is it logically consistent to find that you're "really" a 30-D octopus playing a 3D virtual reality game? I suppose it might be... But then I'm not sure what LC consists of on this argument. It can't consist of continuity or a lack of surprises! Using the SWE is definitely basing the argument on the known laws of QM, if not GR. The underlying assumption of the MWI is that the SWE describes *everything* (or that it's a very good approximation to the real explanation). Since QTI is based on the MWI, it has to assume the SWE as its basis, I would say. Logical consistency is probably a "lower level" requirement that in some manner generates the SWE (according to comp. theory at least). But if we're operating on the level of QM and not worrying about what goes on "underneath" then I'd say the SWE has got to be the basis of QTI. However I must admit I don't see how using the SWE limits the size of the multiverse. The SWE predicts a continuum of resultant states from a given initial states, which leads me to assume that (if the MWI is correct) the multiverse must contain a continuum / uncountable infinity of states. If that's a limit it's a fairly large one by most standards! Re logically possible vs physically possible universes. The "set" (or whatever one shoud call it) of all logically possible universes is called Platonia by Julian Barbour. The "set" of all physically possible universes with the same laws of physics as ours (plus some extra information, as David Deutsch has pointed out) is called the Multiverse. Platonia is either as big as the MV (both being continua) or bigger (a higher order of infinity than the Multiverse). All the above assumes the MWI is correct (evidence: quantum interference), and that Platonia exists (evidence (?) : the weak anthropic principle). Charles > -Original Message- > From: George Levy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 10:48 a.m. > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Conventional QTI = False > > > > > Charles Goodwin wrote: > > > George Levy wrote > > > I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the > > > conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that > > > seems logical > > > to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically > > > consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for > > > consciousness. > > > > I think the only constraint is that the extensions should > be physically possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave > > equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but > the SWE is the constraining factor. > > > > Interesting. You claim that the only constraint is the SWE. You opinion > is based I presume on our current knowledge of physical laws. This puts > a definite limit on the size of the multiverse. I claim the only > constraint is logical consistency basing myself on the anthropic > principle. This also puts a limit on the size of the multiverse. Bruno > Marshall claims he can bridge the two by deriving the SWE (or maybe a > simplified form) from logical consistency which implies that the > currently conceivable physical multiverse is equal in size with the > logical multiverse. > > BTW, your posts are the only ones that do not automatically wrap around > at the end of a line, unless you start a new paragraph. Is there any way > you or I (us?) could fix this? > > George
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Charles Goodwin wrote: > George Levy wrote > > I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the > > conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that > > seems logical > > to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically > > consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for > > consciousness. > > I think the only constraint is that the extensions should be physically possible, >i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave > equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but the SWE is the >constraining factor. > Interesting. You claim that the only constraint is the SWE. You opinion is based I presume on our current knowledge of physical laws. This puts a definite limit on the size of the multiverse. I claim the only constraint is logical consistency basing myself on the anthropic principle. This also puts a limit on the size of the multiverse. Bruno Marshall claims he can bridge the two by deriving the SWE (or maybe a simplified form) from logical consistency which implies that the currently conceivable physical multiverse is equal in size with the logical multiverse. BTW, your posts are the only ones that do not automatically wrap around at the end of a line, unless you start a new paragraph. Is there any way you or I (us?) could fix this? George
RE: Conventional QTI = False
> -Original Message- > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > >From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with > >Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails > >completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for > >the failure are also interesting. > > What the hell are you babbling about? I don't know whether he's thinking about my objections to the SSA argument, but mine certainly *appear* to undermine it (at least I haven't yet heard a good reason why they don't). Briefly, (1) the SSA argument neglects the fact that even with an infinitely long worldline, everyone must pass through every age from 0 upwards, which is precisely what we observe. It also (2) ignores a selection effect, namely that only in a thermodynamically low number of universes can a person who is not "QTI-old" expect to communicate with someone who *is* (and hence 99....% of discussion groups will necessarily be composed of "QTI-young" people). The SSA argument also (3) gives the strong impression (though this could *perhaps* be argued away) that it relies on us treating our worldlines as though we've just been "dropped" into them at some random point, like Billy Pilgrim; which is, of course, not what happens in reality. Maybe there are some more technical objections to the SSA argument, but these are the simplest and most obvious. Charles
RE: Conventional QTI = False
> -Original Message- > From: George Levy [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Wednesday, 12 September 2001 7:48 a.m. > > I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the > conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that > seems logical > to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically > consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for > consciousness. I think the only constraint is that the extensions should be physically possible, i.e. possible outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation. If those are also logical outcomes then fine, but the SWE is the constraining factor. > I can imagine certain branches in which memory is totally lost, (the > null case so to speak - because there is really no consciousness > continuation) and other branches where memory is totally > conserved, yet > other cases where memory is transformed to reflect a different > pastAll these will come true as long as there is a logical > explanation for them to happen. You must keep in mind as Jacques > mentionned, that memory is not necessary identical with the past. It > only represents the present brain state which reflects in a consistent > fashion more or less precisely what the past was. Memory represents the past, basically, because matter is (semi) stable and because the arrow of time only operates in one direction. Obviously there will be errors of recording (our senses and our interpretation of them are not perfect) plus errors in storage (memories degrading with time, false associations being created, etc). This isn't necessarily so. Presumably an advanced AI, assuming such a thing can exist, would be able to have perfect recall. Whether memory is continuous in the QTI depends on what continuations the SWE allows for a given situation. The SWE might allow you to survive being shot through the head, for example (people *have* survived having objects propelled through their heads occasionally) but the most likely continuation might well include you losing part of your memory and undergoing a personality change. > In some branches you will experience increasing old age > without limit... > all ou need is the logical explanation. > For example upon dying as a human, you may wake up as a > billion year old > ten arm octopus living in a 30 dimensional space realizing > that you were > just dreaming in 3-Land. The number of explanations seems limitless. This assumes that identical quantum states can be generated in different parts of the multiverse WITHOUT having evolved from identical previous states. I don't see that this is impossible (and if it isn't impossible it will happen - that's what the multiverse is all about). You are ALSO assuming that identical quantum states - no matter how they might be separated along spacelike, timelike or other-dimension-like intervals - can experience continuous consciousness. To assume that you need a theory which explains how we manage to experience continuous consciousness from instant to instant - of IF we do, or just (heh heh) think we do. > In this list, we are what we are, our age probably ranging > from 20 to 80 > because of our surrounding, because of anthropic reasons. Had > we been a > billion year old group (with the corresponding historical-anthropic > reasons for being 1 billion year old), God knows what we would be > talking and worrying about, but we would certainly not be > debating this > (F)allacious (I)nsane (N)onsense. :-) (Again assuming QTI is true for a moment . . . ) we couldn't be a billion year old group unless advanced technology has enabled everyone to live "forever" (and we've tidied up the solar system, or found a quieter neighbourhood to live in...!) - I mean, you can't have a billion year old GROUP according to QTI, only billion year old individuals in different (and "thermodynamically unlikely") branches of the multiverse. One of the cunning features of the QTI is that it can only be "proved" from the 1st person perspective (and in an incredibly small proportion of universes - maybe the Queen Mother is doing it in our one?). From the 3rd person perspective, i.e. your perspective on everyone else, QTI still predicts death at the normal sort of age. Hence by definition, according to QTI a discussion group will always be composed of people very near the start of their worldlines (in QTI terms), except in an infinitesimal proportion of universes. I'm not putting the arguments for QTI because I believe it but because I've yet to see a good counter-argument. So far the only counter argument I've seen is the SSA one, which doesn't take into account what we might call the "anthropic principle" that leads to people who are able to have discussions being in 99.999% of cases "QTI-young". Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Hi Saibal, I don't know if there is an accepted formulation for QTI and the conservation of memory, however, the only constraint that seems logical to me is that the consciousness extensions should be logically consistent, because logical consistenty is a prerequisite for consciousness. I can imagine certain branches in which memory is totally lost, (the null case so to speak - because there is really no consciousness continuation) and other branches where memory is totally conserved, yet other cases where memory is transformed to reflect a different pastAll these will come true as long as there is a logical explanation for them to happen. You must keep in mind as Jacques mentionned, that memory is not necessary identical with the past. It only represents the present brain state which reflects in a consistent fashion more or less precisely what the past was. In some branches you will experience increasing old age without limit... all ou need is the logical explanation. For example upon dying as a human, you may wake up as a billion year old ten arm octopus living in a 30 dimensional space realizing that you were just dreaming in 3-Land. The number of explanations seems limitless. In this list, we are what we are, our age probably ranging from 20 to 80 because of our surrounding, because of anthropic reasons. Had we been a billion year old group (with the corresponding historical-anthropic reasons for being 1 billion year old), God knows what we would be talking and worrying about, but we would certainly not be debating this (F)allacious (I)nsane (N)onsense. :-) George Saibal Mitra wrote: > > QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is > supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with > probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking. > > I have no problems with the fact that according to quantum mechanics there > is a finite probability that bullets fired from a machine gun toward you > will all tunnel through your body. Or, that if you are thrown into a black > hole (Russell Standish's example), you might be emitted from the black hole > as Hawking radiation. > > The mistake is that QTI ONLY considers certain branches were you survive > without memory loss, other branches are not considered. This leads to the > paradox that you should experience yourself being infinitely old etc.. > > Saibal > > Charles Goodwin wrote: > > > > -Original Message- > > > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > > > > > In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it > > > is much more > > > likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not > > > diagnosed with the > > > disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically > > > cured. The latter > > > possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just > > > because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. > > > > I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI) > in both branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite > > number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the > multiverse in which he survives tends to zero - but that is > > because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a > person survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments > > are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to > timelike infinity. > > > > > You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow > > > transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a > > > different branch that > > > separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), > > > but I would say > > > that the surviving person has the same consciousness the > > > original person > > > would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of > > > having the > > > disease. > > > > That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to > accomodate an uncountable infinity of branches in which a > > given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger) > uncountable infinity in which he doesn't. > > > > Charles > >
Re: Conventional QTI = False
>From: Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with >Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails >completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for >the failure are also interesting. What the hell are you babbling about? - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: Conventional QTI = False
As I said, this is a completely new interpretation of QTI, one never
stated before. QTI does _not_ assume that memory is conserved. The
prediction that one may end up being so old as to not know how old you
are is based on the assumption that you total memory capacity remains
constant - it need not do so. On the other hand, I have no problem
with the fact that dementia might set in.
I suspect you are trying to find ways of making QTI compatible with
Jacques ASSA based argument, when it is clear his argument fails
completely. Not that the argument is unimportant, as the reasons for
the failure are also interesting.
Cheers
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next
> experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations
> were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisely this
> that leads to the the prediction that you should find yourself being
> infinitely old, or that you should live for arbitrary long. If you are
> severly injured in an accident and dying, then the probability that you will
> survive in a branch where the accident never happened is much larger than
> living on in a branch where the accident did happen.
>
> That continuations with memory loss are important can be verified
> ``experimentally´´ (I don't remember everything that has happened to me).
> There are also continuations of me that never forget anything. I am not one
> of them.
>
> Saibal
>
>
> Russell Standish wrote:
>
> > Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This
> > doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to
> > forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense.
> >
> > Cheers
> >
> > Saibal Mitra wrote:
> > >
> >
> > > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can
> =
> > > also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a =
> > > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a =
> > > long time ago.
> > >
> > > Saibal
> > >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> --
> > Dr. Russell StandishDirector
> > High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119
> (mobile)
> > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
> > Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> > Room 2075, Red Centre
> http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> > International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
> > --
> --
>
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
RE: Conventional QTI = False
> -Original Message- > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next > experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations > were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisely this > that leads to the the prediction that you should find yourself being > infinitely old, or that you should live for arbitrary long. If you are > severly injured in an accident and dying, then the probability that you will > survive in a branch where the accident never happened is much > larger than living on in a branch where the accident did happen. As I said previously, QTI implies that ALL observer moments experience an indefinite existence. So *both* these branches do, if QTI is correct. > That continuations with memory loss are important can be verified ``experimentally´´ >(I don't remember everything that has happened to me). There are also continuations of me that never forget anything. I am not one of them. This doesn't imply that the memory loss has to be total amnesia, though. It could be more like a fadeout of memories after a certain time. So one could only ever experience (or remember) being, say, 200 years old. (Does QTI insist that everyone experiences being infinitely old with the memories to prove it, or "just" that they experience indefinitely prolonged consciousness?) Charles
RE: Conventional QTI = False
> -Original Message- > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is > supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with > probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking. To be exact, conventional QTI postulates that all structures in the multiverse should experience becoming infinitely old, including all observer moments. > I have no problems with the fact that according to quantum mechanics there > is a finite probability that bullets fired from a machine gun toward you > will all tunnel through your body. Or, that if you are thrown into a black > hole (Russell Standish's example), you might be emitted from the black hole > as Hawking radiation. Or indeed a different black hole > The mistake is that QTI ONLY considers certain branches were you survive > without memory loss, other branches are not considered. This leads to the > paradox that you should experience yourself being infinitely old etc.. I think it's guaranteed that if you lived for millions of years you'd suffer memory loss. In fact the human brain's memory capacity would probably fill up in about 200 years, after which you'd presumably either lose your ability to remember new things or start to lose old memories to make way for new ones. (My advice is keep a diary...) Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
I just argue that to compute the probability distribution for your next
experience, given your previous ones, you must also consider continuations
were you suffer memory loss. QTI fails to do so and it is precisely this
that leads to the the prediction that you should find yourself being
infinitely old, or that you should live for arbitrary long. If you are
severly injured in an accident and dying, then the probability that you will
survive in a branch where the accident never happened is much larger than
living on in a branch where the accident did happen.
That continuations with memory loss are important can be verified
``experimentally´´ (I don't remember everything that has happened to me).
There are also continuations of me that never forget anything. I am not one
of them.
Saibal
Russell Standish wrote:
> Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This
> doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to
> forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense.
>
> Cheers
>
> Saibal Mitra wrote:
> >
>
> > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can
=
> > also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a =
> > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a =
> > long time ago.
> >
> > Saibal
> >
>
>
>
> --
--
> Dr. Russell StandishDirector
> High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119
(mobile)
> UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
> Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Room 2075, Red Centre
http://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
> International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
> --
--
Re: Conventional QTI = False
QTI, as formulated by some on this list (I call this conventional QTI), is supposed to imply that you should experience becoming arbitrarily old with probability one. It is this prediction that I am attacking. I have no problems with the fact that according to quantum mechanics there is a finite probability that bullets fired from a machine gun toward you will all tunnel through your body. Or, that if you are thrown into a black hole (Russell Standish's example), you might be emitted from the black hole as Hawking radiation. The mistake is that QTI ONLY considers certain branches were you survive without memory loss, other branches are not considered. This leads to the paradox that you should experience yourself being infinitely old etc.. Saibal Charles Goodwin wrote: > > -Original Message- > > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > > > In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it > > is much more > > likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not > > diagnosed with the > > disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically > > cured. The latter > > possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just > > because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. > > I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI) in both branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite > number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the multiverse in which he survives tends to zero - but that is > because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a person survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments > are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to timelike infinity. > > > You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow > > transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a > > different branch that > > separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), > > but I would say > > that the surviving person has the same consciousness the > > original person > > would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of > > having the > > disease. > > That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to accomodate an uncountable infinity of branches in which a > given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger) uncountable infinity in which he doesn't. > > Charles >
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Never heard of this reasoning before. Can you expand please? This
doesn't appear to be related to the problem of being required to
forget how old you if you are immortal in a physical human sense.
Cheers
Saibal Mitra wrote:
>
> According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can =
> also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a =
> fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a =
> long time ago.
>
> Saibal
>
Dr. Russell Standish Director
High Performance Computing Support Unit, Phone 9385 6967, 8308 3119 (mobile)
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 Fax 9385 6965, 0425 253119 (")
Australia[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Room 2075, Red Centrehttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks
International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02
RE: Conventional QTI = False
> -Original Message- > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it > is much more > likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not > diagnosed with the > disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically > cured. The latter > possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just > because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. I don't understand this argument. The person survives (according to QTI) in both branches. In fact QTI postulates that an infinite number of copies of a person survives (although the *proportion* of the multiverse in which he survives tends to zero - but that is because the multivese is growing far faster than the branches in which a person survives). QTI postulates that ALL observer moments are part of a series (of a vast number of series') which survive to timelike infinity. > You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow > transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a > different branch that > separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), > but I would say > that the surviving person has the same consciousness the > original person > would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of > having the > disease. That isn't necessary (according to QTI). The multiverse is large enough to accomodate an uncountable infinity of branches in which a given person survives from ANY starting state, as well as a (larger) uncountable infinity in which he doesn't. Charles
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Hal Finney wrote: > Saibal writes: > > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can > > also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a > > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a > > long time ago. > > Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say, > you don't believe this because you have died. But this is not possible. > So the analogy is not as good as it looks. You do exist in branches where > you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember them. That is true, but I want to make the point that branches where I survive with memory loss have to be taken into account. In the case of a person suffering from a terminal disease, it is much more likely that he will survive in a branch where he was not diagnosed with the disease, than in a branch where the disease is magically cured. The latter possibility (conventional qti) can't be favoured above the first just because the surviving person is more similar to the original person. You could object that in the first case your consciousness is somehow transferred to a different person (you ``jump´´ to a different branch that separated from the dying branch before you were diagnosed), but I would say that the surviving person has the same consciousness the original person would have if you cured his disease and erased all memory of having the disease. Saibal
Re: Conventional QTI = False
Saibal writes: > According to the conventional QTI, not only do you live forever, you can > also never forget anything. I don't believe this because I know for a > fact that I have forgotten quite a lot of things that have happened a > long time ago. Right, but to make the same argument against QTI you'd have to say, you don't believe this because you have died. But this is not possible. So the analogy is not as good as it looks. You do exist in branches where you have forgotten things, as well as in branches where you remember them. But you don't exist in branches where you have died, only in branches where you are still alive. They aren't really the same. There are arguments against QTI but this one does not work so well. Hal F.
