spond to voting against the pairwise winner
> since 40-30 and 40-0 have the same meaning.
That is ridiculous. What can "correspond" mean when adding votes against
the pairwise winner can make him the pairwise loser?
I guess what you mean to point out is that WV actually does ignore a
t ignoring majorities will tend to create legitimacy and strategy problems as
well.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
to be able to ignore the
smallest number of preferences that were actually specified, rather than
imagined. The main difference between Schulze and RP is a preference
to ignore small defeats over trying to make a ranking by locking larger
defeats.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Robert,
See if you can open this page:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100506/ap_on_re_eu/eu_britain_election_q_a
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ck C, and
everything else picks B:
AAAAAAABBCCC
BBBAA...
That's it for now.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
fect)
Scen 6:
ca=schm=schwv=mmpo irv cdla pos spst dac=dsc map=buck vfa appr fpp
The Condorcet compliance rankings are actually pretty similar to these.
The main exception that stands out to me is that in a couple of
scenarios, Bucklin and MAP are very good at not electing candidates
with a majori
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Lun 3.5.10, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> De: fsimm...@pcc.edu
> Objet: [EM] WMA (It's not monotonic or participation compliant, after all)
> À: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
> Date: Lundi 3 mai 2010, 18h06
> Kevin and Chris,
>
> You’re both right, my “proof”
Hi Forest,
--- En date de : Dim 2.5.10, fsimm...@pcc.edu a écrit :
> As for Monotonicity, let’s prove it in a more general
> setting to get more for our money:
>
> The three slot version of WMA can be generalized to other
> Cardinal Ratings ballots as follows:
>
> Let f be a continuous non-decr
te
from X=Y to Y. It's possible that the loss of support for X causes
other Y-top ballots to stop having their threshold lowered, allowing
Y to win when previously someone else won.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
gt; understand how that trick is pulled off.
Well, it's certainly true that there is some concealing of information.
The debatable point is whether this can be worthwhile anyway.
> > I don't really understand how the runoff finalists are
> selected. Are
> > you going to let a faction tie two clones in first
> place and have them
> > both go to the runoff?
>
> Well, show me a scenario and I'll see. Here is how I'd
> choose runoff candidates. The condition is that no candidate
> gains a majority. Clones, generally, would be roughly tied,
> because it's likely that they'd have additional votes from
> the supporters of each other.
>
> I'd look at, however, at the Bucklin winner, i.e., the
> most-approved candidate. I'd look at the ballots to see if
> there is a Condorcet winner. And I'd look at them to see if
> there is a Range winner, i.e,. the ballots counted as Range
> ballots. That gives me up to three candidates. Often,
> though, some of these kinds of winners will be the same
> person. So we might have one or two candidates. If we have
> three or two, those go to the runoff. If there is only one,
> good chance this is the best winner, but to be sure, because
> we don't have a majority, we should pick another.
>
> How? The scenario proposed, that has two clones tied for
> first place, would be political suicide for that faction,
> generally, because much of an election is campaigning and
> name recognition, dividing that between two candidates is
> likely to damage both of them, that they got to first place
> is pretty significant; i.e., it probably means that one of
> them would have done even better if the faction had been
> united.
I don't think so: If getting your supporters to rank two candidates
equally high is a viable strategy to winning without having a (meaningful)
runoff, I think parties will regularly run dummy candidates alongside the
serious candidate even though that means the second round of voting will
be basically pointless.
I don't think even independent-minded voters would fix this. If parties
are setting it up so that you have a single-ballot plan for autowinning,
independent-minded voters will see it as just as valuable as anyone
else, unless they actually desire to see a runoff (which would be kind
of hard to explain in terms of utility).
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
l discover if a majority of
> voters are ready to settle on a candidate. If they aren't,
> it will give them very good information to use in
> determining how to vote in a runoff.
But just like with TTR, the fact that there is a second round provides
incentive to *not* find a majority
ral" receive a
benefit from this criterion (all things being equal, of course).
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
But as I said originally, if it's not possible to bring in a second
axis, I'm still enthusiastic about methods that can pick the median
voter's candidate when there are a few strong candidates on a single
axis.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
m (such as votes against).
>
> If the voters do not SEE clones, there is little to do for
> them.
>
> If they DO see, they should be thankful for, and use, a
> method such as Condorcet that lets them rank such together.
Many methods will let you do that. But it's not clear that you
should always use this ability. Sometimes it can worsen the outcome.
> "for all of them"? Two is easy to have and to vote
> for; more would seem worth less effort due to less
> likelihood.
I should have said "both of them."
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
s with
one or two strong candidates and a half-dozen losers that never
coalesced into anything, so that we mostly will not be able to tell
the difference in effect from just using FPP.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
;limitation."
It's the same when people say, why worry about scenarios with three
significant candidates? The real world doesn't have them.
But the election method, and other facets of the political framework,
affect who can be nominated, and where, in what quantities etc.
Ke
perly attend to "symmetric" with a
> voted cycle?
I responded to that above. It can, yes.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
d.
It's quite possible that sacrificing LNHarm can produce a solution. I
haven't been focusing on that possibility since keeping LNHarm while
sacrificing LNHelp seems like the best way to approximate "votes against"
without having one on the ballot explicitly.
So that's roughly what I've been thinking about.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
so actually *I* won."
That's the team explanation, I can follow that. If you don't follow that
explanation then what the heck? Who is this A guy that thinks he won?
As far as B and C voters actually agreeing with Team A's internal
ranking: Maybe but in a political election there's plenty of room for
doubt. What are the odds that the Republicans' favorite Republican is
also the Democrats' favorite Republican? From an issue space perspective
that's not very likely.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
offensive strategy unlikely to be reliable, and in margins it can protect
a majority you are part of.
> I'm not sure if semi-controlled truncation where
> some voters are expected to truncate (e.g. the ones that
> expect to be the victims of a burial attack, or those who
> think they are leading) while some others are expected to
> vote sincerely is much nicer. And as already noted, there
> may be disagreements and misunderstanding on who is supposed
> and/or allowed to truncate. This approach might lead to a
> big mess.
If you're talking about scenarios where one fragment of a faction is
tasked with doing one particular thing in order to steal an election, yes,
I'm pretty sure that's a bad thing, but no, I don't think it is a very
likely concern. And the only the fact that you're specifically talking
about truncation would make this concern favor margins over WV. I don't
remember any reason to think that margins is harder to compromise than
WV.
> > I should have answered above what this means. I assume
> at this point
> > that you have an idealized view of what would happen
> when nobody ever
> > truncated.
>
> I believe yes :-). I try to see Condorcet methods as a
> group that in a suitable environment (very competitive but
> not pathologically/irrationally competitive and not beyond
> repair) would allow sincere voting as the main rule for all
> rational voters.
Ok. We will have to disagree on that.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Abd,
--- En date de : Lun 12.4.10, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a
écrit :
> De: Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How? Abd
> À: "Kevin Venzke" , election-meth...@electorama.com
> Date: Lundi 12 avril 2010, 10h30
> At 12:56 PM 4/11/2010, Kevin Venzke
> wro
Hi Juho,
Ok, I'm writing this as quickly as possible due to a lack of time.
--- En date de : Dim 11.4.10, Juho a écrit :
> De: Juho
> Objet: Re: [EM] Condorcet How?
> À: "Election Methods"
> Date: Dimanche 11 avril 2010, 19h57
> On Apr 11, 2010, at 7:25 PM, Kev
be the same, the B
> bullet voters would be the same, but the other B and C
> voters would equal rank B and C. Because of the B bullet
> voters, B would win by a small majority.
>
> So my result for A could be an artifact of the voting
> system not allowing equal ranking. I used Range 2, which
> doesn't give a lot of room for "creative interpretation."
> That was much easier with Range 10, as I showed. With Range
> 2, there wasn't any other reasonable way to interpret the
> votes.
It's possible that with equal ranking it would be different, but if we
are not going to ask a method to behave unless voters use equal ranking,
I guess we could just use Approval.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
e disaster
part.
> The main rule for
> me is to optimize the method assuming sincere (and not
> misinformed) votes since there is plenty to do already in
> that case, and in most cases such sincere votes may exist
> (there could however be also some strange vote sets that
> might occur more probably due to strategic voting than dues
> to sincere opinions).
So, why do you not produce scenarios showing that WV is not optimized
for sincere voters? I guess you think margins' incentives will stop people
from truncating without making them do anything *else* insincerely?
> The WV history looks to me a bit like an overreaction to
> some threat scenarios. WV is a good defence against some
> well identified threats but I'm not convinced that those
> threat scenarios would be so common and dangerous that so
> strong defence mechanisms would be needed. The negative
> impact of that preference measurement style may well be
> bigger than the achieved benefits.
I want to point out that I personally never even brought up offensive
strategy.
The way I view margins is that it's sort of elegant, but an unrealistic
oversimplification. The reasonableness of the split vote is apparently
irrelevant because the intention is to make people not truncate, no
matter what may result from that.
> > The problem of mutiny with clones isn't solved by
> threatening a car crash
> > if they don't play nice. It's solved by one of the
> clones dropping out
> > of the race. That's not just design advice: Political
> players will do
> > that on their own. That's why I am mostly concerned
> with candidates who
> > are not clones (in sincere terms).
>
> There may be also e.g. "left wing clones", i.e. candidates
> that are nominated by different parties but that are clones
> in the sense that they are typically ranked next to each
> others. The borderline between clones and candidates that
> are close to each others is not clear.
Voters (probably with the aid of the media) will have to figure out which
one to drop then, or take the gamble of keeping both.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
--- En date de : Sam 10.4.10, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> I can't study the underlying utilities because I don't have
> them. If I
> did I could make them say anything I wanted. I would have
> to come up
> with a general rule anyway, or else give up and say all
> methods
might make sense to appoint our favorite the
> dictator, as well. Why bother with these stinkin'
> elections?
Juho said that. I think he's probably right, but in practice I don't think
our information is precise enough to find these situations.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
A). The support of C could grow within
> the "BC wing" to 49:A, 6:B, 45:C>B and B would still win
> with WV if B supporters truncate.
To some extent I have responded to this above.
Does margins punish B voters for truncating C?
a. doesn't that assume they like C?
b. maybe, but it is also punishing C for being nominated. That's what
WV doesn't do.
If support for C grows then these voters will most likely stop voting
for B as much. If those 6 B voters actually like C better than A, they
will be foolish to not vote for C when C is so much stronger.
The problem of mutiny with clones isn't solved by threatening a car crash
if they don't play nice. It's solved by one of the clones dropping out
of the race. That's not just design advice: Political players will do
that on their own. That's why I am mostly concerned with candidates who
are not clones (in sincere terms).
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
to overcome them (they may e.g.
> quite efficiently cut out any strategy considerations). I
> also understand that in some environments all "agreements
> between parties" may be considered to represent too much
> some "spirit of old times".
>
> In summary, maybe the "third" party explanation is more
> what you are after than the "not heard of C" explanation. In
> the example "B" and "A" voters were maybe from some old
> established parties and they did not want to recognize the
> emergence of a "third" new strong candidate.
Yes, that's right.
> I believe such
> problems may well be temporary. If one adopts a new method
> that allows also "third" candidates to run in a meaningful
> way and with real chances to win if they have strong enough
> support, then I'd guess the attitude and problems of
> ignoring them and not ranking them could fade out very soon.
> The two main contenders and voters that support them can not
> pretend any more that other candidates do not exist (one can
> e.g. not play down a candidate with 27% of the first
> preference votes).
That would be nice, but even if true, it is just a mitigation of the
problem, not a reason to refrain from eliminating the problem.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
an
> cause.
I don't know what this means. In practice I don't believe that parties
will nominate clones, because it's inherently hazardous, even when the
method is clone-proof. That means it's better to worry about three-
candidate scenarios without clones.
Even if parties could harmlessly nominate clones, I don't think this
would be all that advantageous. It's not the kind of "additional choice"
I care about offering to voters. So I don't mind if a method does nothing
to facilitate it.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
#x27;s suggestion of pre-
election agreements in DYN) because I'm not interested in the case that
a single party (for all practical purposes) nominates two candidates.
I don't think that will normally happen or be desirable under any
method. What I'm concerned with is the viability of a "third" option and
voting for the third option.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
't believe that the margins
ranking of defeat strength (resulting from its treatment of unranked
candidates) is in agreement with what voters would expect and want.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I think,
which simulates something like this...
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
r perception of
> realities.
Well, this is just a change of terminology. You can say that Range
relatively has strategic incentive to exaggerate, or you can say
that in Range the "sincere vote" is relatively dependent on voters'
perceptions of which candidates are viab
ut you
don't seem to care how Range uses this information. That's what I'm
talking about.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
same thing?
--- En date de : Ven 8.1.10, Dave Ketchum a écrit :
> Range/score also permits voting for multiple
> candidates. Its ratings permit varying strength of
> approval among rated candidates - both more power and more
> complexity than Condorcet.
Kevin Venzke
El
ed on.
You can make it work if you want to I guess.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
be made? Majority rule?
It's not hard to imagine a referendum with that kind of effect. I
don't see how you can get away from majority rule; even if we elect
a body using PR-STV to vote on the party system, that's still majority
rule (or a super-majority rule with a
Hi,
I reread this part:
--- En date de : Dim 30.8.09, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> > Ouch. That passage is obviously unclear. I meant
> > "strategy" in the sense of "declared
> > strategy". I was not considering any strategy at all
> > from the actual
y their authors, are utterly
> false. Range voting is
> beatable, and has been beaten, with honest voters -- and I
> was the one
> who did that!
Sorry. I should have said "virtually unbeatable," considering that you
don't consider this new method usable.
Kevin
your
> example is no longer covered by the SFC, which states:
> "If a Condorcet candidate exists, and if a majority
> prefers this
> candidate to another candidate, then the other candidate
> should not win
> if that majority votes sincerely and no other voter
> falsi
ersal, A might be the "sincere CW" but B definitely
is not.
It doesn't satisfy the votes-only interpretation of SDSC, because it
can elect B with these rankings:
49 b
24 a
27 c>a
This is related to favorite betrayal.
Again, it could be that it technically satisfies SDSC but I'd have to
reread it.
The "defensive participation" criterion I would like clarification on.
I don't see how it doesn't imply Participation. It sounds like you are
saying that if X wins, I can cast any vote I want, and nobody I rate
below X will become the winner.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
d your method, admitting strategic votes, he would make
strategy assumptions that would make it look terrible.
Your wiki page seems to be lacking some proofs.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi,
I had written this privately.
Kevin
--- En date de : Ven 14.8.09, Kevin Venzke a écrit :
> De: Kevin Venzke
> Objet: Re: "Votes For" versus "Winning Votes"
> À: "Chris Benham"
> Date: Vendredi 14 Août 2009, 8h26
> Hi Chris,
>
> With WV
allots on which E is ranked
> above
> at least one other candidate'?
>
> Or does it mean something that can be
> read purely from the pairwise matrix?
It's the latter, read from the matrix. "Absolute number" is in contrast to
using margin or ratio.
Kevin Venz
d two-party system too static.
>
> Could you point me to studies about this?
Does it have to be a single-winner method?
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
onfrontative
> candidate?
I have never seen persuasive arguments about the incentives for
candidates to be "cooperative" or "confrontational" under various
untried methods.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
is correct,
then points 1-3 are not even close to all-encompassing for Condorcet
methods. You never explicitly argued that they were meant to be. Although,
you did make comments like:
"My old (1999-2000) Bayesian Regret simulations, when considering
strategic voters,
made as their first move, the decision to rank the two frontrunners
top and bottom.
As we've seen, that decision was wholy justifiable..."
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
that only A or B can win, go out the window as soon as neither A nor B
has an outright majority. This happens already in Plurality elections.
I am pretty sure that third party supporters will analyze this situation
and find that the odds of C>A>B votes creating a harmful cycle are small
compare
frontrunners, then I'm not all that
interested in reform.
> 5. In a monotone Condorcet method (such as Schulze, Tideman
> ranked
> pairs, etc) you cannot go wrong by ranking A top and B
> bottom (both of
> which, in general, will be dishonest, but this is always
> strategical
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Mar 9.6.09, Chris Benham a écrit :
> Kevin,
>
> "I have found that Schulze(wv) had little
> favorite betrayal incentive. In simulations I mentioned in
> June 05, out of 50,000 trials, Schulze(wv) showed incentive
> 7 times, compared to 251 for Schulze(margins), 363 f
very
informative either though. For one thing, it would only tell you about the
zero-info case. And it wouldn't consider utility, which should be important:
Whether or not you should compress at the top probably depends on how much you
like those candidates compared to
y
> approves {B C} provides no information as to the voter's
> desires being B>C, B=C, or B them over A.
That isn't what the argument is about. Nobody disagrees with this part.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
hat's not very formal but it's how I would explain it.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
hat
to the extent that they don't vote tactically, it's an improvement. And that if
everyone does vote tactically, then it's reduced to Approval, but Approval
isn't that bad.
Have fun.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Ven 23.1.09, Chris Benham a écrit :
> "I can't see what's so highly absurd about
> failing mono-append. It's
> basically a limited case of mono-raise, and one that
> doesn't seem
> especially more important. Is it absurd to fail
> mono-raise?"
>
> The absurdity of fail
ulze(Winning Votes), and I think also in any
> method
> >that meets "beatpath GMC" and mono-raise, the
> 26C truncators can
> >virtually guarantee that C be elected by using the
> "random-fill" strategy.
> >That is silly and unfair.
>
> "They have to vote for A,.."
>
> With no change to the other ballots, only 4 of the 26C
> ballots have to change
> to C>A for Schulze(wv) to elect C (even if the other
> 22C change to C>B).
>
> "They have to vote for A, and the B voters have to
> give those C
> preferences, which they shouldn't (if they have the
> same quality of
> information as the C voters)."
>
> The only "quality of information" these C voters
> need is that the method has
> a 0-info random-fill incentive.
I wonder if there is a simple way to see that it really has this
incentive.
I didn't realize your complaint about unfairness pertained to the
zero-info situation. Still, perhaps the unfairness is to the voters
who have actual preferences and can't sincerely truncate or random-fill.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
torama.com/2008-December/023590.html
>
> (not that that is a very relevant strategy problem for the
> methods like WV that have the
> much easier and safer random-fill strategy for the
> C>>(B<=>C) voters.)
1. I'm not concerned about push-over. In this scenario, to attempt
a pushover strategy again requires C voters to expect that they are
getting significant support from B voters. Without that support, C
is the *weakest* candidate, and even a few insincere A>B votes are
likely to elect A.
2. I am not sure why you suspect that under margins it can't happen
that by adding to A's margin over B, you can cause this margin to become
larger than B's margin over C, when this change has no effect on the
latter margin. You lessen the margin of C over A, but there's no
guarantee that it will become weaker than B>C.
3. Push-over works under Schwartz//Approval when B would be the CW, but
when the B>A win is reversed (but not the C>A win), C has the most
approval.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
TT."
>
> Why?
Because in the three-candidate case this is likely to be a failure
of MD or SFC, or close to it.
> 25: A>B
> 26: B>C
> 23: C>A
> 26: C
>
> In this "situation 2" election from my
> demonstration, can you seriously contend (with a straight
> face)
> that electing C is "a problem"?
It's not ideal. You have to use the B>C votes contrary to the wishes of
those voters, and for little purpose that isn't self-defeating
considering that voters will just truncate, accomplishing the same result
as if you had just guaranteed in the first place that the C preference
wouldn't unnecessarily hurt B.
I can see justifying the election of C using burial-related arguments,
or FBC. But that doesn't mean it's not a problem.
> Refresh my
> memory: who first suggested "Max. Approval
> Opposition"
> as a way of measuring a candidate's strength?
Probably me, in 2003.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
at I remember, there were monotonicity problems.
I guess there are probably clone problems also.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
t a criterion.
If I thought it was a novel discovery that carelessly electing from
the set of candidates permissible by Mutual Majority, could violate
mono-add-plump, then I would have used better wording.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
is:
49 A>B
3 B
48 C
This hypothetical criterion would require that B be elected, when many
of us would rather say that A should win this election, because A can
defeat the other candidates pairwise. Also, if B wins, then the A voters
will feel that it wasn't safe to vote for B.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
, then Y must
not win."
Although, the effect of that criterion is that {A,B} are the possible
winners in both scenarios.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Sam 10.1.09, Chris Benham a écrit :
> De: Chris Benham
> Objet: [EM] "Beatpath GMC" compliance a mistaken standard?
> À: "EM" , "Kevin Venzke"
>
> Cc: "Markus Schulze"
> Date: Samedi 10 Janvier 2009, 0
't you propose instead "CDTT-C3RW"? The only reason you gave
for adding a beatpath requirement is that you're "still interested" in
Condorcet methods.
> So given a method that meets what I've been recently
> calling "Strong Minimal Defense"
> (and
Hi Chris,
--- En date de : Jeu 25.12.08, Chris Benham a écrit :
> Did, as far as you know, Woodall ever actually propose
> the "CDTT criterion" as something that is
> desirable for
> methods to meet (instead of just defining the CDTT set)?
One thing is that Woodall thought the CDTT was compatib
Hello,
--- En date de : Lun 22.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax a
écrit :
> At 12:56 AM 12/21/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
> > --- En date de : Ven 19.12.08, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
> a écrit :
>
> [starts with Venzke, then my response, then his]
> > > > Mean utility is sup
at prefers
> all the candidates that
> > you ranked, in some order, to all the others.) But
> this doesn't help
> > the added candidate win if a different candidate
> supported by this
> > coalition was already winning.
>
> MMPO is easy to explain, but the *implications* aren't
> easy without quite a bit of study. DSC being harder to
> explain makes the implications even more obscure. Thanks for
> explaining, I appreciate the effort; but I'm
> prioritizing my time. I'll need to drop this particular
> discussion. If, however, a serious proposal is made for
> implementing one of these methods, I'll return.
Again, the point was not to encourage you to advocate DSC.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ue to
> > principle. It is harmful under Plurality and here is a
> situation where
> > it would be harmful under Approval.
>
> What does that mean?
>
> Here is what I get from it. The Nader voter cast a
> supposedly "suboptimal vote" under Plurality. For
> principle, i.e., the importance of voting for the best
> candidate, in one's opinion.
>
> Is that the meaning?
Yes.
> But who are we to say that this vote
> was suboptimal? Remember, the campaign rhetoric, by Nader,
> was that it didn't matter who won, Bush or Gore, they
> were both totally in the pocket of the large corporations.
> So why can't we just assume that the voter made an
> *optimal* decision? From the voter's perspective.
There are two possibilities. If the voter really didn't have a preference
between the two frontrunners, then it doesn't matter. But if they did,
then by not voting for one of them, they vote "suboptimally" because
they fail to vote in a way that maximizes their expectation. And it is
suboptimal overall, because the wrong frontrunner will be elected.
> Or does this mean the voter who supports Nader, but who
> *does* have a reasonably strong preference between Gore and
> Nader, and decides to vote that?
I don't understand what you're saying here. If the frontrunners are
Gore and Bush, then I'm calling "suboptimal" all votes that don't favor
one over the other, when the voter actually had a preference.
> Note that these situations apply to Approval. Both
> scenarios will happen with Approval just as with Plurality.
> In the first situation, i.e., Nader is believed, there is no
> incentive to add a vote for Gore or Bush.
But under Plurality it is hardly ever a concern, because the polls are
sufficiently stable that voters who wish to cast a meaningful vote have
no difficulty in doing so.
If Approval polls prove relatively unable to whittle the field down to
two frontrunners, I would expect more votes on principle and (with it)
more waste of votes.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>> multiple favorites, but this was simply to make the coding
>> more manageable). I don't know what you mean by voters
>> not giving up so easily as my simulated ones. How easy is
>> easy? I could conceivably program some voters to insist on
>> being sincere. (In whatever sense that it is not sincere to
>> vote also for C.) But it seems to me that this type of voter
>> is a bad thing for Approval, just as it is under Plurality.
>
> What type of voter is bad for Approval? Easy compromiser or
> tough bullet voter?
The type of voter who is willing to cast a suboptimal vote due to
principle. It is harmful under Plurality and here is a situation where
it would be harmful under Approval.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
anything
differently because of it. Thus, *all things being equal* (which must
be kept in mind if it's IRV that is on your mind), I would expect that
failing LNHarm will provoke more insincerity (and thus destroy more
information) than failing monotonicity.
IRV has other issues that can lead to a different conclusion, but that
isn't what I was discussing.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
es, pure favorites.
> Plurality has a fairly good ability to predict what a
> preferential voting system -- or Approval system -- will
> come up with, and it only breaks down under certain
> conditions. If the D voters have a significant preference
> for D over C, they will hold out longer, and some of them
> will never compromise. Remember, not all voters will follow
> frontrunner strategy. They don't with Plurality, why
> should they start with Approval?
Well, I'm not using "frontrunner strategy" but "better than expectation"
strategy, since that can be applied more universally.
If D voters are more resilient then it's possible that B will sink
instead. It's not as likely to be C, though, since C has an avenue of
bouncing back that B and D lack.
In this simulation, I don't simulate voters who don't care if their
vote isn't expected to be effective.
> To summarize this, the scenario makes sense only if B, C,
> and D are in a near-tie. If both B voters and D voters
> prefer C over the other of B and D, then C is, indeed, their
> compromise candidate! It's perfectly rational that the B
> and D voters, iterating over polls, increase their support
> for C, but it will never go all the way.
Well it wouldn't be both the B and D factions. You would only add votes
for C if you believe your expectation is dropping. That happens when
your preferred candidate (D) looks to be slipping. The B voters have no
need to compromise that far.
In this situation, D voters who decline to vote in the main contest
are basically "voting for Nader."
> The behavior described seems reasonable, proper, and is
> effective for finding a compromise winner. Is there some
> problem with it?
No, I don't think so. It's pretty good behavior actually. At least on its
face, it would seem that Approval would ruthlessly favor the median
voter's candidate in this kind of scenario.
The big concern is what happens when poll stability can't be achieved.
> Bucklin allows them to maintain their sincere preference,
> but, effectively, vote this way. Some might add C in the
> second rank, some in the third, depending on their
> preference strength. But some will always bullet vote,
> perhaps even most. Real voters don't give up so easily
> as your simulated ones!
I did simulate MCA, and yes, the D voters continued to vote for D as
their favorite (they were not allowed to list multiple favorites, but
this was simply to make the coding more manageable).
I don't know what you mean by voters not giving up so easily as my
simulated ones. How easy is easy?
I could conceivably program some voters to insist on being sincere.
(In whatever sense that it is not sincere to vote also for C.) But
it seems to me that this type of voter is a bad thing for Approval,
just as it is under Plurality.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ference strength. If we look at a voter equidistant
>between B and C, the voter may actually have minimal preference between B
>and C and even have difficulty deciding which to vote for as a first
>preference. For some region between B and C voting for both in Approval
>will be common.
My simulations involve polls. When the polls find that the winner will
either be B or C, then it's strategically unwise to not approve one of
them.
At first, the polls report that C will win a lot but (due to bullet
voters for B and D) there is some chance that B or D will win. Eventually
the polls (which are subject to some randomness) will produce a prediction
that D's odds (or B's) are abnormally poor. This causes D voters to stop
voting only for D, and also vote for C. This almost immediately makes D an
unviable candidate, and the bullet voters for D disappear.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
if you could get it.
In my simulations I treat poll questions as equivalent to the actual
question on the ballot. So Range voters would be asked who they would
rate where. Then the frontrunners would be those with the highest
reported scores.
> In order to do it, we need a method of *meas
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Date: Jeudi 4 Décembre 2008, 13h23
> At 09:07 PM 12/2/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>
> > > This is the "relatively objective method of
> > > assessing" election outcome. When it's
> easy to
> > > determi
sion.
>
> Perhaps. But a discussion will also be read by many others.
> It's tricky to use words with a specialized meaning when
> a larger audience will read the text with generalized
> meanings. Hence "accurate," which itself needs
> definition, is far less a loaded term than
> "sincere." Accurate raises the immediate question
> "accurate to what?" And that's what a reader
> would need to know.
I want to note that I'm only interested in the terms used, in order
to understand the underlying issues. I'm not interested in discussing
what terms *ought* to be used.
> The point is that the additional preference information
> available in Range does not harm the outcome over not
> allowing that information.
However, this argument is only useful when you're talking to an Approval
advocate.
> Okay, Approval may encourage third parties. This is a real
> objection which has been used, in the past, against both
> Bucklin and IRV. It's false with IRV, we are pretty sure
> about that. Bucklin might be the same, actually. (All this
> is irrelevant with nonpartisan elections, by the way.)
> Approval, I'd guess the same. Not much of a real help,
> because it takes away the stinger that third parties can
> threaten major parties with. Listen to us, or we will run a
> spoiler. Range, though, does something else, a little better
> than Approval. It allows a measurement, not perfect, but
> better than what we have, of real support for a third party,
> because the expression of this is safe. It would allow major
> parties to detect a third party sneaking up on them, and to
> become more responsive to the positions of this party before
> it whacks them upside the head in a surprise election. They
> can tell by the votes how many of *their* voters are
> impressed by the third party and might switch. It may not
> eliminate the party system, but it will surely make it more
> responsive.
My feeling lately is that it might be better to arrange the incentives
of a method so that a third candidate is likely to be able to gather
enough support, as opposed to simply getting rid of all barriers to
entry, which could tend to leave the two frontrunners unharmed.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
the effect of their vote. However, when
> it does this, it would not then flip to a much worse
> candidate, unless, again, the conditions were truly bizarre.
> It would simply choose, in almost every simulation (quite
> likely all or nearly all), the next best winner, and the
> best would be in second place.
Actually a lot of methods fail in this way: The best candidate actually
places second.
> In real life, though, the majority will surprise us. The
> runoff will have different turnout than the original
> election, and some voters will change their votes, and both
> of these effects will favor the *fully sincere, absolute*
> Range winner over the majority preference, because, in this
> situation the majority preference must be weak. So only if
> the normalization or strategic voting have sufficiently
> distorted the Range results, I'd predict, would the
> apparent Range winner fail to win the runoff. You hold the
> runoff, indeed, because of this possibility, the possibility
> of distortion.
>
> Are you starting to see this, Kevin? I'm not writing
> just for you, as I assume you know, and much of this,
> I'd think, you already understand. Or did you? Or do
> you?
Which part are you asking about, the runoff part? I'm well aware of
the fact that you prefer a runoff, and I don't disagree with the idea
that the result of the runoff could be different.
Actually the fact that you are not writing just for me, makes it hard for
me to find the answers to my questions, or even determine whether you
are specifically trying to answer them, at any point in time.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ed by Range
strategy, I wonder why you would keep it to just this.
> Now, to prevent the advantage that knowledgeable voters
> would have from being able to vote accurately, should we
> damage the outcome averaged over all voters?
How is it even clear that it would be damaged? You've p
The answer probably depends on which critics you're talking about.
> Because some voters may "get what they want" by
> voting with full strength -- I thought that seeking to get
> what they want is what voters are supposed to do! --
Yes, if they're being sincere/strategic they are supposed to do that.
> we
> should require all voters to accept results that are,
> overall, inferior to Range Voting?
Well, you argued earlier that voters will only vote sincerely, and don't
know how to vote accurately. You stated that the various ratings don't
have inherent meaning. That's why accuracy is a red herring, surely.
This makes it confusing that you want voters to be allowed to do something
that they 1) cannot do and 2) ought not to do if I take literally your
last comment that voters are supposed to be trying to vote effectively.
> (1) Start counting all the votes, and the candidate with
> the most votes wins. I have yet to see anyone knowledgeable
> about voting systems who thinks that this would be a step
> backwards!
While I don't think it is a step backwards, I can imagine some arguments
against it. I think of the reasons why FPP isn't as bad as it ought to
be in theory, and consider which of those reasons might not apply under
Approval.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
o because satisfying the criterion in one
case isn't enough to satisfy it overall, so why state it. I think the
intention must be to just say that three levels are not required, in
cases where there are not three candidates.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
win when I don't know why he won in the first place. It seems to me I'd
rather state why A's original win should be guaranteed. (I think this
direction may lead to SFC or votes-only SFC.)
All things being equal it is desirable, of course.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods m
kes it easier to assume
that preferences map intuitively to votes as some kind of general
principle. If we debate about Approval we will probably argue about what
the sincere vote is, not whether Approval supports the concept at all.
We would find a similar problem if we granted the idea of sincere
cyclical preferences, and then wanted to analyze rank ballot methods
and what "sincerity" must mean there.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
oncept of "approval,"
but you can also deny that you have an internal transitive ranking
of the candidates. Maybe it's harder to believe, but it can't be
disproven. (Though, I don't really think it is harder to believe,
since "approval" has a plain English meaning.
irrespective of context is "a
total misconception of what we are doing when we vote," then what useful
theory is Range based on? What makes it "objective" and "ideal" if not
what I stated above?
I also wonder, what, theoretically, does it look like when Range fails
he decisions related to voting under that method?
If a decision makes sense in a given context, then that is a sincere
decision. Is that not your stance?
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
the median voter can get what he actually
wants.
For the latter, I don't think it's clear that if Condorcet can't succeed,
nothing can.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Hi Jonathan,
--- En date de : Mar 25.11.08, Jonathan Lundell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> It's not an unreasonable
> conjecture that Bayrou would have gotten a larger percentage
> of first choices (some from Sarkozy and Royal) under IRV.
Could you explain this viewpo
d (esp.
one that isn't defined for more than three candidates, or is too
manipulable if nominations can be made directly).
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
or else they are centrists but don't
have the resources necessary to become visible, viable candidates (since
how are you going to get donations etc. if we can already say that you
won't win).
There may be something about San Francisco elections that I'm not aware
of.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
ng to come down to competing blocs of core support that probably
dislike each other. Mostly, and related, it's that if we agree that we
can't trust voters to give us meaningful lower preferences, then I lose
most of my enthuasism for voting methods. If we can only trust first
preferences, an
ould do that to state >elections.
Not necessarily, since there would be some threat of intervention by the
federal government, if democracy were to fail too obviously in a state.
Sometimes people do claim irregularities with a vote within a certain
state.
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
cond point, or at least that it has been
a good thing that the elections have not been conducted by a single
authority.
It's possible to imagine a different American history, if the federal
government had been in a position to cancel or postpone or manipulate the
presidential election.
Kevin V
I misstated something:
--- En date de : Dim 26.10.08, Kevin Venzke <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> > Now change the 4 A>>C ballots to C>>A
>
> To my mind you aren't allowed to move C over both A and
> the cutoff at
> the same time, unless the method for s
akest and so also
> elects C.)
>
> Now change the 4 A>>C ballots to C>>A
To my mind you aren't allowed to move C over both A and the cutoff at
the same time, unless the method for some reason doesn't allow it any
other way (such as if this is the bottom of the ballot and you can't
approve all candidates).
Kevin Venzke
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
flavors:
> 1. districted single winner contests
> 2. party-based systems
> 3. mutlwinner methods
> 4. delegation
When you use the term "parliament," I guess you're only referring to
a legislature to whom the executive is responsible?
Kevin Venzke
E
mith, then you have a simple Smith-compliant
> Condorcet/approval method.
It satisfies Smith and monotonicity.
Kevin Venzke
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n Mon, Oct 20, 2008 at 7:15 AM, Kevin Venzke
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Consider these sincere preference orders:
> >
> > 40 A>B>C
> > 20 B>A>C
> > 40 C>B>A
> >
> > I can't see any reason why it couldn't be
> expec
disadvantage it has compared to
> Majority Choice Approval (MCA)
> and ER-Bucklin(Whole) and maybe Kevin Venzke's ICA
> method is that it fails
> what I've been calling "Possible Approval
> Winner" (PAW).
>
> 35: A
> 10: A=B
> 30: B>C
> 25: C
Hi Raph,
--- En date de : Dim 19.10.08, Raph Frank <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> On Sun, Oct 19, 2008 at 4:29 PM, Kevin Venzke
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Actually even if exactly one candidate had majority
> approval, that would
> > not guarantee that
Hi Dave,
--- En date de : Lun 20.10.08, Dave Ketchum <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit :
> Your suggested possibilities had best have STRONG arguments
> to overpower
> known facts:
Yes, I'm aware of this.
Kevin Venzke
__
Do You Y
l the result
> settles. That would be a
> sort of automatic conditional ballot. The idea would be
> that the system
> or computer would be so good at strategizing on your behalf
> (for all
> voters), that it wouldn't pay off to try to manually
> use strategy.
M
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